

TRENDS OF THOUGHT AND
CHRISTIAN TRUTH

JOHN A.W. HAAS

LIBRARY OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT



BR 100 .H3 1915
Haas, John A. W. 1862-1937.
Trends of thought and
Christian truth

L6161

Ha

TRENDS OF THOUGHT AND
CHRISTIAN TRUTH

TRENDS OF THOUGHT AND CHRISTIAN TRUTH

✓
JOHN A. W. HAAS

President of *Muhlenberg College*, Professor of
Religion and Philosophy.



BOSTON: RICHARD G. BADGER
TORONTO: THE COPP CLARK CO., LIMITED

Copyright, 1915, by Richard G. Badger

All rights reserved

THE GORHAM PRESS, BOSTON, U. S. A.

To

EDGAR FAHS SMITH

Beloved Provost of my Alma Mater
who combines true scientific culture with
strong Christian convictions and vital Christian service

PREFACE

Several years ago a number of lectures were delivered by me, upon request, on the relation of Christianity to modern issues. These lectures formed the starting point for this volume. Some of them were repeated before the students of Wittenberg College and the Hamma Divinity School. They are now elaborated and put into a form which shall correlate them as a text-book with the logical and philosophical studies, which are usually found in certain groups and courses in the Senior year of the college course. There is in them also much material which may serve for apologetic courses in theological seminaries.

No doubt many of the positions taken will be objected to by the philosophers, because I belong to no philosophic school, claim the independent right of Christian truth, and am frequently reactionary. The advanced theologian will find fault because not enough of the older orthodoxy has been eliminated. The strict adherent of the older position will claim that undue concessions to the modern spirit have been made. The whole aim has been to aid in a just comparison between modern attitudes and Christianity, and to find a proper logical basis for discriminating apologetics. It is my conviction that Christian apologetics must enter into the study of modern logical positions. At any rate such is the endeavor of this volume. It will have answered its purpose if it arouses discussion, particularly in the Church to which I belong and which I serve.

J. H.

March, 1915.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	9
PART ONE — LEADING TRENDS OF THOUGHT	
CHAPTER	
I THE MATHEMATICAL METHOD	29
II THE INDUCTIVE CLAIM	46
III THE COMPARATIVE IDEA	61
IV THE CONJECTURAL SCHEME	77
V THE MECHANICAL DEMAND	90
VI THE BIOLOGICAL SUPPOSITION	104
VII THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SOLUTION	126
VIII THE SOCIAL TREND	144
PART TWO — THOUGHT AND TRUTH	
I THE FINDING OF TRUTH	163
II THE ABSOLUTIST AIM	167
III THE MYSTIC ABSORPTION	184
IV THE PRAGMATIC PROGRAM	196
V THE RESULTS OF PRAGMATISM	216
VI THE VITALIST VIEW	242
VII THE REALIST REALM	299
INDEX	317

INTRODUCTION

THERE is a great common character about the thought of every age. It may, as in our time, appear in many forms and be expressed in contrary conceptions, but still it possesses unifying centres and combining ideals. Thought passes around the world and through the minds of men like a great current. It has common trends and directions even when an age is one of unrest, search and doubt, and is not controlled by a single, over-ruling idea or by one mighty passion. To suppose that thought is merely individual is to fail in understanding its force and influence among men. A great thinker may think a new thought, he may originate an idea which is actually novel, but it lives only as it appeals to other minds and becomes a part of general thinking. Mostly the thoughts and ideals of the leaders of thought are only the crystallizing centres of the subconsciously working trends and forces of thought. With such a conception of the movement of thought we are led to analyze its elements, for it is a movement of a number of trends.

The character of the trends of thought in our age concerns us, however, not purely in themselves but in relation to the truth of Christianity.

We cannot escape finding a real contact between the claim of the truth of Christianity and the thought-trends of an age. Christianity must influence thought, and thought must condition the intellectual expression of Christianity. By its very nature as a great world-religion, and in agreement with its universality and finality, Christianity in every form has a world-view. There lie back of it not merely deep religious experiences, strong

spiritual insight and a mighty treasure of individual and social feeling, but also the philosophies and ideals of the ages which it has used to express and defend its message. Because of the message of Christianity it must make a demand upon the thought of every age, to ask whether it can accept and employ, or whether it must reject the prevailing modes and forms of thinking. Its action and judgment cannot be one of mere sentiment, deep and true as sentiment may be, but it calls for a calm deliberation. Deliberation must include acquaintance with the ruling thought, comparison of this thought with Christian ideas, and then only can criticism follow. When such a fair and just procedure has been adopted there can be either adoption, or apology and polemic of Christianity against the thought of an age. As an introduction to fuller comparison and an incentive to more intensive study of modern thought and Christian ideals this short volume attempts a mere general outline of modern positions in relation to Christian truth.

The trends of thought that shall be considered are those which appear in the scientific and philosophic thinking. To these our examination shall be limited. A complete survey of the thought of the age would demand that in addition the artistic and literary ideals should be considered. Art, in its production, and the account which it renders to itself by exposition of its ideals, and criticism of its results, expresses some ruling philosophy and gives voice to certain trends of thought. Views of life and some sort of philosophy are frequently clothed in the literary forms of the novel or short story, the poem or essay. Both art and literature are closely related to religion in many aspects. To literature as well as to art there is applicable what Doctor Galloway says: "Art makes worship more suggestive and impressive, while religion imparts a purifying and uplifting motive to art. The

fact that the two should help each other in this fashion implies something common in their methods and their aims, something akin in their attitude to the world and life. Art and religion both work through the imagination, vivifying experience by lending to it a significance beyond that of the moment. Neither the one nor the other can live in the region of pure thought; the æsthetic mind has its sensuous intuitions, and the religious mind envisages the things of the spirit in an imaginative representation drawn from the world of sense.”¹ Back of both art and religion lie sympathetic insight and a feeling for unity and harmony, and both art and religion must be accepted by a peculiar spiritual mood. But while such a relation is true, yet the connections of thought with Christianity do not appear as definitely and directly in art as in science and philosophy. The definite intellectual programs of science and philosophy allow of a clearer comparison with the claims of Christianity. And if a conflict exists between thought and the truth of Christianity, it must show itself more markedly between the philosophic and scientific thinking and religion, because their methods are more diverse. Even where religion becomes scientific in theology there is a great difference between it and the purely scientific and philosophic temper. The data of science are the things of sense and the datum of philosophy is experience, while the facts of religion are not things of sense nor merely natural experience. For science and philosophy the regulative principle is the mind, for theology revelation. The method of philosophy and science demands consistency of thought; theology, however developed, requires consistency with the religious sources of authority. The content of philosophy and science is the universe in its being, development and truth, the content of theology is the communion between God and

¹ “The Philosophy of Religion,” p. 207.

man. For the sake, therefore, of both comparison and contrast it is more to the purpose to correlate the philosophic and scientific ideas of an age with Christian truth. We must, consequently, pass by the æsthetic expression of thought, delightful and stimulating as it might be to compare and contrast Christianity with the classicists, realists, impressionists and cubists in the fine arts, with the productions and speculations of Wagner in music, and with the literature of various countries both in its threatening decadence and shocking naturalism.

The trends of thought which shall occupy us are first of all the leading modes of thinking, and then, secondly, the problem of truth which is so much discussed to-day. In the modes of thought we approach the formal side of truth or the great logical ideas and ideals which cannot be overlooked in any outline of the ways of thought in relation to Christianity. The logical ideas do not become ruling and leading ideals of thought after the manner of a formal analysis of thought, which any mere discussion of logic must deal with. The ways or trends of thought combine content with form, and they must do so. The abstractness of formal logic is useful as an analytic reduction of thinking to its ineradicable ultimates, but the actual thinking in any science or art is never, even in the use of principles and abstractions, without content. And when an age accepts certain ruling trends of thought and classifies its knowledge according to them, there is still more concreteness in the living logic than in the scientific formulation of the principles which dominate its thinking. We shall, therefore, select those prominent and outstanding concepts that enter our life from the various sciences and mold our thinking into certain shapes and schemes. Such a selection will not be exhaustive, but it aims to be characteristic.

There are four centres about which the discussion of the

leading trends cluster. The problem of quantitative thinking and the exactness of mathematics with its claim as the highest and most certain form of thought are presented first, and their bearing on Christian thought is not insignificant. They do not, however, loom up so large in common consciousness and thinking as does the modern emphasis on inductive thinking which starts from detail and particulars. Out of it grow directly the questions of comparison and analogy and of real conjecture or hypothesis. These together with induction form the second centre in distinction from mathematics as the first centre.

The problem of inductive thinking as related to Christianity is the question, whether we must begin with the universal and general, or whether we can rise from the particular to the type of thinking which Christianity favors. The question of comparison is the application of the place and the value of analogy in human thinking, the right of its extension from instance to instance, and from sphere to sphere. How can such comparative reasoning be employed in religion and what does it mean for or against Christianity, is the resultant problem.

Comparison is only one of the great methods; by its side stands conjecture. Conjecture or conjectural thinking is very prevalent. It is the basis of all critical construction, and it embraces in addition the arguments from probability and those that lead to hypothesis and theory. The interrelation of positive critical construction and probability and hypothesis is constant. What does it mean over against or in favor of Christianity? How can Christianity use or how must it modify probability, hypothesis and criticism?

The third centre embraces three trends which largely influence modern thought; they are the mechanical, the biological and the psychological positions. The mechan-

ical conception, resting on a restricted formulation of cause as external and material, attempts to form a unified view of the universe in terms no higher than chemistry. What Christianity must do with this view seems very clear and evident at once to most of the writers and thinkers who take the Christian attitude. They utterly reject and deny it. But still it may be asked, whether it is not possible to modify the mechanical view, to make it supplementary to idealistic conceptions and then so to adjust it that Christianity may employ it without surrendering its position.

While the mechanical point of view has sought to subsume all phenomena under its name it has found a strong counter-claimant in the biological standpoint. The biological supposition seeks to interpret the connection and relatedness of the universe from the idea of physical life. It appears most prominently in the character of biologism, which may be defined as that point of view that seeks to reduce all terms in the universe to terms and processes of natural life. For it the thought of functioning, which is more important than the thought of being or substance, is very central. The seething, seeking, pushing and progressing life is the all-controlling factor in this trend of thought.

Out of biologism and in close affinity with it there arises the modern psychological point of view. From the examination of the phenomena of the mind, as natural occurrences physiologically controlled, many of the higher human interests have been reconsidered. Psychology has offered new solutions and novel points of view in history and economics; it has claimed to give a right idea of society and communal life and action; it has stimulated and reformed education; it seeks to attack morality, and to furnish an adequate basis for the explanation of the religious life. It is at once apparent that we must in-

quire how the psychological point of view will affect Christianity and whether Christianity can accept it as sufficient and adequate.

The fourth centre leads us to a summary examination of the great social viewpoint in our age. It is expressed in the philosophy of history, in economics, sociology, political philosophy, morality and religion. The problem it offers is, how shall Christianity deal with the claim of the primal importance of society and of society's need and value as paramount to the individual. The influence and results of social ideas reach very far and are re-making modern life. To understand them and to discriminate between what is valuable and what is defective is one of the greatest tasks put before the Christianity of our day.

After the attempt to indicate the relations of thought in these leading modern aspects there still remains the second main problem. We must seek to determine the connection of thought with truth and how this connection affects Christianity. The results which may be attained in the discussion of the mathematical method; of the inductive, comparative and conjectural arguments; of the mechanical, biological and psychological claims; and of the social trend naturally lead to the further problem of considering the whole question of truth. Thought and truth belong together. While thought may deviate, err and be incorrect, and while thinking does not cease as a fact when it fails to reach truth, nevertheless the aim of thought is to attain truth. The science of thought has always sought to give the principles and laws of correct thinking and to eliminate the fallacies. Logic has dealt with the question how we ought to think, not how we do think. The latter has generally been the problem of psychology.

Not only does thought demand truth but truth must

also use thought. No matter how we determine and interpret truth, whether as absolute reality or simply as satisfying end, whether we include or exclude feeling and will, whether we believe that it is made or that we make it, yet it always includes the question of intellect. The intellect may not be all that truth needs but it cannot be absent. In fact it remains, after all, the dominant factor, if not in the actuality, at any rate in the demonstration of truth. And as valuable and necessary as demonstration, proof and verification are to truth, so essential is intellect to truth. Even the satisfaction which it may be supposed to involve for the feeling can only be tested and approved through the intellect.

In the elaboration of the problem of truth we must enter upon the question of the finding or possession of truth. Is truth a finding or a possession, is it a search or a revelation; and how shall it be discovered or unveiled? Such questions as these enter deeply into the determination of truth and its character and the claim of truth which Christianity makes. This problem of the quest of truth leads us directly to the diverse interpretations of truth which to-day occupy the minds of thinkers.

Some there are who reassert and redefine truth as the Absolute and as Reality. To them truth is; and with high idealism they maintain the ultimate harmony and unity of truth which gives the final meaning to all things, even though it be unapproachable in its eternally existent universality. How shall Christianity deal with those to whom truth is the absolute whole or the absolute meaning of the universe? Can it agree with this logical abstraction of unity? Beside the absolutists of reflection are the absolutists of feeling. They do not find truth in the harmony of logic but they claim to touch reality in the immediacy of the intuition to which feeling leads. These are the mystics who merge thought into the Infinite by

the fusion of meditation. In meditation the power of the concentration of the intellect loses itself in mere abstract feeling. What sympathy has Christianity with mysticism either in its full or partial assertion? Is Christianity fundamentally mystical and does it find truth by such intuition of feeling as the mystic lives in? These and kindred questions arising out of the mystic situation are by no means unimportant to Christian truth.

In contrast and polemic opposition to all absolutism stands pragmatism. With strong emphasis on actuality and direct experience, with unabating assertion of the vitality and progress of truth, pragmatism defines the question of truth as that of verification, satisfaction and real utility. It is the attempt to formulate the question of truth from the Darwinian and biological point of view as purely and solely inductive. What can Christianity do with this peculiar American position, for pragmatism has been most largely developed in America? Are there in it elements that can be used in Christian thought or must it be totally rejected? Is it the best method for solving the theistic attitude of Christianity, and does it furnish the most adaptable philosophy for the understanding of Christian experience? Such and similar problems are agitating men's minds to-day and they cannot be passed by, inasmuch as for good or for evil pragmatism is a leading way of thinking of thousands to-day for whom the philosopher has defined the ruling attitude. Pragmatism is not really new in itself; it is a new way of stating an old problem, but nevertheless it is new in its claim and emphasis at the present.

Connected with the pragmatic claim although different in many features is the new philosophy of life of which Eucken and Bergson are the main exponents. This vitalistic philosophy seeks to find truth in life itself and in a new use of intuition which is not the intuition of the

mystic. Its intuition is that of life in its fulness. Life is made the final unity which is to be accepted without analysis, for intellectual analysis will destroy its richness and concreteness. The philosophy of life claims to have found the key to the problem of truth. Is the conception of life consonant with Christianity? Will the new vitalistic point of view furnish a vessel for holding elements of Christian truth which have hitherto not found an adequate philosophic carrier, or will it lead away from clear conceptions of the faith to the indefiniteness of unanalyzed life? Will it elevate or depress Christian truth? Can the views of Eucken or Bergson be adopted? Such and cognate questions at once rise in our minds and demand some adjustment.

Not totally unrelated to vitalism but more closely connected with pragmatism is the new realism which is asserting itself strongly at the present through a number of American professors of philosophy. It claims to deal directly with the facts of life and give them their real par-value. While it is still in the flux it has begun to define reality and to give an opinion on the question of truth. Therefore we cannot escape the question how Christianity shall relate itself to this new realism. This opens up the larger question whether Christianity is more in sympathy with the realistic or the idealistic philosophy. Can it express itself equally well and without detriment through either a realistic or idealistic philosophy?

In adjusting all of these questions which arise out of the discussion of the leading trends of thought to the truth of Christianity we cannot allow Christianity to be undefined. It is necessary to show that, in all its various forms Christianity must come into relation with the problem of thought and truth. Among all the varieties of the conception of Christianity there are several leading types, and it is to them that attention must be directed if the

relation of Christianity to methods of thought is to be determined. It will appear that the connection of Christianity with thought and truth, and particularly with the thought and truth of modern times, is not accidental but fundamental and far-reaching.

The type of interpreting Christianity which immediately demands and is concerned with thinking, is the dogmatic ideal. According to this ideal Christianity is in essence constituted by a number of truths. These are formulated into some kind of a Christian philosophy and form a system. The foundations and guarantees of the Christian system of thought may differ; they may rest on biblical authority or on ecclesiastical approval, but this does not affect the issue at hand. Under whatever guarantee the Christian system of truth appears, it is evident that its content will not merely make claims upon and counter-claims to systems of philosophy and hypotheses of science in such problems as God, the nature of man, evil, and many like and related questions, but that also, owing to these very contents, the methods of approach to and of the discussion of these problems as well as the whole sphere of thinking will be involved. But it is not this conception of Christianity alone which must necessarily define itself over against the trends of thought. It does so most directly, but it is not exclusively determinative of the whole discussion.

Closely related to the dogmatic ideal is the mystic conception. At first mysticism may appear to be purely anti-intellectual, for it apprehends Christianity in the immediacy of feeling; but what does feeling lead to? Does it ever remain purely undefined and undefinable, and merely subjective? In its highest ranges of elevation and in its deepest expressions of dependence, it has an object which is universal, and which is at least in part intellectually conceived and expressed. By intuition and imagination

a religious world of thought is constructed. The method is not the reflective and systematic thinking of dogmatic Christianity, but the results are truths, and the very emphasis of the immediacy of feeling in the mystic experience as a source of truth necessarily affects the problem of thinking. The advocates of mysticism of every kind cannot escape defining their attitude toward thinking.

As little as the mystic can the voluntarist, who interprets religion from the point of view of will, escape the problem of thought. Will and action in religion no less than feeling cannot remain blind. The impulses and motives of the will, the purpose of volition, and the aim of action demand thought. A scheme of thoughtful willing and acting resting on some great principle underlies either consciously or unconsciously. The principles of action imply some theory of life and some valuation of other values than their own by exclusion if not by definition. When truth is found in volition the relation to intellection is and cannot be evaded. In the motive and desire of men as they lead to will, there must be a union with thought. Professor Cohen rightly says: "Motive and thought dare not remain two unlike elements, if they are to be capable of being combined into a unity in will. Without the unity will would not be will; not an original direction of cultural consciousness."²

In our age the voluntarist ideal generally takes on a moralistic or philanthropic coloring. But in either case it must be related to thought. The emphasis on religion, and particularly Christianity, as merely ethical at once determines what we estimate in Christianity and how we think either from principles downward or from practice by generalization upward. The philanthropic conception which so frequently boasts that it has escaped the quarrel of truth and error and the uncertainty of

² "Ethik des Reinen Willens," p. 166.

theory deceives itself. It acts on a great principle which shapes its thinking. The life of love is not thoughtless, for were it such it would become empty sentimentalism. It rests on definite ideas of the reality and value of human love. All thinking even of a theoretical nature is more or less controlled by the ruling passion of life, and the ruling passion of life is a theory of life. Consequently philanthropy is a theory and ideal of life as well as a practice. It determines values and the modes of thinking constantly from its peculiar prejudice, and argues deductively from the impulse of a helpful will.

A very large emphasis is put by the adherents of a mystic or voluntaristic ideal upon experience. But not only the advocates of these ideals, but many also, who interpret Christianity either from a more intellectual standpoint or from the conception of the total individuality, set large store upon experience. Religion like philosophy is traced back for its material and its tests to experience in all its fullness and manifoldness. But the complexity of experience cannot remain unanalyzed; therefore, the empiric ideal finds some tests and norms which are intellectual. If the verities of religious experience are gathered from the types of feeling or of the will to believe, it is still true that the "twice-born" souls are brought into connection with thought and truth from their new fundamental attitude. The new life remakes all life, and men in consequence of a great experience argue from a controlling principle. They compare and correlate everything with the new ideal of their life, and from the psychology of their religious experience they form the logic of their religion. This result is the more necessary where the experience is more directly a new birth of thought, and rests upon the objective truth either of the Bible or of the Church. When religious experience is, however, not restricted, but allowed to remain total and

synthetic in a concrete interpretation of personality, and what it may experience, nevertheless experience conceived even thus has its intellectual implications; and the logic of religious experience shows us that the pure mystic or voluntaristic ideal are as inadequate in denying thought, as the dogmatic ideal is in denying the other elements of the psychic life.

The experimental type of personal religion arising from the theory of experience marks individualism in religion. Individualism in religion, like pluralism in philosophy, implies an intellectual position and a fundamental logical attitude. The very principle of the many individuals in contrast with the Absolute One demands processes of thought. Christianity shows us that where individualism makes its strongest claim it cannot remain without some intellectual basis. Some of the different small divisions of Christianity which frequently appear to be distinct because of tense feelings, nevertheless make their propaganda by the appeal to some peculiar tenet or truth which they claim to have rescued. This fact appears equally in greater movements of an individualistic character like the rationalistic theory or the ideal of the inner light. Rationalism made the claim that the individual man must establish his religion upon the plain arguments of thought and common sense, but this very claim shows that the validity of rationalism is based on the idea of a common human sense or general rationality. The individualism of rationalism never destroyed its logic. The theory of the inner light emphasizes an intuitional principle, but this principle has an intellectual trend. Therefore, it was entirely natural that when the theory of the inner light was put into practice by Fox, the founder of the Society of Friends, that its development brought about a freer, liberal, and a more orthodox form of belief. It was impossible, in the effort to get away from the letter,

to avoid returning to an intellectual attitude and to certain definite doctrine resting upon great principles.

The communal idea of Christianity, either in its historical form of the Church or in modern attempts of socialization, is more strongly intellectual than the individual attitude. The Church, when it is conceived, not as a bond of unity in action, but as an eternal organization, naturally is the source and guarantor of truth and the framer and defender of dogma. But even where the Church is not so conceived, but only as a spiritual fellowship, it could never live without some intellectual platform or some creed, whether expressed or unexpressed, whether officially adopted or loosely acquiesced in. It is equally impossible to define Christianity, as some modern thinkers would define it, as a social movement without including a large element of intellectualism. There can be no final and permanent fusion of men for real action by mere feeling or passion. Great waves of emotion may pass through a mass of men but they can only do so where the emotion has some common background of conviction. There can be no unity of common willing without the communication of intellectual elements which make permanent the ideals of the community. No community can live without loyalty of the people in it to its ideals and principles which must be expressed in terms of thought. Wherever the individual has protested against the community, and particularly against the religious community, it has been against what the individual considers to be the intellectual bondage or the error of the community. Consequently it is clear that in the communal conception of Christianity also we cannot escape the relation to a logic.

All the types of interpreting Christianity which have been discussed may be finally reduced to another fundamental distinction, namely that between the permanent

and the changing, the eternal and the temporal. Unfortunately this distinction instead of being combined into a living unity has been made a line of cleavage. On the one hand have stood those who assert that Christianity is naught else but a spiritual unchanging reality and truth. They have not allowed for its historic origin nor its development. In the conception of its doctrines, they have held only to the idea that the doctrines were revealed truth, and they have disregarded the historical character and the debated formulation of doctrine. Back of mysticism they have found the Absolute One whom the mystic has grasped. As explanatory of all voluntarism they have emphasized the eternal impulse or the everlasting purpose. Experience itself, and the life of the individual and the community, are interpreted as founded on the adherence to unchanging laws. These conservatives hold that there is no true change, nor real history, but that there is only maintenance or loss of the essential truth, which ought always and everywhere be believed by all reasonable believers. This attitude with its fixedness has only judgments of condemnation for changing forms and trends of thought. Unmindful of the fact that the conservatism of the present has clothed itself in the garments of the logic of the past, there are still those who would make their accepted theory eternal. Every temporal act and idea, they hold, must be absorbed into the revealed scheme and canonized or rejected by it. This conservatism of a Christianity of everlasting rest has no real place for progress, for even the progress of the assimilation of the eternal truth is in fact only the absorption into the unchanging reality.

On the other hand, stand the defenders of change, history and progress. For many of them there is no vestige of eternal unchangeable spiritual truth in Christianity. They find in its history no elements of vital permanence.

The definition of Christianity which they accept is that of a merely human religious historical movement to be determined by, and measured and compared with, other religions. In such a comparison all claims of universality and finality in Christianity and every trace of an eternal value must be eliminated by historical critical standards of development. According to the men of this type, the claim of real revelation, real prophecy, and of real miracles is to be interpreted as a fact of religious history alone. Consequently we would possess only humanly created values but not existent and actual eternal realities. The truth of this kind of historical emphasis lies in its realization of actual progress, but its error is the denial of the Christian conviction that there are eternal elements in the unfolding history of Christianity.

The sane attitude appears to be in the combination, and not in the separation of the two elements of eternity and temporality. Christianity to be rightly understood needs such a union as much as it is needed in a living conception of Christ. An eternal Christ without the problem of the historical Jesus, or the historical Jesus apart from the eternal Christ, are two conceptions equally defective and inadequate. Similarly an eternal Christianity without true development, or a historical Christianity without unchanging principles is a misconception. When we have combined both elements it is evident that from this point of view particularly we must from time to time inquire how the historical interpretation of eternal truth is related to the thinking of an age. In such an inquiry it is not proper either absolutely to reject or unquestionably to accept ruling trends of thought and interpretations of truth. The just procedure is to inquire, weigh, balance, compare, criticise, and then to attempt without violence to what we conceive to be the eternal elements in Christianity, to reaffirm its truths and to indicate how they agree or can

agree, and how they disagree and must disagree with modern conception of thought and truth. The Christian truth which will be compared with the trends of thought, embraces the fundamental and essential features of what constitutes the general, prevalent and common Christianity.

PART ONE

LEADING TRENDS OF THOUGHT

TRENDS OF THOUGHT AND CHRISTIAN TRUTH

CHAPTER I

THE MATHEMATICAL METHOD

FIGURES and religion, forms and faith, have apparently but little to do with each other. But the judgment of the surface, which sees no connection between the thinking of mathematics and the reasoning of religion, has never considered the deeper relations. If the manner in which we think in arithmetic and geometry, trigonometry and calculus, is the one fundamental, accurate and ideal form of thought, then as far as we reason in religion we must approach the mathematical goal. Furthermore, the constructive power and the connected contents of mathematical logic can never be passed by in any consideration of thought. They make and form the related system of all thinking in quantity. If this system is the perfect plan for the intellect, must it not determine any effort to formulate the convictions and truths of religion? Conversely, if our faith claims any intellectual element, and as far as it formulates the facts of belief, it must in its procedure either adopt or reject or modify the mathematical claim. Even if religion has independence in making its system, the parts of this system must follow a logic or create a logic. What is the relation of this method of thought to the manner in which the science of quantity argues, is therefore a question that cannot be evaded.

The conception of the cogency of mathematical proof and the finality of its axioms was the regnant one ever since the great German philosopher Kant wrote his "Critique of Pure Reason." In it he ascribed to mathematics the solution of the problem of the certainty of thought. He held that no really new and certain knowledge could be attained through an analytic judgment, in which the predicate simply gave one of the attributes of the subject. But in a synthetic judgment it was possible to add a real truth. And mathematics was the science in which prior to all actual experience it was possible "by means of a chain of reasonings always guided by intuition to establish necessary synthetic judgments."¹ By these judgments, unchangeable, fundamental necessities of thought were expressed. They were conceived to be imbedded in the very nature of reason. Their validity went as far as the universe. The necessity of the certainty in the multiplication table was firmer than the heavens. What Euclid had established in his unfoldment of geometry was the real and final formulation of the principles of space. Since space was prior to experience and determined the manner in which the mind must arrange its sensations, it followed that the form of all sensations was given a priori in ourselves, and that no external phenomena could be possible in any other way. It was necessary to hold "that the propositions of geometry are not the results of a mere creation of our poetic imagination," but "they are necessarily valid of space, and consequently of all that may be found in space, because space is nothing else than the form of all external appearances, and it is this form alone in which objects of sense can be given."² It follows from this that nothing can be given in appearance that geometry does not de-

¹ First edition of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," p. 716.

² Kant's "Prolegomena," paragraph 13, remark 1.

scribe. In other words, the mind has certain definite forms that condition all experience. Mathematics is the one certain constructive side of the mind.

In this attitude of Kant toward the foundation of mathematics he had returned to the idealism of Plato. For Plato in his later years numbers expressed most definitely and certainly the great existent ideas. He adopted much that Pythagoras and his school had developed, but he did not follow their fanciful interpretation of numbers to symbolize moral and religious ideas. Kant, however, differed from these ancients inasmuch as he founded the certainty of quantity on the human mind and not on objective eternal ideas. He was also influenced by Descartes, who in opposition to the abuse of logic found in mathematics the certainty of self-evident truth. Descartes' "Discourse on Method" seeks, like mathematics, to find first principles. But the philosopher who most definitely sought to demonstrate the fact of God and the world, of nature and truth, in a mathematical manner was Spinoza. It was his endeavor to deduce all truth from a few fundamental definitions which he developed into axioms. Upon these he founded propositions and from them he deduced corollaries. His initial definition was that of substance, but this led directly to the definition of God, and thus the main interest of Spinoza was religious.

It is equally true of Kant that his purpose was also to find a basis for religion which was sound. In his great construction of the "Critique of Pure Reason" the problems of the soul, the world, and God are those toward which the whole investigation tends. Merz rightly says, "Kant, indeed, had at heart a vindication of the fundamental verities of religion: of the belief in the existence of God, the Immortality of the soul, and the Freedom of the Will. Was the human intellect able to reach in these matters of belief something like that certainty which be-

longed, according to his view, to the sciences of applied mathematics; and, if not, on what foundation had this belief to rest? Mere experience could not give to knowledge the characteristics of universality and necessity — it could not make it generally valid or convincing. The question then presented itself, how does some of the knowledge we possess, viz., mathematical knowledge, arrive at this generality and convincing evidence? ”³

For Kant the answer which mathematics offers gave the answer for the foundation of all knowledge. Knowledge to be certain needed the mind to add the logical qualities of universality and certainty through fixed categories to the material given in experience. In mathematics there existed a science the procedure of which was to give the logical clue to physics and metaphysics. It could, prior to all experience, add to knowledge; in other words, it had real synthetic judgments. And as far as knowledge and its logic were to approach to sure foundations, it needed reasoning akin to mathematics. All logic, therefore, was to be fundamentally of a mathematical nature. It was through synthetic judgments a priori that certainty could be found. There must be, according to Kant, prior to all that we may know, certain categories of thought which lead to ideas and determine contents.

When the conception of the nature of thought was thus determined mathematically, the problem of the rational basis of religion was settled. The problem of the rational reality of religion rested upon the reality and existence of thought. If religion was to be rational, God and His existence had to be established by certain proofs. There were in vogue three venerable proofs which men had used to establish as they thought, the conception of God on a strong intellectual basis. These proofs were: the

³ “History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century,” Vol. III, p. 342.

proof from a plan and purpose in the universe, known as the teleological or physico-theological proof; the proof from the contingency of the world and its demand of a first cause, called the cosmological proof; and finally the proof from the inner necessity of thought, called the ontological proof. In this last proof Kant rightly saw the basal argument, for causality and contingency, plan and purpose, become sign-posts toward God when the necessity of thought demands Him. Kant argues that the ontological proof cannot be maintained. The thought of an absolutely perfect being may exist, but the existence of the thought does not prove the external existence of God. It is possible to say, God is almighty, or omniscient, but then we have only an analytic judgment. In such a judgment the predicate only unfolds what has already been in the subject. But we cannot argue synthetically and say that God is, or exists. This synthetic procedure which is justified in mathematics is not justified in rational theology. The idea of a hundred thalers, thinks Kant, does not imply their reality. Consequently we can neither in thought reach the conception of the existence of God, nor can we test it by outward experience. Therefore, no theology could be constructed theoretically and no proof found for religion on a basis of certainty like that which holds of mathematics.

Kant believed it to be his mission to destroy the unjust claim of reason to make room for faith. He proved that theoretically we cannot establish the idea of God, of the soul, or of human freedom. By his arguments he destroyed the claim, that there could be a demonstration which was cogent for a natural religion of God, immortality, and the soul. The arguments which would alone lead to the assumption of these religious verities, Kant found in the moral demands of man's practical reason. The necessity for adjudicating the moral inequalities in

the world, the desire for permanent happiness, and the categorical imperative of conscience called for God and eternity. The proofs, therefore, which Kant allowed were of a moral nature, and had presumptive worth. They were not scientific and could not be cogent, as they were not of a mathematical nature. They were rather answers to a demand, and judgments of quality and value. By the acceptance of this type of proof, and by the destruction of the former kind of proof, Kant, for a long time, influenced thinking. He had found a true distinction, but at the same time he destroyed all claim of religion to have a basis in the certainty of thought. He aided, therefore, an agnostic attitude in reference to the intellectual foundations of religion. And this result he reached through the fundamental assumption that thought was fundamentally mathematical.

Later in his life, Kant after all attempted to construct a reasonable religion in his book on "Religion Within the Limits of Reason." In it he returned to the attitude which prevailed prior to his system. Before Kant, Wolff, a leading German philosopher, who was influenced by Leibniz, gave voice to the conception, that certain rational elements of Christianity could be proven. Kant, in restricting religion to the limits of reason, and not following out his suggestion of basing religion on moral demands, which might have led him to recognize the religious demands, reverted himself. He sought to deplete Christianity of its supernatural elements and he argued again for the eternal truths of reason, which, of course, had to be of a mathematical nature. He was thus forced to the tacit acceptance of Lessing's conception, that the accidental facts of history cannot be eternal truths of reason. The historical elements of Christianity were consequently as valueless as the supernatural content. Thus, finally, the deeper philosophy, founded on mathematical reason-

ing, led to the same result as the common sense reasoning of the rationalists before Kant. The only Christianity which could remain was a belief in reason, the soul, God, and immortality, and the three last were only the requirements of the will.

From all this it appears clearly that, wherever the certainty of mathematics is accepted, and its sure proof is supposed to be the most certain, there only such knowledge can approach certainty, which is capable of demonstration similar to that of mathematics. Consequently, only problematic value can be assigned to religion, which cannot be submitted in its fullness to such proof unless it be emptied of all emotion, and denied all reality of truth, which is not of a mathematical nature. Whatever other kinds of truths there may be, they cannot approach in scientific value and certainty to the mathematical truths. If these, therefore, are the highest, no religion can have a real intellectual certitude. It will be even more uncertain and relative than all the relativities of science.

The disregard of this fact has constituted one of the mistakes in the apologetic literature of Christianity since Kant. It lacks the understanding of its relation to mathematical methods in human thought. Strange to relate, it did not abolish, as it ought to have done, the wrong assumption of a natural theology which could be employed as the foundation of revealed truth. It was still supposed that there existed unalterably in the consciousness of man, and in his innate reason, axiomatic truths of religion. These were given more or less content in disregard of the contradictory facts of history. Despite the experience, that rationalism used the conception of natural theology to declare revelation unnecessary, because reason could furnish the necessary basis and information for religion, and despite the effort of rationalism to limit religion to its legitimate rational elements; nevertheless, natural theology

was again used, although in a secondary place, by the advocates of a positive faith. Kant's destruction of natural theology in his great "Critique" did not affect much of later apologetic literature. Even when finally changes were made and natural theology was laid aside, many theological teachers still argued for a propædeutic of reason. It seemed impossible for Christianity to separate itself from the dangerous alliance between reasoning, which finally rested on mathematical argument, and direct biblical truth. Wherever this union persisted it injured positive Christian truth. There could be no escape from condemning much Christian truth intellectually, as long as the very nature of reasoning and speculation was conceived to be essentially mathematical.

No relief was given in the rise of positivism. It claimed to be concerned merely with direct positive facts, but it dealt with them from the point of view of mathematical accuracy. Of it Edouard LeRoy well says: "The dream of that time, despite all verbal palliations, was a universal science of mathematics: mathematics, of course, with their bare and brutal rigor softened and shaded off, where feasible; if possible, supple and sensitive; in ideal, delicate, buoyant, and judicious; but mathematics governed from end to end by an equal necessity. Conceived as the sole mistress of truth this science was expected in days to come to fulfil all the needs of man, and unreservedly to take the place of ancient spiritual discipline. Genuine philosophy had had its day: all metaphysics seemed deception and fantasy, a simple play of empty formula or puerile dream, a mythical possession of abstraction and phantom: religion itself paled before science, as poetry of the gray morning before the splendor of the rising sun."⁴ This attitude of positivism was both a result and a new influence, but it became an influence

⁴ "The New Philosophy of Henri Bergson," p. 129.

rather indirectly than directly. It helped on the mathematical ideal in science. Astronomy had always been mathematical, but mathematics now began to press most vigorously into the domain of physics. Psychology so long a free mental science was to be submitted to mathematical proportion in the calculation of the impressions of sensation through a stimulus, according to the law of Weber and the formula of Fechner. Until this day the thought that science becomes more accurate as it takes on the measurements of mathematics continues. Biology is much interested in calculating the strains of heredity which make for health or lead to defectiveness. Eugenics bases its claims on an effort to use medical tabulations. Sociology is aiming at exactitude and scientific standing on the basis of statistics. In other words, the aim in every group of data that claim the name of a science is to approach measurement, in order that scientific accuracy may be reached by following the mathematical ideal. Consequently when Christian truth, which cannot be measured and quantified, is pressing forward for its rights, it will always be disqualified as long as the very nature of thinking at its best is held to be quantitative.

But the certainty of the mathematical argument has been very much attacked by the later theories of the mathematicians themselves. There has been developed a non-Euclidean geometry which seems to demonstrate the impossibility of the absoluteness of the older geometry. It is now held that the first principles of geometry are not fundamentally the only possible ones and the only logical ones. Professor H. Poincaré succinctly puts the issue thus: "Whence are the first principles of geometry derived? Are they imposed on us by logic? Lobatschewsky, by inventing non-Euclidean geometries, has shown that this is not the case."⁵ And in greater detail Dr. J.

⁵ "Science and Hypothesis," preface, p. xxv.

M. O'Sullivan thus states the situation: "Euclidean geometry has operated under assumptions which have always baffled every attempt to *prove* them. It has, for example, been forced to assume either that the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, or that through the same point one, and not more than one, parallel can be drawn to any given straight line. Now, however, it has been found that starting from assumptions different from those of Euclid, we can develop various perfectly self-consistent systems, the results of which are not in harmony with those of ordinary geometry. Thus we may regard space as having a constant curvature instead of being homogeneous, of being four instead of three dimensions, as being such that we can draw (through a single point) any number of parallels to any given line, and so on. We find, moreover, that these assumptions involve us in no *inherent* absurdity, no self-contradiction."⁶ Through the possibility of a geometry of four dimensions, equally logical as that of three dimensions, the old idea of the eternity and unalterability of Euclidean geometry suffered a dangerous attack. When, in addition, it was mathematically proved that any number of parallels to any given line could be drawn through a single point, and that one of the axiomatic presuppositions of Euclid was capable of being disproved by the very sort of argument which always seemed invulnerable, the faith in mathematical certainty was still further shaken. It is true that all of these systems may have no validity for our present space. In other words, they cannot be practically demonstrated as we now conceive practicality, but they are thinkable and systematically certain. It is only sense as generally interpreted that contradicts them, but not reason.

It is not only the mathematical foundations which

⁶ "Old Criticism and New Pragmatism," p. 111 ff.

have been attacked, but mathematical continuity may be questioned. This is important, because logic has sometimes been believed to be symbolic. It has been translated into figures and its mathematical nature has been demanded by the investigations of the Englishmen, Boole and Jevons. Dr. Shearman, in "The Scope of Formal Logic," has largely followed this same symbolic procedure. And in the same manner Prof. Louis Couturat, in "The Principles of Logic," a sub-treatise in the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, Vol. I, also works out the problems of logic mathematically. But can all thought be thus accurately translated into mathematics? Is it not true in thinking that an apparent law not failing up to a certain point may suddenly break down when put to a practical test?

A machine might be constructed to give a perfectly regular series of numbers through a vast series of steps, and yet break the law of progression suddenly at any required time. The sudden freezing of water at one point without a gradual approach is another argument against an absolutely continuing mathematical progression in real experiments. The law of the minimal changes in the effect of a stimulus upon sensation has its limits. There is thus more than one instance where the continuity of mathematical thinking loses its force for reality.

These and similar facts led the thinkers on mathematical problems to new theories of mathematics. In strongest contrast to the reigning conception of mathematical certainty and the claim of its priority to all experience, there arose the hypothesis that mathematical thinking rested purely upon experience. Its axioms were workable generalizations drawn from the actual experience of mankind. While for a time the defenders of the mathematical ideal still claimed that the mathematical concept was prior to and determinative of every percept,

it is now true as Professor Pitkin says, that: "Geometers pretty generally concede that they get their original information about figures and their relation from perceived forms. The primary subject of inquiry in geometry appears in its very name; it is the measuring of the earth. And there can be no doubt that for centuries geometers had no thought of analyzing anything save the observable character of space and spatial entities."⁷ In arithmetic as in geometry the actual counting, and the growing number experience of mankind was the basis of the abstraction which formed the science. Where this attitude obtains, there can be no absolute category of number or space or time to begin with. All these are supposed to be drawn from experience. Consequently there is no fixed nature of thinking of a mathematical character; it is simply the experience that creates quantity and makes the science of mathematics. It appears very evident that on such a basis mathematics cannot claim to dictate to religious experience or thinking. From its method it cannot question religion, but must humbly remain in its restricted sphere and within the limits of experience and the character of the experience which makes it possible. Religion, then, has full right to its peculiar experience and the independence of the character of this experience. It is a problem of clearly distinguishing separate types of experience with their legitimate inferences.

Another point of view does not permit empiricism as much room as the theory just discussed. One of its leading advocates is Professor Poincaré, who holds that experience does not make mathematics, but that the mind formulates certain definitions and tries them out. An axiom is nothing but an assumption or a definition agreed upon. He says: "We shall also see that there are several kinds of hypotheses; that some are verifiable, and

⁷ *Journal of Philosophy and Psychology*, X, 15, p. 399.

when once confirmed by experiment become truths of great fertility; that others may be useful to us in fixing our ideas; and finally, that others are hypotheses only in appearance, and reduce to definitions or to conventions in disguise. The latter are to be met with, especially in mathematics, and the sciences to which it is applied. From them, indeed, the sciences derived their rigor; such conventions are the result of the unrestricted activity of the mind, which in this domain recognizes no obstacle.”⁸ The conventions, while thus imposed, are not arbitrary, but they are fertile and experience helps us to discern the most convenient path to follow. The conventions of the mind are, therefore, not mere postulates from experience, but postulates for experience. Mathematics and logic following it describe the nature of relation, order, dimensionality, number, and space. All their postulates, however, for experience are no absolute ideas of the mind, they are merely conventions prior to experience, and the scientist selects the postulates that experience can establish. In a somewhat different but related manner, Professor Russell holds that there exist in the world certain mathematical entities, and that a relation is to be established between these entities or terms. The terms exist and are experienced, and the mind does not make the terms, but it discovers the relations. Consequently we need the relating activity of the mind, for the mere experience of the terms cannot create quantitative thought. In its total effect, therefore, Professor Russell’s idea leads, like the theory of Professor Poincaré, to a modified empiricism.

There are many facts in favor of such a theory of modified empiricism. Upon it there is a possibility of the agreement of Christian truth with mathematical theory. Christianity can, from one point of view, be conceived as an experience, but the experience is what it is, and

⁸ “Science and Hypothesis,” preface, p. xxii.

becomes what it becomes, through the relations established by the soul. It is the soul which makes its postulates for experience, but it does not create the facts of the religious experience which exist and are found. In such a hypothesis, there is a balance which seems to hold in proper poise what life offers and what the soul adds. The balance appears far better sustained than in the efforts of Kant, who, despite every attempt, never succeeded in doing full justice to the value of experience.

An attempt was made to overcome the force of the mathematical conception of Kant by Hegel. He believed that the content of thought must determine the method, and for him the mechanical and notionless procedure of mathematics could not properly express the living movement of thought. He opposed Kant in the contention that each branch of knowledge has only as much strict science as it contains mathematics. According to Kant the category of quantity becomes all-controlling. But Hegel says: "Our knowledge would be in a very awkward predicament if such objects as freedom, law, morality, or even God himself, because they cannot be measured or calculated, or expressed in a mathematical formula, were to be reckoned beyond the reach of exact knowledge, and had to put up with a vague general image of them, leaving their detail or particulars to the pleasure of each individual, to make out of them what he will."⁹ Hegel believed that reason could establish itself through arguments of quality rather than of quantity. Perhaps he ascribed too much force and accuracy to reason in its movement, but he destroyed the over-emphasis of quantity. There is much danger in using quantity as the sole category of the mind. Professor Bosanquet rightly says: "This false employment arises, or would arise, supposing the category of quantity to be considered not merely as co-

⁹ Encyclopedia, paragraph 99, note.

extensive with determinate existence, but as, in its abstraction, the ultimate reality of all determinate existence, and consequently as furnishing the final ideal of science. It is obvious that the true use of this as of every category slides easily into the false one. Every science is occupied with its own abstractions. Every individual mind tends to magnify that with which it is occupied. The category of quantity, for reasons mentioned above, lends itself to universal application. It seems a short step from universal application to sole application, but it is the step from truth to falsehood. It is not made exclusively by votaries of physical science, nor perhaps by them chiefly. It meets us in theology and in philosophy under the form of the quantitative infinite as a sublime attribute of the Deity, or of soul life, or of the universe as contrasted with the 'finite' mind of man." ¹⁰

A real danger has been indicated by Professor Bosanquet when he shows how the quantitative idea has corrupted theology. He is entirely right when he assails the manner in which the philosophical and mathematical notion of the infinite is applied to God. In similar manner the error of a mathematical point of view lurks behind some of the conceptions of divine unity. Unity is conceived of as a mathematically closed quantity, and not as a quality which may imply a rich complexity. The presence of God has sometimes been defined to meet the conditions of space. Such a spatial idea of God is an entire misapplication of the idea of spiritual presence, because it attempts to make it clear through a material medium; in fact, however, it confuses the notion. In the idea of the soul, as present in every part of the body and in no particular part of the body, there is an effort to describe a spiritual entity by material and spatial paradoxes. The effort, however, fails and there is indefiniteness instead of

¹⁰ "Logic," Vol. I, p. 193.

clearness. Where Christian truth uses such terms, it lays itself open to the objections which Mansel made and which Spencer repeated,¹¹ when they show the contradiction between cause and absolute and infinite. The whole character of the argument is of a mathematical character, and arises from the fact that incongruous notions, which are in essence quantitative, are applied to religious ideas. Religious ideas, however, are fundamentally qualitative, and have value, and, therefore, demand not judgments of quantity, but judgments of value and quality.

A very formidable enemy to the quantitative way of thinking and to the exclusive sovereignty of the mathematical method has arisen in the French philosopher Bergson. He denies the fundamentality of quantity as a part of living thought. The real primal character of thinking is to him not the reasoning of the intellect, but the living quality of intuition with its large range of possibilities. Quantity is a result of separation from the stream of life; it is a reduction of vital moving duration and impulse to static space. Space has been demanded for the sake of matter, and the intellect is instrumental to the demands of matter. It only answers to the external needs, and becomes mathematical because of matter which life has sloughed off. Says Bergson: "All the operations of our intellect tend to geometry, as to the goal where they find their perfect fulfillment. But, as geometry is necessarily prior to them (since these operations have not as their end to construct space and cannot do otherwise than take it as given) it is evident that it is a latent geometry, immanent in our idea of space, which is the mainspring of our intellect and the pause of its workings."¹² It is because intellect and spatiality go together, believes Bergson, that our thinking is so mathe-

¹¹ "First Principles," p. 33.

¹² "Creative Evolution," p. 210.

mathematical. He says: "When we consider the admirable order of mathematics, the perfect agreement of the objects it deals with, the immanent logic in numbers and figures, our certainty of always getting the same conclusion, however diverse and complex our reasonings on the same subject, we hesitate to see in properties apparently so positive a system of negations, the absence rather than the presence of a true reality. But we must not forget that our intellect, which finds this order, and wonders at it, is directed in the same line of movement that leads to the materiality and spatiality of its object. The more complexity the intellect puts into its object by analyzing it, the more complex is the order it finds there. And this order and this complexity necessarily appear to the intellect as a positive reality, since reality and intellectuality are turned in the same direction."¹³ While Bergson in this attitude has perhaps been unduly severe to the intellect of man¹⁴ as a whole, he has laid his finger on a real distinction which applies to mathematical thinking with its abstractness as related to life. True reality is finally not mathematical; it possesses a vital quality. When we conceive of thought as a living movement, then at once the judgment of quality is more important than that of quantity. With this new ideal of thought as primarily inner life, Christianity can make an alliance, for its knowledge is fundamentally vital. Its truth is the direct, fresh, gushing water of life. When we have gained this point of view, and when knowledge is considered in this way, we are delivered from the tyranny of every kind of dogmatic rationalism, which has its roots in the mathematical type of thinking. We can purify Christian thinking from the dross of past quantitative reasoning and restore it to its living quality.

¹³ "Creative Evolution," p. 208.

¹⁴ Cf. Part II, Chap. 6, p. 259 ff.

CHAPTER II

THE INDUCTIVE CLAIM

NO demand is more insistent in the present than the claim for facts. Facts are believed to be the unalloyed realities, from which alone legitimate thinking has a right to proceed. It is considered utterly futile to begin with an idea or an ideal; such an undertaking is judged as an unwarranted disturbance of the actual world. Consequently the reasoning which classifies and explains things, setting out from great principles, is put aside. Deductive argument is tabooed, for this is pre-eminently the age of induction. From particulars and not from principles sciences are built up, and out of the details and single instances in experience the interpretation of life is sought. Generalizations are only permitted as summing up individual experiences. For the sake of economy and for purposes of order and classification universal laws are admitted. But it is held that every explanation from one principle must have back of it some cases out of which it is developed; without such a foundation, all argument from the universal is considered illegitimate.

The great formulator of the inductive trend of thought in its working details is John Stuart Mill. It is true that Socrates in his day began to gather up instances, and that Plato used illustrations. Following them Aristotle knew of the fact of collecting particulars and called this procedure induction. Every one of these great Greek thinkers realized the value of particulars. But the greater estimate of particular cases by Socrates and his arrival at concepts from living cases and situations, and the allowance of an eternal world of thought with its many ideas by Plato, were crowded back in human thinking when

Aristotle thought that strict proof and demonstration were deductive. For him induction was only a counting of cases, and as enumeration it was a secondary and weak substitute where and when the accurate reasoning from foundational, first principles could not be employed. The deduction of Aristotle and his strong formulation of the argument of the syllogism, which always begins with the major premise, ruled down to the modern age.

But the spell of Aristotle was broken with the coming of modern times. Many were the thinkers who led to the inductive ideal. It is very interesting to note that, while the most immediate beginnings of the new science were controlled by the mathematical notions of Leonardo da Vinci, Kepler, and Galileo, the new impetus to inductive reasoning was made by Bacon. Bacon, however, was most fortunate in his criticisms. When he formulated induction he saw in it largely the gathering of material and the formation of preliminary hypotheses for the sake of orientation. His induction is continued with the aid of these hypotheses. To deduction he gave a very secondary place, and he believed that all quantitative considerations had to be inferred from experiences.¹ But the impulse which Bacon gave to induction was not at once to prevail. The mathematical ideals of Descartes, and the influence of Isaac Newton, did not allow the inductive process full development and lasting triumph. It was only after the days of Mill, that inductive logic began to exercise its largest sway over the minds of men. While Mill gradually revolutionized, or rather aided in revolutionizing the science of thought, it was nevertheless not his influence alone which brought about the general reign of induction. This was most largely effected by the rise of biology in the researches into nature of which Darwin was such a consum-

¹ Cf. Dr. H. Hoeffding, "Geschichte der Neueren Philosophie," Vol. I, p. 217.

mate leader. He applied most effectively the logic of induction, but it grew out of direct practice and not from a formal study of Mill or any logician. Along with the new biology, the advances of geology, as represented in such a thinker as Lyell, also furthered the inductive method. In addition the newer chemical researches confirmed it, and upon its principles arose a new period of physics. It has pressed into history, economics and sociology, and has laid its claim even to the proper study of morals and to the history of religion. Everywhere its reign is paramount. The conviction rules that we are an age with its feet on the ground, touching real mother-earth in all that we do and think, and that we are fortunately free from the dreaming which has its head in the clouds.

But the claim that this is the age of reasoning from facts and from facts alone is deceptive. Where reasoning begins there are no longer mere facts. The very materials upon which it draws are no longer the mere external facts. Even if we allow the contention for the moment, that all the material of thought comes from sensation, psychology shows us that we no longer possess the external physical fact. Even the first reports of sensation color and change the external data. Much more is it true that the argument which draws from memory, which is stimulated by interest, which must consider attention, and employ concepts, is not a mere resultant of the external existents. The argument from particulars is already a complex argument and must be analyzed into simpler terms. The purely physical facts must be separated from the psychological approach. It is necessary to analyze the mental process which is legitimately true scientific induction, and to note its elements and its parts.

When, however, we begin the analysis of induction it is found that we must consider the problem of the causal chain. We cannot study particular facts scientifically

in any real way without noting that they depend upon each other. The constant sequence that we notice about all phenomena, which we study and begin to interpret scientifically, we divide into cause and effect. Somehow we can never get away from this conjunction. Now, the problem in induction is not primarily to study the idea of causality, but only the direct causes and effects. It is true, that from them we may be led to the deeper question, whether we would ever find in temporal succession causes and effects without the idea of cause. When it is necessary to study the manner in which we are able in observation or through experiment to find causes, we are naturally led to certain methods. These methods have been first analyzed in a most direct and thorough manner by Mill, although they may have been used previously. The value of the logic of Mill largely consists in calling attention to and describing the methods, according to which we find causes in the inductive process.

It will be necessary briefly to indicate these methods in order that we may show what is after all the main problem lying back of all of the methods. The method of agreement posits a causal relation, when in a number of instances and different settings it is found, that the supposed cause is always followed by a certain phenomenon as corresponding effect. In the method of difference, an instance, in which the supposed cause is present, followed by the corresponding effect, is compared with an instance of the same general setting, but where the supposed cause being removed, the effect also disappears. These two methods are sometimes combined into a joint method in which the comparison of instances where the supposed cause is present is made with like instances where it is not present. If the corresponding effect is found in the former, and absent in the latter collection of instances, a causal connection may rightly be assumed. The method of concomitant variation so modi-

fies any given datum, that the supposed cause will vary in intensity; if then, there is a like variation in the resultant, a causal relation exists. The method of residues is the analysis of a complex phenomenon, in which all elements are related severally to all others in a causal way, except one residual element in the antecedent and one in the consequent. The latter may be considered the effect of the former.

These different methods and varieties of analyzing the causal chain are sometimes alone, but mostly they are combined. Among them agreement will be discussed further on because it leads to the modern comparative proof, the argument of analogy. The proof from difference is only the negative side of the proof from agreement, and consequently only a confirmatory proof that leads to similarity and merges into it. And when both are combined in the joint method of agreement and difference, it appears all the more clearly that the common element is likeness, and that even in the unlike element it is the similarity of the unlikeness which establishes it. Concomitant variation is fundamentally the finding of a constant in quantity amid the change of variables. It is the reduction of cause and effect to a mathematical equation or proportion. The value of the proof from residual elements is really the emphasis of the exception that may lead to new facts or revision of old views. It is largely accessory to the main method and in its nature, after all, rests on similarity. It appears, therefore, that the constant pressure in all of these arguments when summed up is toward similarity in variation. The whole question reduces itself to the problem of variation according to a constant. The constant may be not only quantitative, and this has been frequently the defect of the method of concomitant variation in its statement and use. When this method is rightly combined with agreement and varia-

tion, and residues, it will lead in actual experience, first of all, to a qualitative constant. It is only the mathematical ideal which adds the quantitative interpretation.

The question now arises, is this qualitative constant, around which all the methods of Mill are actually grouped, in the things themselves? Is it true that the mere experience of the senses and their data carries within it the unvarying constant? While our consciousness reveals a mighty continuum constantly passing through it, yet so changeable and shifting are the things within it, and so complex and heterogeneous the flow of experience through our consciousness, that a fundamental constant does not reveal itself. We are after all driven to the assumption that the mind adds the fixed constant, and groups together the received impressions, and draws inferences from them. Of course, experience confirms the mind and we must consequently accept, as a matter of intellectual belief, the external existence of a great constant. But this constant is not a reality of brute fact but rather an inference of associating mind. Consequently the necessary presupposition of all induction is the arrangement of experience as it comes to us in the rough, and the selection of impressions, and the grouping of them into classes which finally constitute the data of various sciences. As history proceeded the mind has more and more separated new groups out of old ones, and thus constituted new sciences. Observation and experiment which are the two methods of the practical working out of induction are not possible without grouping and classifying. How can we rightly observe or experiment unless we fix our attention on specific objects, which we study for certain definite purposes, and to answer certain questions arising out of the co-relation of the grouping. What we really are inquiring for is the constant. We arrange phenomena to compel them to answer our inquiries with the constant in mind

and with faith in its existence.

There is nothing in religion which does not allow of the arranging of its phenomena by a constant. This constant within man is the religious consciousness, and the external constant believed in is a real revelation. But Christianity has an additional claim. It demands the examination not merely of a distinct group of historical facts and of specific and peculiar religious truths, but also of a special and peculiar consciousness. This Christian consciousness is the center of any system of experiences that can be combined into a unity. It crystallizes what is borne in upon it through the religious data that occur in a man's education or surroundings. But it at once seeks an object and claims that it is guided by the Holy Spirit, who interprets Christ, whether He be mediated by the Bible or the Church. Thus the constant of revelation is joined to the constant of the religious consciousness. In this procedure Christianity finds a center for the grouping of Christian experience, and it is really in this respect inductive. Consequently Christianity uses induction and induction can bring no charge against Christianity.

It has happened, nevertheless, that some types of modern induction allowed themselves to be combined with a materialistic interpretation of evolution and life. These, then, claimed that the constant must be of a material order, and that it must be found in the lowest stratum of things. But this is unjust, for in passing from constants to constants they must answer in their character to their own group of facts. The careful induction cannot apply the inductive constant of mechanics to biology, or the constant of chemistry to sociology. Of course, finally, induction desires to unite the separate constants into a great unity; but the question remains whether this unity must be physical. In the course of its operation induction has no right to adopt a metaphysic. Each group of facts

which shall constitute a science or art or any separate domain of life can not suffer violence by introducing any constant untrue to it. Although the mind finds the constant, it must be of the nature of the facts that are crystallized about it and serve it. Strange to say, induction with its claim of realism and respect for facts has been employed by some scientists in the service of a materialistic metaphysic. By this attitude, induction has really been perverted into a deduction, and without the exercise of the proper care and a just estimation a wrong presupposition has been forced upon the facts. Where such abuse of induction has obtained, it is perfectly explicable that Christianity has suffered from the deductive assumption of a mere metaphysic of nature, which denied spirit in its very formulation and initial definition, and under the cloak of induction and its facts really assailed Christian truth from an opposite deductive supposition. But in an equal manner Christianity must be careful to allow for the facts and the groupings of science and not attempt any deductive interference with the sphere of science. It must not take its religious value of man and the world, and through them attempt to deny either the fact or assail the constant that science may find in an examination, which must naturally overlook or abstract from the religious point of view.

When the various constants have been found the problem of uniting them into some great fundamental constant remains. There never can be any fully carried out induction without a great presupposition. This presupposition of induction in all science is usually termed, the uniformity of nature. This uniformity of nature is applied to the whole chain of causes with the additional assumption of the real continuity of nature. Such an assumption of a real whole is essential, if any worth is to be attached to particular facts. Particulars must be thought

of as parts of a great whole. Their action is to be conceived as illustrative of what can be found everywhere. If particulars are the mere counting of single instances, they can create only a probability, and this probability will be only as high as the number of counted cases is in relation to the whole range of existent facts. Mr. Venn, in his *Empirical Logic*, believes that this probability is all that induction can reach. But most thinkers hold that few cases are conclusive and that even one experiment can be crucial and pivotal. Now such an attitude is only possible if we contend that nature has uniform laws throughout, and that everywhere and without break these laws hold good. In other words, a certainty is ascribed to individual cases out of all relation to their proportionateness because of the belief in the uniformity of the universe. It seems impossible for the human mind to hold to a changeable universe. Even if with some thinkers we should deny a universe and simply argue for a multiverse, nevertheless the many individual factors are still conceived of as constant, and in some respects uniform. We may, like Bergson, become convinced that creation as evolution is constantly new, but as we look back upon its course we must note that it has proceeded along certain unified lines. We cannot in any view of the universe disregard its continuity in our thinking, and, therefore, we must believe in its existence.

There still remains, of course, the problem of defining the continuity which appears in a uniform universe. Too often it has been described in the terms of the lowest facts of life, and then from these low origins the higher facts have been injured. If continuity be reduced to mechanical connection and to mechanical movement in a line of conjunction from the atom to man, then such a physical visualization of continuity must be disputed. But if, allowing for new departures at the point of the ori-

gin of life and of the origin of spirit, we do not depress the facts of the sphere of life and soul to the laws of mechanics we are engaged in a true process. It will then be necessary to subsume the continued action of mechanics, and somewhat higher up of chemistry, as contributory and secondary to the laws of life and of the spirit. Continuity thus becomes the widening of a great stream into which new, stronger tributaries pour in their waters, and with their mightier currents carry on the currents of the first simpler sources. At present this is the only justifiable conception of continuity; any other idea is a hope. Even should the bridge between matter and life be actually constructed, this would, nevertheless, only raise the problem whether we have not unduly limited life.

When we assume such a constant as universal continuity and uniformity, we are easily led to the foundations of religion. It has as an implication the idea of a universe as a unity back of phenomena. In addition it involves the thought of regularity in this universe. These ideas are correlative to its conception of God. It is true that all religion, and Christianity also, believes in special interventions and miracles. But these evidences for a specific need have never destroyed the idea of a uniform character of God, and have never made Him arbitrary. Consequently in its deepest beliefs Christianity assumes a regular universe. The conception of a universe as a mental ultimate, and the idea of law as uniform, constant and reliable procedure of phenomena, leads to trustworthiness as a mental assumption. When we ascribe trustworthiness to a universe we are led to the very threshold of the theistic idea by the underlying supposition of induction. As far as Christianity is a theistic faith it is a further unfoldment and completion of the primal postulate of uniformity. This it applies to the higher moral and religious spheres of life, whose uniform constant it finds

in human and divine love.

The idea of continuity, as it was defined above, also lends itself readily to religious faith, which demands mind back of the universe, and centers it in a personal God. When new elements enter into the progressive stream of being and life and absorb, though they do not destroy, the previously existent elements, there must be in this resultant unity more than accidentalism or chance. The assumption of these would prove inadequate, for the unity and uniformity and continuity are the summing up of the complex into a oneness which is not thinkable without mind. Of course, it may be supposed that this mind is nowhere else but in the process itself. Such an idea, however, materializes mind, or it idealizes matter. Either result is full of difficulties. Consequently, is it not better to see in the continuity the effect of the mind but not its actual presence? If this be our conception, we are led from the finding of purpose and of mind in the uniformity and continuity of the world to the supposition of its separate existence in a purposing spirit.

Another problem is opened up by the discussion of the relation of induction and Christianity. Can Christianity, as a religion, argue in its truths inductively upward, or is this a defect and must the argument be only deductive? It has generally been believed that religion must argue, to argue successfully, from a universal downward, and, therefore, deductively. The very idea of God is always a universal, and a first principle. Now out of this idea of God its implications are deduced, and certain attributes are ascribed to God, as necessary to the validity of the idea of God. Wherever thus, by a systematic procedure, the idea of God is developed, He is not defined as the sum of experiences in communion with Him, and mediated by His revelation. His nature and attributes have been fixed by thought itself through a logical analysis of what the

idea of God was supposed necessarily to contain. In the same manner the idea of the soul and other truths were unfolded, deductions were made, and all of these brought into relation with each other. Now is this procedure necessarily native to religion, and native, therefore, to Christianity? Does it lie in the spiritual order itself that it must deduct? Professor Hobhouse says of religion: "Essentially a matter of insight rather than of reasoning, its truths are partial, rather than complete, and where it seeks to cover the whole field of knowledge and action, it does so rather by deduction from conceived positions than by the patient reconstruction of reality through the piece-meal interpretation of experience."²

In this attitude it has been forgotten that no deduction can be made apart from the communication of actual facts and truths. The fulness of the conception of God grew out of experiences, and many deductions were really inductions. It is not necessary nor native to Christianity to employ only deductions, and a legitimate Christian system cannot fill in its gap by unjustified inferences. It is true, of course, that the great universal notions of Christianity are rich in their implications. The very experiences of Christianity are full of universal meaning. But in the interpretation of such meaning a real Christianity ought to rest on constant historical facts and guaranteed truth. For it is not the aim of Christianity to be a consistent logical system and to keep on drawing conclusions, but to answer the practical needs of the soul. It has also been overlooked by many systematizers of Christian truth, that what they deemed to be inherent in its character was only the influence of past tradition and past philosophic interpretations of Christian truth. Among all the philosophers who have held sway over the minds of the teachers of systematic truth in the Christian

² "Development and Purpose," p. 189.

Church, no one was and is more powerful and has had a longer rule than Aristotle. In the movement of the Reformation there was a reaction against Aristotle. This was largely fostered by the realistic spirit of the later scholastic period. The Reformers were nominalists in philosophy, and the essence of nominalism is really the emphasis of the individuals. It is, therefore, a close approach to the inductive idea. Despite, however, this reaction, many truths, in the dogmatic systems which followed the first outburst of the Reformation, were simply a restatement of truth according to the old Aristotelian method of deduction. Only the great direct experiences of salvation and the truths which these immediately imply were freshly formulated. At the very beginning, it is true, the various Reformers inductively collected the biblical truths, but they did not at once formulate complete systems. The one great exception was Calvin. But very soon both in the ethics and dogmatics of Christianity Aristotle gained a new entrance. Even to-day many Christian systems of truth and many doctrinal differences and disputes show his influence. It is this long historic rule of Aristotle which has made many believe that deduction was the essential way of arguing about Christian truth. Even the establishment of a discipline like biblical theology has not altogether removed Aristotelianism in Christian thinking.

The influence of the deductive idea in the formulation of Christian truths and experiences, is seen in the acceptance of a single controlling principle. In the Middle Ages the doctrine of the Church was all-controlling, and it colored all other truth. Mediæval thinking was under the thralldom of a single principle in theory and in practice. When the Reformation assailed the supremacy of the Church by its emphasis of Christ it endeavored to reach a living center and to escape from the overbalance of an

insufficient single principle. There was a return to Christian experience in which the dominating subjective factor was faith, and the ruling objective element, Christ. The first doctrinal expression of this experience was founded on the Pauline formulation of justification by faith. This became a practical principle and a test for truth. It never attained, however, the place of a deductive principle, and it never created systems. Consequently it was not really of a deductive nature. It is true that the acceptance of Christ was held to be guaranteed by the Scriptures. Gradually the Christ, the living interpreter of revelation, was made the Christ who guaranteed a set of books. Thus the canon became a ruling principle and some of the life of the Reformation was hemmed in by the principle of the Book and its law. Some life kept its freshness because it conceived of the Book as the living Word. But even where this idea ruled a mechanical doctrine of inspiration finally obtained sway, and again a single external principle ruled.

But the rule of this principle still left open the inductive gathering of the many revealed truths in the practical life of Christianity. More dangerous in its final influence was the assumption of the great principle of divine sovereignty. This became far more powerful and led not only to a determined life, but to an absolute rule of the deductive method. Christian experience was forced into the mold of divine absoluteness, and the universal crowded out the particular. The results of this dogmatism crowded back many of the best ideals of Christian experience. It robbed it of its freedom and joy. In thinking it opened up the way to the control of Christian thought by consistent philosophy.

There started somewhat later movements which laid emphasis on vital Christian experience. The direct touch of divine power in human lives was demanded, and the

regenerating life of the Holy Spirit was to be made the new principle. It is true that the experiences were more discursive and inductive, and the principle was not subversive of individual data. But these movements of piety were rather of the feeling than of the intellect, and, because they dwelt more on the psychology of Christian experience than on its logic, they possessed no standard and principle to overcome the regnant power of deductive dogmatics in the sphere of thought. The subjectivism of piety did not offer an adequate and sufficient objective foundation to guarantee and test the soundness of the religious experiences. There were in these experiences, and there still exist in them where they are emphasized to-day, disjointed and atomistic Christian conceptions. There is a lack of the knowledge of the valuable traditions of the past, and a failure to interpret the whole of Christian experience, to see it in its totality and to find its proper objective standard. History shows that after the subjectivism of pietism there followed the individualism of rationalism. The brief sketching of the rule of single principles in Christian thinking has shown us their danger. While it cannot be concluded that the inductive procedure is the only one favorable to Christianity, nevertheless it offers large opportunity, and, guarded by the proper objective presupposition of the unity of revelation, can be made most serviceable to express the truths of Christianity, and to formulate the many and manifold Christian experiences.

CHAPTER III

THE COMPARATIVE IDEA

WHEN the inductive argument uses instances that agree it is really employing the logical law of identity. Truly interpreted identity does not mean tautology, and its expression is not $A = A$, but it does formulate the fact of constancy and close correspondence amidst elements of difference. One grade lower than identity and agreement is logical similarity. Its unity is not as strong as that in agreement, but it is more than mere likeness. The bond of connection in similarity is constantly approaching identity, and yet the highest member in the rise of its serial approach to identity is below the lowest factor in identity of clear correspondence. Because of this fact similarity, which is generally known in logic as analogy, and which forms the basis of the comparative idea, has often been severely criticised. The analogical proof received a low estimate and a mean value. But such a discouraging appreciation has disregarded the real use and application of analogy in scientific advance. And it has been untrue to a large number of cases that show how analogy and comparison have been used in real scientific discovery.

It was analogy and comparison which moved Darwin to hit upon the conception of natural selection. The opening chapter of his "Origin of Species" shows that it was the artificial selection in the breeding of pigeons, from which he started out and found selection going on in nature itself without human intervention. In the same manner Darwin also was led to the term "struggle for existence" which had such a large corroborating meaning

for his theory. He could find no explanation, for a time, to account for the fact of the elimination and the break in the serial development of the species through variation. After he had come into contact with Malthus' great treatise, which emphasized the terrible importance of the struggle for existence in mankind, and which gave economics such a dismal direction, he applied this conception with advantage from the economic sphere to the processes of nature. The argument of comparison, therefore, entered into the very discovery of the Darwinian hypothesis. It was, furthermore, found exceedingly useful in biology in the comparison from plant to plant, from species of animal to animal, from structure and function to like structure and function. Out of it grew comparative anatomy, comparative physiology, and comparative psychology. One of the most important and fundamental discoveries in physics, viz., the principle of a single energy into which heat and light and electricity might be transferred, was due to an observation in which comparison played a large part. A German physician, Robert Mayer, found in Java that the blood of the veins of Europeans who had but lately come to Java was very bright red. He explained this remarkable phenomenon through the fact, that in the tropics with their heat there was less oxidation of the blood, and, therefore, it was brighter. From this biological fact Mayer was led by careful reasoning to the conjecture of the transference of energy.¹

The comparative method has also been very useful in deciphering lost languages. Through it, it was possible to argue from the Greek writing on the "Rosetta Stone" to the undeciphered hieroglyphic and to the cursive script. The starting point of Egyptology was, therefore, based on comparison. In a similar manner it was found possible

¹ For full account of this, cf., Alois Riehl, "Philosophie der Gegenwart," p. 140 ff.

to understand the Assyrian language and to found the study of Assyriology when the great tri-lingual inscription of Darius was found by Sir Rawlinson on the high rock at Behistun. The case was parallel to that of the "Rosetta Stone," and again the comparative method was the starting point. In the discovery of these lost languages it was necessary to begin with the mere parallelism of word with word, but out of such comparison there grew consistent meaning when the discovered words were applied in other connections, and finally similarity of grammatical structure made the comparison very forceful. Thus it was that the ancient languages of the East, which had been lost, were added to our knowledge and placed into that family group of languages to which they belonged. In linguistic study it is found that etymology is not only historically derivative, but also comparative. A similar fact appears in the phonetic laws of languages. Grimm's great "Law of Lautverschiebung" is in its essence analogical. Thus we possess comparative phonetics, comparative etymology, comparative grammar, and through them all comparative philology. In view of facts like these we cannot pass by a serious consideration of comparison and analysis.

If the use of analogy is to be just, it is exceedingly important to find the essential condition of comparison. It dare not remain a mere supposition of likeness, some times successful, and sometimes and perhaps more often a failure. To escape this uncertainty analogy or comparison must be analyzed. It must appear in the analysis that there is a fundamental unity of character in the phenomena which are compared. There ought to occur no great dissimilar feature and no disturbing essential characteristic. Thus there can justly be comparative anatomy and it can be strongly approved within its limits, because the similarities are all traced within the unity

of morphological character. It is far more difficult to establish firmly the science of comparative psychology. There are in man and his mind great conceptual unities which cannot be found below him, as the latest researches in animal psychology in distinction from the conjectures of Romanes seem to show. Nevertheless, in the realm of sensations and perceptions there can be a real comparative psychology; in them there is a unity of function. When comparison passes from the sphere of one science to another, or from science to art, or from science to religion and vice versa, it is often very problematic whether the analogy is legitimate. The main problem then is, whether new and diverse elements do not destroy the force of similarity.

The caution necessary when passing from one sphere to a different sphere needs consideration in our study, particularly as applied to science and religion. Butler in his famous, "Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature," was true to analogical reasoning and gave it a very careful logical foundation. He met the Deism of the eighteenth century and many of his applications are just and carefully guarded. When, however, in our own day Drummond, in his book on "Natural Law in the Spiritual World," attempted a comparison between nature and its laws, and faith and its principles, he was by no means as successful as Butler. He failed because the phenomena which he cites as a basis of comparison have a great disparity in religion and nature as to their inner value, worth and place. An apparently similar fact to science in religion, as e. g., the atrophy of organs that are not used, is not really similar. Atrophy in nature is the result of environment and necessity, in religion responsibility and choice enter in. There is a failure in the total comparison of Drummond because of his neglect of the ethical element

and of freedom in faith. His comparisons are largely illustrations for the preacher, but they are not scientifically tenable arguments.

The failure of Drummond in finding in analogy a real constructive argument to unite nature and religion ought to be a warning to those who, from the scientific point of view, attempt to use comparison destructively against religion. When necessity, indestructibility of matter, and conservation of energy, or natural selection, adaptation, and survival of the fittest are transferred to religion as essential conditions and as basal laws a great logical error has been committed. There has been no examination into the specific phenomena and into the differences of their character. The laws of one sphere have been unjustly forced upon another. It is true in science that the laws of no one science can form the essential conditions of another science. Still less can the formulations of any science be introduced as demands into the sphere of faith, which is radically diverse. If they are forced upon religion, its nature and character will be distorted. Valuable facts of religion will be eliminated, and minor facts because of an apparent analogy, will be stressed out of all relation to their real worth in the totality of religion. It is very strange to note how some scientists so strongly resent the interference of religion through comparison with nature, but, seeing the world from their small angle, they would apply their generalizations to religion.

But the converse is also true. Religion dare not carry its comparisons or analogies into science as demonstrations or arguments. It would be entirely wrong to use the great convictions of faith and to strain the facts of nature to fit into them. Because of the goodness of God it is not possible to deny the "red tooth and claw" in nature. We dare not be oblivious to the facts of nature and slight them from the desire to find the goodness of God, which

is a religious experience, in nature itself. The many inequalities of nature, and its brute forces cannot be covered over or slightly passed by because of a belief in divine providence. The meaning of disasters and calamities in nature dare not be suppressed. It will always be an error to smuggle in the God of moral purpose on the basis of the mere evidences of nature. Because salvation and service are such fundamental conceptions in Christianity the healing processes of nature and the common life of the species, with its mother-love, must not be over-valued to establish the presence of grace and love in the realm of nature. In the projection of our adoration we can unify the world in faith, but we dare not argue and claim cogency for the unification from the faith of freedom to the law of necessity. The religious convictions of providence and predestination, in which man regards himself as divinely determined, would be very much misapplied if they were used as vital counterparts of necessity in nature. The responses of natural forms to environment never permit the intervention of conscience, which Christianity demands in all responses to the religious environment. It is true that predestination has sometimes been thus formulated as to empty it of its religious character, and to make it really fatalistic. Then it approached the necessity of nature. But it is increasingly realized to-day that such a religious interpretation of predestination makes it really irreligious and fundamentally unethical.

Like predestination the fact of the spiritual unity of the race and its common sin is fundamentally different from the natural unity of the race and natural heredity. The spiritual unity of the race is mediated by Christ, the second Adam. Men enter into this unity through the decision of faith, even though faith be divinely wrought. They are not in the unity by necessity, as they are in the unity of nature. Common and original sin after all im-

plies guilt. It always leads to and implies individual responsibility and guilt. Nature in its working of heredity knows nothing of such guilt. Thus whatever comparisons we make of this type must fundamentally fail from the point of view of a correct logic.

The same problem, which appeared in the question of unity and sin, is also evident when religion attempts to argue from divine will to force and energy in nature. The attempt to unify them from the religious standpoint is very questionable. This whole problem of the relation of will and energy is fundamentally a philosophical question. Idealism generally claims that the action of the will is the interpretation of energy in nature. In nature itself only sequence of phenomena can be discovered, and direct and diverse forces. The unifying of all of these phenomena and forces into the idea of energy can only receive its full interpretation, idealism argues, if we suppose energy as an idea to be derived from the experience of human willing. This contention is one which deserves fair consideration, but when frequently, in the interests of defense, Christian thinkers pass from the conviction of the divine will to the fact of energy, they endanger just logical procedure in comparison. The difficulty with this comparison is, that the more the similarity is pressed, the more the divine will is emptied of its moral character and freedom, and reduced to the category of necessity. It may also lead to the inclusion of God as a willing God in the world, or of the abolition of a real world in a willing God. Speculatively it is more to the point to pass from the energy of the universe to the complementary notion of a universal will of which energy is the result.² But this will must receive its fuller definition from history and the demands of man's moral nature.

Analogy plays a large part as man passes from the

² But cf. Chapt. V, p. 95.

elements of his nature to the conception of the character of God. There has been much severe criticism of this comparison, and it has been disapproved through the historically tabooed term of anthropomorphism. But if no elements of human character and no intimations of human personality dare be used in the effort to formulate the idea of God, it is necessary to reduce this idea to impersonalism. Of course there are those who have coined the designation superpersonalism; but when we examine its meaning, it is, after all, nothing but a very nebulous impersonalism and denies some of the highest elements in our human life. Are not the moral demands of responsibility and obligation, the belief in freedom, and the triumph of the good, elements closely bound up with personality? If we deny personality must not these considerations fall to the ground? Consequently will not a truer result be reached, and one in accord with our deepest religious and moral desires and demands, if we conceive of God in analogy with human personality? When personality is defined as limitation, confused with mere individuality, and connected with subjectivism, then, of course, the personal determination is a limitation. But if we remove restricted human individualism, and accent in God purely His determinative self-possession and His freely self-willed relation, there is an ideal which the development of the human personality through ethical and religious life adumbrates. In such foreshadowing there is an element of true comparison. The comparison is the more just because it takes place within the limits of religious experience and religious thinking itself. It is, of course, speculative and approaches the hypothetical, but it is more justly comparative and analogical than the argument from impersonal nature or the deification of nature. Christianity not only allows the analogy from man to God, but requires it. For its acceptance of the idea of the

divine image of man, and its fundamental tenet of the incarnation of God in Christ, rest on the presupposition of the real likeness and similarity of God and man. Christianity is theomorphic in man, and consequently anthropomorphic, within the religious and ethical side of man, in God.

The employment of the comparative argument must necessarily lead us to the consideration of one of the main elements involved in its analysis, viz., the relation of purpose to comparison. As important as the close analysis, restriction and balance of analogy may be, it cannot be complete without the understanding of the relation of analogy to purpose or teleology. Many logicians have avoided stressing aim and purpose in comparison, because they feared that it might lead them to the position of Hegel. When, after the manner of Hegel, the world is considered a whole in the Absolute, and when every part is held to be inexplicable without the whole, and is supposed to be intimately and internally related to the whole, every comparison is of necessity an interpretation of the purpose fulfilled in the whole. But it is not necessary to adhere to the metaphysics of the whole and absolute, in order to find in analogy the implication of purpose. It is possible on the basis of the inductive assumption of uniformity to hold to an inter-relation. This inter-relation, however, can not be merely accidental, as little as the uniformity. The common nature of uniformity and continuity in the world implies equal functioning. Where there is equal functioning, there are equal results. Equal results reach equal aims. Therefore, comparison, or analogy, involves postulates of purpose. The purpose may appear only at the end, and may not be seen at its beginning. But is it illegitimate to argue back from the resultant aim to the original purpose? In the sphere of the organic and upward from it

into the historical, the moral and the religious, we begin to deal more definitely with the conception of a whole of parts serving a specific end; or in other words, where organism begins, purpose cannot be excluded. It is due to the reasoning of Kant, in his "Critique of Pure Judgment," to have clearly stated the necessity of purpose where the organic begins. But Kant has perhaps limited teleology too much in restricting it only to the organic, and allowing necessity to rule below the organic. After all, if the organic does show a direct and immediate purpose in the parts and organs of a single organism, this internal purpose in single structures leads to the consideration of purpose in wider spheres. A careful consideration does not permit a complete exclusion of purpose below the organic. Mechanism and finality are really related, and the mechanical inter-relation of the universe shows ends reached on a large scale.³ But even those who dispute this application cannot deny the application of purpose in comparison from biology upward. The problem, then, only is, where does purpose begin? No fair consideration of the universe can exclude purpose as apparent in it, at least in parts of it. This is sufficient to permit the hypothesis of teleology, which makes analogy cogent, and it allows for an ideal element in the universe, and for a presumptive argument for theism.

But the sphere in which the connection of purpose with comparison or analogy first touches Christianity most evidently is in history. There arises a real problem out of the comparison between the ideals and purposes of general history, and the specific history of Christianity. The special character of the history of Christianity has been largely doubted. Because it is interwoven with general history, and because particularly in the Middle Ages the history of Europe is largely the history of the Church,

³ Cf. Chapter V, p. 96.

and vice versa, therefore, the attempt has been made to absorb the history of Christianity into general history. Upon this claim the history of the Church and of Christianity is only a division of convenience in general history, and is not justified by its separate and distinct character and life. The similarity of the history of Christianity to general history has been pressed to the point of identity. Therefore, the critical principles of general history, which allow for no supernatural element and eliminate everything inexplicable and extraordinary, and deny everything miraculous, have been applied to the history of Christianity, and to the history of Israel, which Christianity claims as preparatory to its origin. It is true that there has arisen a treatment of the problems of Christianity from the point of view of the history of religions. In this history, miracles, prophecies, revelations, are found everywhere, and they are allowed to stand as psychological facts. But this admission does not settle the question of the real existence in Christianity of supernatural elements. It still allows for a theory of a purely natural historical evolution. With the philosophy of a purely human, natural development, controlled by noting the historic process in many nations in mind, many thinkers have reconstructed, first of all, the preparatory history leading to the New Testament in the Old Testament, which at the beginning of the Christian Church was largely the religious book of Christianity. Its documents have been critically severed, and human purpose, corrupting the purer ideals of the prophets by a narrow legalism, has been made the controlling factor. Though the earlier conjectures of reconstruction in the Old Testament are losing their hold, nevertheless the main idea of a natural development has not been abandoned. In the same spirit, the uniqueness of Christ has been questioned. He has been reduced either to a religious genius, whose life the

Church embellished by legends, or He has been explained as a myth which attached itself to a person. The history of the Church has also been re-edited into a real history by such a critical handling of the naïve accounts of the New Testament as shall make them really, as it is supposed, historical. This whole point of view which has determined the historical criticism of Christianity and its documents, rests on the idea of the entire similarity of the history of Christianity to all other history. Similar purposes, similar motives, and, therefore, real likeness are found. Now is this attitude correct, or must Christianity claim an exceptional treatment? If we are to answer this question, the problem must be traced further back. Our defense of taking the historical documents as they stand, and our refusal to reconstruct them as they are reconstructed by many historians, must rest on the fact of a specific nature of Christianity. The claim of the special character of Christianity in all history is due to the conviction of a unique revelation; and, therefore, the problem, whether it is justifiable to treat Christianity on the same assumption as other history, must be settled by answering the question, whether Christianity is merely a religion among other religions.

The difficulty of a real analogy between the history of Christianity and general history will thus lead us to the consideration of comparative religion. The reason why the history of Christianity is given no special privilege and place, is because it is denied that Christianity is the unique and final religion. It was Schleiermacher, who held that other forms of religion than Christianity were on the same basis of development; Christianity was more complete, but it was not the only true religion.⁴

This attitude is explicable from the fundamentally pan-

⁴ Cf. Schleiermacher, "Der Christliche Glaube," Introduction II, paragraph 7, 3.

theistic philosophy of Schleiermacher. Since his day there has arisen on the basis of general evolutionary principles the science of comparative religion. The naturalism of this general evolution, like the pantheism of Schleiermacher, finds a common process in all religions. With Schleiermacher the process was an ideal development, with many to-day the process is a natural, psychological one. By speculations of a psychological and anthropological sort, the origin of all religion is found either in animism,⁵ or magic,⁶ or in ancestor worship, according to Spencer, or in an impersonal power.⁷ The religion of the lower tribes is investigated, their religious beliefs and practices are analyzed, classified, and traced upward until the period of historic religions approaches. Common features are found in all faiths. In prayer, sacrifice, sacrament, the idea of God, of sin, etc., the mass of men are found to have comparable, common notions. Christianity is included in this process and elements of similarity to other religions are found in it. Is this inclusion really logically just? To accomplish it the minor elements of Christianity have frequently been emphasized, and passing errors as well as degenerations in its history have been used. The difference of meaning and claim in apparently like acts, as in prayer and sacrifice, and in apparently like occurrences, as in the Virgin Birth, is not maintained. What on the surface appears the same has a totally different import in Christian truth and history. This import is neglected, the original documents are wrongly reconstructed upon the basis of a merely human development, and then, of course, Christianity can be fitted into the plan of comparative religions. After the documents have been reconstructed upon the initial assumption of a natural development, they

⁵ Cf. Tylor, "Primitive Culture."

⁶ Frazer, "The Golden Bough."

⁷ Leuba, "A Psychological Study of Religion."

are again used to support in this reconstructed form the theory of a common human religious history. Thus the argument in the circle works itself out. But now there remains a larger question. Even after this process has accomplished all that it can, does Christianity appear more like, or more unlike, other religions? Does it possess ineradicable, peculiar features which, from the examination of facts, discredit the comparative procedure? Is Christianity not only superior, but does it possess truth of such a nature as bears finality within it?

It is not possible within the range of a short chapter to answer this fundamental question of Christian apologetics. It must be answered upon the basis of careful historical procedure. A few lines of claim can, however, be indicated. The Christian conception of God, combining the fullest and largest indications of nature with the highest moral and religious demands, in the ideal of God as Father is one great line of difference.⁸ The other religions have claimed its possession, since the spread of Christianity, but they have made it prominent out of all relation to their own past history and teaching, and have secretly changed their defective conception of God into the Christian idea. This appears very clearly if any one will study the documents of the World's Congress of Religions at Chicago, and compare it with the teaching and history of these religions. Another claim of Christianity is the ideal of Christ and the interpretation of humanity in Him. There is no approach to the breadth of humanity in Jesus either in Zoroaster, or Buddha or Mohammed. None of these possess the complete and perfect personality of Jesus, which supports His divine claim. In similar manner, prayer and sacrifice have received a different valuation, which is always overlooked by those who include Christianity within the compass of other faiths.

⁸ Cf. Orr, "The Christian View of God and the World."

One of the most permanent and valuable differences between Christianity and other faiths, is the nature of its ethical demands with their unlimited possibility of development in the world. Ethical developments have wrecked other religions. They overcame the ancient Greek faith; they are severely injuring Confucianism and Buddhism to-day. Christianity has been the constant inspirer of larger ethical progress. Even when ethical advances have sought to cut loose from Christian history they have finally needed the inspiration of some of its ideals. It is true that the organized form of the Church may not always readily respond to a new ethical ideal, and may be ignorant of the fact that secretly the force of Christian truth has wrought the very change which is opposed. But the other organized forms of society in family or state have also not adapted themselves quickly and readily to great changes. The force of conservatism in fixed forms and customs of society is always strong. Frequently the resistance of the state and of government has been mightier than that of religion. Despite some hesitancy, Christianity has been able to adopt the most ambitious program of modern progress. It has adopted, inspired through Christian personalities, if not through direct organizations of the Church, the peace movement, the child labor question, and many similar problems sufficient to wreck any other faith. Some of its ideals, as that of non-resistance, are not yet realized. They are called impracticable in an age of competition. The larger growth of co-operation will help to justify the neglected truth, that Christianity is opposed to the principle of an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. In this, one of its oldest truths, is the possibility of a moral progress and expansion which is not yet realized. When such and similar facts carefully gathered from the Bible and Christian history are combined, it will in the end appear that there is a difference between Christianity

and other faiths larger than the modern comparative argument allows. The burden upon the present apologetic of Christianity is the full and clear elaboration of this ethical claim by a careful and critical use of facts.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONJECTURAL SCHEME

IN all thinking conjecture plays a large part. Many results are not fully demonstrated, they are simply accepted because they are highly probable. Probability and not necessity enters into most of our intellectual possessions. When the question of probability is approached, the first effort is to make probability more definite by calculation, which seeks to determine chances as they approach reality. Mathematically probability is expressed in a fraction, whose denominator gives the total number of possible cases, and whose numerator shows the actual number that have occurred. The relation of the numerator to the denominator shows the amount of approach to certainty. If a quantitative series should be arranged, the movement of the numerator toward the denominator would show how closely probability can approach certainty. The mathematical form and the calculation of chances and probabilities is an effort to improve on the old enumerative induction of Aristotle. Most cases of probability, however, are not calculable mathematically. They are not such simple cases as the average of births and the rate of death, but they fall under a qualitative probability which is less exact than the mathematical doctrine of chances. Much of our practical life and many of our choices are determined by such general considerations of probability. There is incalculable chance in a large part of our experience, no matter how definite its outcome may be. The present and the hope of the future is subject to chance, which is our admission of ignorance. Experience is not in its formative stage definite, but shift-

ing, changing, multiform, heterogeneous, leading to novelty amidst all similarity.

Much of human evidence, whether in a trial at court, or in historical sources, is subject to the calculation of probability. Circumstantial evidence is more so than direct human evidence. But even the most direct human evidence with no desire to be untruthful has its contradictions, and, therefore, is never absolutely unified and consistent. If this experience of human evidence is rightly valued, it must affect the problems of evidence in historical documents. We can never expect to have completely accordant accounts; minor difficulties will always remain. It is all the more remarkable in view of this fact, to find that the accounts of the gospels, which bear no marks of having been tampered with, are in such large agreement. There are, naturally, minor difficulties, particularly if the effort is made to bring into unity in a chronological way the evidence of the witnesses of Christ's resurrection. But all accounts have no larger problems than are naturally found in evidence. A careful consideration of what probability means in evidence is favorable, and more than favorable to the New Testament accounts.

Probability in human experience is very illuminating when applied to Christian experience. In our day, when in our Christian thinking we so frequently return in proof of a Christian truth or conviction to experience, it must be remembered that from experience as a source we can obtain only probable results. The assurance of the truths in Christian experience, and the belief in their real eternal existence, are certain. But the appropriation of the truths and their working out in Christian experience is subject to the approximations toward pureness in experience. This consideration is necessary for the defenders of the faith, so that they may not ascribe to Christian experience undue certainty. The authority of the original ac-

counts of Christian experience and their normative value is due to the conception of revelation and not to the character of experience. Experience, as experience, can never attain full certainty. It is equally important for those who doubt or oppose Christian truth, to note that they have no right to demand a superior certainty in Christian experience. The same probability which rules in other spheres, and upon which science builds up its conjectures, must in all fairness be allowed to Christianity.

Another question which arises out of the fact of probability and chance, is their relation to the Christian conception of Providence. What chance, which lies back of probability, means, is fundamentally our impossibility to determine, in full detail, the course of our life. Chance expresses the fact of our uncertainty and of our impotence to control occurrences of our life. There are chances and probabilities in science, but despite these thinking still holds to the ideal of uniform and inviolable law in nature. It cannot abandon this supposition without destroying itself. If everything were chance and chance were final, ignorance and helplessness would be final; and there could be no order even on the basis of probability. We cannot deny chance but we look rather to its determined elements than to its undetermined remnant. Consequently, we formulate laws even on the foundation of the similarities in chance. If science operates on this basis, is it not possible and equally just for faith to assume a Providence and to select the orderly elements of life in its favor? The dwelling on the facts favorable to Providence is no more a distortion, than the selection of classifiable facts from the whole realm of the unclassified, probable, and doubtful data in establishing a scientific law.

Of more value in the conjectural way of arguing than probability, is hypothesis. There can be no scientific progress without the use of hypothesis, which is created by

sound imagination. Such imagination before all verification projects a possible and a probable explanation. When this projection is made, the hypothesis is one that seeks to find, and is rightly called a finding hypothesis. Its character is not that of a mere guess, but it presupposes facts and experiences, knowledge and scientific training. It cannot be made without postulates, which are conditions in a given set of appearances that call for a certain solution. The hypothesis, then, which answers to these postulates and demands, seeks to reply to their request. When it seems to make possible a fair arrangement and to give a plausible demonstration it is adopted and becomes a working hypothesis, in which a number of agents make clear a law or principle. Such a hypothesis is imaginative, but it is not a fiction. In a fiction we would refer a consequent to an antecedent, which we know cannot produce it. In hypothesis we sometimes find that we cannot discover the real agent, which must always remain an assumption, but not a real fiction. Even when scientific men appear to make the wildest trials, they are only actively theorizing. Their theorizing is successful when the hypotheses work out. A large set of accordant hypotheses, or hypotheses becoming more confirmed, may be called a theory. The whole situation of accordance of phenomena in testing them out is well described by Professor Hobhouse: "But it is admitted, that while there are some first principles which are true axioms, needing no proof, there are others which at the outset are mere assumptions, taken up for the purpose of seeing what flows from them. These conclusions can be tested by experience, and if there is agreement, the assumption on which they depend stands uncontradicted. It may be true. If further results are elicited, and the agreement with experience continues, it becomes difficult to believe that an assumption which works so well can be

false.”¹ It is in this manner that many of the results of science have been reached, as a body of judgments whose strength lies in their common support of each other. It was thus that Darwin was led on in his work.² Professor Tyndale has defended this proper use of imagination in science. He says: “We are gifted with the power of imagination,—combining what the Germans call *Anschauungsgabe* and *Einbildungskraft*,—and by this power we can lighten the darkness which surrounds the world of the senses. There are Tories in science who regard Imagination as a faculty to be feared and avoided rather than employed. They have observed its actions in weak vessels and were unduly impressed by its disasters. But they might with equal justice point to exploded boilers as an argument against the use of steam. Bounded and conditioned by co-operative Reason, Imagination becomes the mightiest instrument of the scientific discoverer. Newton’s passage from a falling apple to a falling moon was, at the outset, a leap of imagination. When William Thomson tries to place the ultimate particles of matter between his compass points, and to apply to them a scale of millimeters, he is powerfully aided by this faculty. And in much that has been recently said about protoplasm and life, we have the outgoings of the Imagination guided and controlled by the known analogies of science. In fact, without this power, our knowledge would be a mere tabulation of co-existences and sequences. We should still believe in the succession of day and night, of summer and winter; but the soul of Force would be dislodged from our universe; causal relations would disappear and with them that science which is now binding the parts of nature to an organic whole.”³

¹ “Development and Purpose,” p. 252.

² Cf. Francis Darwin, “Life and Letters of Charles Darwin,” Vol. I, p. 126.

³ “Use and Limit of Imagination in Science,” p. 16.

It appears, therefore, that hypothesis and the imagination which creates it are fundamental in inductive reasoning.

It has generally been thought unworthy of religion, and specially of Christianity, to employ such a speculative process of imagination as hypothesis implies. The certainty of faith seems to demand a sure foundation. Nevertheless it is true that, beyond the knowledge immediately given in Christian truth, Christianity in its intellectual formulations has been compelled to enter the hypothetical sphere. Many of the efforts to formulate a system of doctrines show the same speculative and imaginative procedure in giving a probable account of the mysteries of God, man, sin, salvation, as does science. Outside of biblical theology, there is a real chance for hypothesis and philosophical speculation. This, however, must not be permitted to determine the data of Christian faith, or to modify its character. But as in science, such imaginative framing of hypotheses has and can lead Christian thinking to new possibilities and fresh vistas.

One of the applications of hypothesis to Christianity is the use of criticism, particularly of a historical nature. There can be no inherent objection to such criticism, when it is applied to the documents and history of Christianity. These can be rightly examined both in the form of the texts and in their contents. Such examination is really a development of true induction when it rests upon examined, criticised and tested observations. The difficulties, that arise and seem to injure the very content of Christian truth, are not the result of a just hypothesis, but are derived from a wrong naturalistic presupposition. It is, therefore, not the proper application, but the abuse of conjectural imagination in the hypothesis through which criticism has injured Christian truth. If the value of religious experience is conserved in the criticism of the origins of Christianity, and if revelation is given its legiti-

mate worth, then only advantages can accrue from using proper hypotheses. These, in fact, have led to the rule of biblical theology, upon a careful historical basis. Through it Christian thought has been clarified, new life has been brought into Christian thinking, and the foundations have been furnished, upon which we can place the instances of Christian experience. But not only biblical theology has gained through historical hypotheses, they have also supplied material for the formulation of modern dogmatic systems. Frequently, however, the modern dogmatic systems have been philosophically colored rather than biblically controlled. They have failed to understand that the imagination in theological hypothesis dare not injure the primal facts and experiences of Christian truth. No requirement of the unity of a system can pass by contrary facts if they are properly attested. The problem must be to arrive at the best fundamental theory for all facts.

In any usable hypothesis a prime requirement is that it be simple and plausible. Too complex a conjecture does not reduce the multiform data to the simplicity which ought to characterize a real explanation. A very apt case illustrating this was the employment in astronomy of the hypothesis of epicycles. It required cycle upon cycle, and really destroyed itself by the very complexities to which it led. This demand of simplicity has been too largely disregarded in the conjectural analysis of biblical documents. The manner in which the hypothesis of sources was worked out led to continuous disintegration. Small fragments were all that was left after a complete analysis. The seams which were to unite the many patches were also of the minutest kind. There was a process of dissolution evident which had no right limits. Frequently the analysis was based upon a few words, and a fictitious editor was introduced, who formed a new document in the

most arbitrary manner. The artificiality of the whole procedure, unknown in other literature, made it fall short of plausibility, and was the result of complex character in the hypothesis. This same mistake was committed when Judaism and Christianity were thought to be derived from combinations of other religion. The resultant history was a complex combination in which the unity and simplicity of both of these faiths suffered. The difficulty was not simply the historical problems arising from tracing elements in these religions to other religions, without sufficient evidence of dependence, but the total explanation described a complex situation out of all accord with the simplicity of a religious faith.

Another great necessity in any hypothesis is the demand of its sufficiency. A hypothesis must include all data to be explained, and must give a fairly adequate conjecture to embrace all elements. This demand, so cogent in science, has been very much violated in treating Christianity. In the great body of critical work, the aim has been to satisfy sometimes merely the facts of literature, and sometimes merely the facts of history. There have been saner critics, who have combined both properly. But even when the hypotheses of literature and history were just, there has often been a real failure, because critics forgot that it was religion which they dealt with. The inner facts of faith were disregarded, Christian truth and experience were overlooked, and, consequently, the total hypothesis was inadequate. It was like explaining poetry merely as meter and rhythm and neglecting its soul. It was like analyzing the grammar of oratory and forgetting the motive of the orator. The fundamental difficulty with the critical efforts has been the neglect or denial of the vitally religious facts as most necessary to an adequate critical hypothesis.

Different hypotheses have different value as they can

be arranged in their approach to certainty. Some hypotheses are fully demonstrable by discoveries. One of the great instances of this was the finding of the new planet, Neptune, by Leverrier and Adams. But most hypotheses do not allow for facts that shall be discovered to confirm or disprove them. It is impossible by the very nature of some hypotheses to absolutely prove or disprove them. They must be accepted as probable if they are thinkable and useful, and are capable of explaining connected appearances. They become strong in proportion as they increasingly fit new discoveries. To this class of hypotheses belongs the doctrine of evolution. Its very character excludes real demonstrability. The utility of such a hypothesis can become very high, but it can never reach the place of a fully assured and confirmed theory. The effort has been made constantly to extend evolution beyond its biological limits and to try it out as a universal theory. Of course, mankind in the discovery of any new hypothesis attempts, especially if this hypothesis gains large ground, to unify its knowledge. Consequently, when a great hypothesis helps masses of facts, it is liable to become controlling and to press into every science. Thus it assumes a place of certainty not guaranteed by its nature. Accurate thinking cannot allow such extension. When this limitation is kept in mind, there can be no difficulty as long as evolution as a naturalistic hypothesis does not claim to explain spiritual facts.

The proper rating of hypothesis in science will also lead us to give it a right place in religion. When we deal in so much of our thinking with the hypothetical, we have no right in the far more difficult and universal problems of religion to demand certainty in the intellectual and speculative features. As a direct experience of life religion will always have its own immediate evidence, but when we come to the proofs of its assertions, if such as-

sertions are to be proved intellectually, we can only reach hypothetical assurance. Consequently, science must not demand of religion greater certainty than it reaches. It has no right to dispute the value of the religious hypotheses in theology, because they are hypotheses; nor can it dispute the privilege of religion to make its own conjectures in consonance with its nature and character. Science cannot disqualify religious facts by hypotheses of science. Similarly, in the scientific formulation of facts, and in the framing of scientific philosophy, faith, through the evidence of things not seen, cannot as faith, when it steps into the realm of logical proof, demand that its hypotheses shall control science. It cannot demand an exceptional logic. Consequently, religion cannot give higher and more certain logical valuation to its speculations as far as they are speculations and not experiences. This just limitation will be exceedingly helpful to a true apologetic. Its violation has caused much difficulty, and has done much harm to Christianity.

A remarkable fact about all hypotheses is their mental character. All the great suppositions of science have tended toward the invisible. In every science and in all life, there seems a pressure backward to the unseen. The reality of the unseen appears in all final thinking. It is a remarkable thing, that, when the scientific student of nature seeks explanation of phenomena, he presses beyond the visible facts. Explanation has as its purpose to make real to the mind the questions and problems put by observation and experiment. We ask and must ask why are things as they are. From what we see we are led to argue back to the causes from which at last all visible effects come.

Thus the physicist finds the cause of light and sound in minute waves, that are only demonstrated by certain visible effects. In themselves they are unseen. Similarly

wireless telegraphy and the passing of electricity through the universe are explained best by assuming an invisible ether everywhere present. There can be no doubt that from the acceptance of such ether the physical phenomena gain a connected value and ground. The chemist no less than the physicist, when he asks for reasons and arranges his scientific results goes back to atoms. To-day it is even held by some chemists that the atom must be explained by corpuscles which are thought to be minute lines of force. Here again it is the smallest divisible particle beyond vision that is the basis of explanation. Does not chemistry, therefore, strengthen the right of the invisible?

When we pass from chemistry to biology we find the biologist dealing not merely with the movement and the chemical qualities of the cell. In order to explain heredity he assumes certain minute elements which carry in them the permanent possibilities of transmission. The invisible parts of the cell are called into the account for a full solution of the problems. If this natural, bodily life demands an invisible, can there be any objection in the spiritual life to pass from experienced invisible facts to other invisibles in order to explain the lower and directly-felt invisibles?

Psychology adds its emphasis to the trend towards the unseen. It shows us that we do not see the third dimension directly, whether we project it by vision or thought alone. Psychology rests on physiology. But physiology when it studies nerve-structure passes finally beyond itself. Then begins psychology. Its reality is consciousness, but consciousness fringes out into subconsciousness. Now subconsciousness is the realm where the mysterious presses in and demands the undiscovered invisibles beyond. Have we a right to stop if religion unfolds those invisibles?

The forces of the mind play also through humanity. Society is not explained ultimately by its industries, its

economics, its wealth. These rest on invisible forces and beliefs. If we mention but the part which credit plays in all economic progress, and realize that credit is belief, guaranteed it is true, but resting largely on confidence, an unseen force that holds men together, we must admit that even in its material pursuits society needs invisible foundations. It cannot live by bread alone. And thus also history seeks the explanation of the unseen. When our country was in the throes of birth it had no strong army, it possessed no great treasury. Finally the battles were fought on faith. There was unswerving faith in liberty and a strong conviction that democracy was real and could be realized, before it ever became a fact. If faith made America, what can it not do in things spiritual?

If then everywhere, in science, in sociology, in history we must seek the invisible factors as the ultimate explanation, have we a right consistently and logically to refuse the claims of the invisible given in personality? What are the ultimates for personality? In our ethical conception what is implied in obligation, right and conscience? As far as personality seeks moral aims, and this it must do, for personality demands character, can it stop short of the demand that its longings of mind and heart be satisfied in the belief in a personality still further in the invisible than phenomenal facts urge us to? Is this demand and belief not universal? Is it less cogent in the moral sphere than other arguments in the sphere of natural science? The conviction of the moral demand rests again on the religious longing, on the desire for God in worship both for the race and the individual.

Is it not just for faith to claim its right to the positing of things not seen, if science must go beyond things visible, even though it pictures them as they might be if they were visible? Can we not approach thus by a just hypothesis to a universe which is in part by the very

pressure of science and life, ruled by the Unseen in a manner approaching to Plato's speculation of eternal ideas? But the Unseen must not absorb the seen or we shall have an uncertain world; it lies back of the seen as its ultimate cause and explanation but not as a Total which swallows up all the world of seen things, men and facts. There seems no reason why we cannot thus frame on the foundation of the last assumptions of science, a view of the world which leads up very fairly and continuously to the postulates and hypotheses of faith.

CHAPTER V

THE MECHANICAL DEMAND

THE demand of the mechanical point of view is to conceive of the whole world in the picture and according to the method of a machine. It is not a new conception, and at present is very hard pressed. Nevertheless it has not been eliminated from a great deal of thinking in science. The idea which mechanism presents as the solution is that of millions of ultimate particles which move on and on, and constitute the real causal chain of all events. This actually connected chain of events and happenings must, according to the mechanical ideal, be traced back to the final moving particles of matter. From the lowest to the highest phenomena in the world the rule of mechanical force is assumed. In many quarters the mechanical connection of the world is not interpreted, as it occurs in causes and effects, in an altogether grossly material manner; but even if the grosser conceptions of matter in mechanism are not maintained, nevertheless, its whole trend is strongly anti-ideal. In its origins the mechanical view of the world is strictly due to the notions prevalent in mechanics and physics, but it has not remained within the narrow limits of its beginnings. The mechanical view has grown to be the chemical view, and this is all the more powerful since the modern combination of the science of chemistry and physics into physical chemistry. Now apparently the chemical view is not mechanical, and yet the explanation of chemistry through ultimate material particles, even though they be made electrical, is mechanistic. The mechanical conception finds in the chemical elements an addition through which it seeks to explain

life, and it also attempts to find the basis of thought through the chemistry of the brain. But despite the effort to save the contentions in the main of the older grosser material mechanism, through the refinement of the chemical conception, many of the objections to a merely physical mechanism still remain valid.

Mechanism deceives itself in the idea that it has encompassed fully the thought of cause, for it actually deals only with individual cases of sequence and material succession. It may name these causes, but from none of these successions can it derive their uniformity, cogency and necessity. Because it cannot find these elements in its causal chain it cannot really find cause. When mechanism deals with the lower elements of the universe as the ultimate particles it cannot explain the rational relations in the causal chain. The laws of the motion of matter, the proportionate inter-relations of molecules, the mathematical formula of mass, the law of chemical equivalence, and many similar mechanical facts will not allow for a mere material sequence. Unconsciously there is introduced the idea of rationalized matter or mind-matter, which is a contradiction in terms. Mechanism is even more helpless when it comes to the explanation of living organisms. It is true that there are those who believe that plants and animals are mere mechanisms, arranged with greater or less responsiveness to environment. These mechanisms are supposed to have grown up through the modification of original living tissue in the form of mechanical combinations. But such an explanation does not satisfy really and adequately any theory of organic structures. Hobhouse rightly says: "Whatever the cause or origin of the organism, it is in itself not a purely mechanical arrangement of parts. It is neither a machine created by intelligence *ab extra*, nor one built up by unintelligent processes. It is not a pure machine at all, but a whole in

which an organic, and that is a teleological, principle is at work within, operating on and modifying what are otherwise physical, mechanically determined elements, and so fashioning the growth and functioning of the parts to the requirements of the whole.”¹ In this statement Hobhouse has clearly expressed a real principle. It is not possible to have results, and relevant means toward an end, without the conception of purposive cause. Merely mechanical structures can be explained by mechanical principles, but this does not prove that mechanism explains the universe. Hobhouse again and properly says: “The denial of purposive causation, therefore, is not suggested, but repelled by general experience, and owes its existence only to the theory that everything must act by mechanical laws. But this theory is a pure assumption, which derives its apparent cogency from confusion with the quite different principle that everything must act in accordance with some law.”²

A peculiarity of the mechanical view, when it is rightly understood, is its static character. It can never make really clear to us causal progress. At the beginning the whole mass of matter is given. The given matter remains fundamentally indestructible. There can be no room for any real loss or any real addition. Therefore, whatever happens is only a change of combination of the ultimate particles of matter, and there is no real creative evolution. At the start there must be homogeneity, but it has never been shown on a mechanical basis how homogeneity can become heterogeneity. It is true that the homogeneity is supposed to be unstable, but the thought of such instability is itself a heterogeneity in the homogeneity. The assumption of mechanism with its fixed mass of matter is in absolute opposition to all real progress. This ap-

¹ “Development and Purpose,” p. 324.

² *Ibid.*, p. 326.

appears equally when the problem of energy or force is considered. It is impossible for energy in its transference to remain whole; still less is there progress. Normally the motion of bodies is interfered with and rest ensues. The kinetic energy is re-translated into the potential energy, but there is never the same full amount. Some portion of molar motion is always lost in its reduction to heat. Heat as a whole cannot, according to thinkers in physical science, be collected again to make the sum of original energy. Therefore, energy which can do mechanical work is diminishing. "There is a steady dissipation of available energy measured by the increase of 'entropy.' Thus the mechanical view of the universe, in strange contrast with that of biology, psychology, and as we may now add, of astronomy, chemistry and the physical theories of matter contemplates a process of steady degradation or dissolution rather than a process of evolution or development."³ Consequently the only ideal left to save a mechanical universe is to demand a rejuvenation in some kind of a cyclical manner. Such a cyclical universe was argued for by Nietzsche. He was really adding the religious possibility to the view of a mechanical universe. The religions which favor a universe of cycles are Brahmanism and Buddhism with their births and re-births. Christianity, however, does not fundamentally agree with a slowly degrading or static universe. It is true that its acceptance of the creation thinks of a certain ideally originated, and therefore ideally fixed universe. The degradation of evil in the world as a moral fact in human life and society is also emphasized by Christianity. But, despite these facts, Christianity embraces the thought of a real progress and growth of man conditioned by his being and living in Christ. It has hopes of a new world. Therefore, Christianity is not actually

³ Hobhouse, "Development and Purpose," p. 355.

a static religion, and even could mechanism be freed of its materialism, the thought of a fixed balance is after all contrary to the creative and historical ideal of the faith of Christ.

Another difficulty which grows out of mechanism is that it begins in its assumption of first cause with a complex notion and not a simple idea of matter. Matter is never alone. It is always combined with the thought of force or energy. Atomism can arrive nowhere without the thought of energy, and energy is, therefore, indispensable to the mechanical point of view. In its development and history, the mechanical point of view has tended toward the dynamical. Newton began with believing that the mechanical actions required a medium, and that gravitation demanded contact. He assumed force to be innate, inherent, and essential to matter. But Newton's idea was reverted by Boscovich, who held that matter is a congeries of mathematical points with the power of attracting or repelling according to fixed laws. The solid particles of Newton's assumption were rejected and inherent forces were supposed to act through a vacuum. The finite molecules of matter were reduced to infinitesimal mass points. The idea of Boscovich was developed by Lord Kelvin into the theory of a circling fluid. Later men have returned to the conception of ether and have not conceived action to take place through a vacuum; but the pressure of thought has been toward the emphasis of force and not of matter. Consequently, mechanism is almost compelled to conceive of energy as explanatory, rather than of matter. Such a physicist as Ostwald strongly argues on behalf of energy. But the problem of energy at once leads us away from the attitude of a successful mechanism and destroys it. The complexity in the original conception of matter and force has worked against matter. The increasing emphasis on force has brought physical theories

within the range of ideal interpretations.

Because energy can be idealized into will, its existence has been supposed to offer a favorable medium for Christianity. But if will be made into energy, violence is done to will. And if energy be conceived of as will, its conception has been changed. In such a procedure the will is made more natural and unmoral than it should be, and energy is made more ideal and moral than it can be. Consequently some Christian thinkers have been deceived in their supposition that the conception of energy is most usable in Christianity. The fact, however, that the German philosopher, Schopenhauer, could use the conception of will as impersonal and non-moral, that in the same manner von Hartmann could translate energy into the unconscious, and that Nietzsche made will to power brute force, demonstrates the danger of this combination of will and energy. The approach to divine will suggested by energy is very questionable. It can deflect the concept of God into mere activity, but any such emphasis in the idea of God necessarily leads away from the moral character of God and injures the thought of His personality. An equal injury is done to the inclusion of wisdom in the conception of God. Even the Christian ideal of God as love cannot be real if God be thought of as energy of spirit apart from wisdom. The very value of will as moral, as wise, as just, is lost when we press the view of energy. Only as God is more than will, and His will is wise, just and loving purpose, can His will be sustained as really a will of purpose, and not of impersonal force. Consequently, Christianity must be very cautious how it employs energy as descriptive of God. It is in danger of depersonalizing God and absorbing Him in nature if it stresses energy too much. Even will as will is not sufficient to guarantee a personal God, and where will is approached as energy, it is still less able to keep the idea of

a personal God and Father pure and intact.

It is impossible in the discussion of mechanism to avoid the question of its relation to purpose. It has sometimes been argued that the idea of the universe upon a mechanical basis, which makes it a machine, does not permit the thought of purpose or final cause. It may be true that mechanism in itself can be considered as indifferent to purpose. It may follow along its own peculiar lines no matter what the attendant circumstances or values may be. But while the mechanical explanation may answer the question of how, for example, wheel may move within wheel, nevertheless, the problem of the specific function always leads to the further question of purpose. No mechanism is really explained merely as a succession of efficient causes. There is an inter-relation and general arrangement, which takes up the units of mechanical actions, and gives them their full setting. Mechanism always tends toward plan. The more perfect the arrangement of the mechanical is, the more it argues for predetermination, the larger is its purposive character. It gradually passes over into the organic. From the purpose which is merely evident without there is a progress toward the purpose which appears within. We may begin in the universe by explaining a collocation of acts and occurrences merely by referring them to an antecedent collocation, but gradually these collocations require an answer of the relation of function to effect. When this answer is given we have arrived at the thought of purpose. And purpose implies not merely the action of force upon force, it is not merely forward motion, but it is also looking forward. There is in purpose a consciousness of plan, and in the consciousness of plan there is the evidence of mind. Successions of phenomena are not fully explanatory of the universe. It needs the rational relation and the adaptive adjustment. These are real elements of purpose and

mind. The mechanical, therefore, is not in itself complete. It must lead forward. Its answer to the question, why, is only half an answer, but its half requires the other half. Mechanism calls for final purpose.

The fact that mechanism cannot escape finality shows that when properly limited and rightly completed it is usable by Christianity. The question that remains is whether, as we approach finality from mechanism, we can really find an answer to the demand of purpose by making the evidence of mind immanent in the course of the universe all there is of mind, or whether, to maintain the integrity of the thought of purpose, we must make mind transcendent. It is true that the evidences of purpose are found in things and processes; but is it not mythological to ascribe to things, when they are seen in a rational and purposive whole, the strength to make that purpose? If it be maintained that the real explanation of purpose lies in the parts and that they are purposive in themselves, then the parts are the whole in their aim, which is contradictory. If the whole is needed even in any single collocation of particles or in any organism to explain the parts, then there is a departure from the strictly mechanical view, which maintains the ultimate value of separate particles and derives the whole from them. If the explanation of purpose, therefore, remains within things, it is either illogical, or degenerates again into the mechanical. Purpose conceived from the point of view of the whole is ideal. It is only as we maintain an ideal angle that purpose can be spoken of. The difficulty in the mechanical ideal is that it constantly levels down the facts of the universe to the possibility of a mechanical explanation. From the point of view of mechanics, life can have no spontaneity, mind no freedom, morals no real choice, and religion no spiritual value. Mechanism cannot answer the highest demands and it cannot do this because it is in-

capable of explaining purpose. In the loss of the idea of purpose all else in the higher realms of life is lost. It is true that mechanism may be portrayed in a very attractive form, and it may be used for a very refined materialism; but does this allow it to be conceived of as adequate to purpose, mind and soul? John Burroughs, who has sympathy with a mechanical and naturalistic view, is compelled to write thus: "When we have followed matter from mass to molecule, from molecule to atom, from atom to electron, and seen it in effect dematerialized — seen it in its fourth or ethereal, I had almost said, spiritual state,—when we have grasped the wonder of radio-activity, and the atomic transformations that attend it, we shall have a conception of the potencies and possibilities of matter that robs scientific materialism of most of its ugliness. Of course, no deductions of science can satisfy our longings for something kindred to our own spirits in the universe. But neither our telescopes nor our microscopes reveal such a reality. Is this longing only the result of our inevitable anthropomorphism, or is it the evidence of things unseen, the substance of things hoped for, the prophecy of our kinship with the farthest star? Can soul arise out of a soulless universe?"⁴

While we cannot accede, therefore, to the tendency of mechanism, of leveling the world down, is it an advantage to level the world up in such a manner as to eliminate mechanism? There seems a need from a religious point of view to maintain that a part of the universe is mechanical, even though the whole universe cannot be explained on a purely mechanical ideal. When we admit mechanism in the world we feel that we have allowed for real things. Now it is only in the conception of the reality of things, and their inter-relation as a part of the world, that Christianity can find a guarantee for

⁴ "Life as the Scientist Sees It," *Yale Review*, October, 1914, p. 48.

the purity of its theism. While absolute mechanism denies God, partial mechanism allows for the conception of a transcendent and personal God. It is quite possible to combine God's transcendence with mechanism, if mechanism be not all that exists. A transcendent and personal God is necessary in Christianity, and He must be above the universe; consequently, His immanence must be in effects and results, His presence personal and moral, and His power in nature not an imprisonment in the universe. Only the supposition of a secondary mechanism and of things apart from, though influenced by, divine mind and power can furnish the proper explanation of a world that leaves room for a real, personal, transcendent God. If this be so, then a modified mechanism, but not an absolute naturalism, is more useful to Christianity than any theory of pure idealism.

It has often been supposed that because complete mechanism was in opposition to Christianity, therefore, it had to appeal to idealism as its ally. But a passing review of some great idealistic systems shows this to be a misconception. When Platonism began to influence Christianity through Neo-Platonism, it introduced a pantheistic current. The high ideality of Platonism was cognate to the spirituality of Christianity. It was this inwardness of Platonism which helped Augustine toward Christianity. But in its fullness and details Platonism, in denying material things, injured the realistic side of Christianity. This appears very clearly in the difference of emphasis which Platonism and Christianity give to the body. Christianity maintains the vital connection of body and soul and believes in the resurrection of the body. It cannot conceive of a complete soul without a body, even though this body be called spiritual. For Platonism the body is the prison-house of the soul, and the important thing is the old Orphic tradition of the immortality of the

soul. It was, therefore, not accidental when the greater influence was exerted upon Christianity by Aristotle, whose idealism was tempered with the sense for the reality of things.

When we enter modern idealism, we find similar difficulties. None of the idealistic systems fuse with Christianity without detriment to Christian belief. It seemed a great discovery when Descartes was able to discover the thinking self as the foundation of certainty. But when he introduced God to guarantee the world, and when he employed the old argument of Anselm, he did not strengthen his position. His effort to prove God from the necessity of the idea of God, and from the contention that the thought of an Infinite in us could only be created by a real Infinite, was inefficient. This idealism, on the one hand made the world dreamlike; on the other hand, it necessitated a theory of mechanism which Descartes extended upward even in the animal world. The influence of the mechanical side of Descartes' theory aided mechanism, and his idealism failed in unifying the conception of the world with the idea of God. Apparently greater success awaited Spinoza, when he identified substance and God, but among the attributes of God the two most vital were thought and extension. Spinoza thus became the father of parallelism. His realistic idealism, after all, could find no real union. The result of parallelism has generally favored not so much mind as matter.

When Berkeley, in the interest of theism, began to found his psychological idealism a solution seemed to be at hand. But God became only the guarantor of ideas. He guaranteed phenomena, mere appearances made of the stuff of sensations, and not things. Berkeley's idealism in attempting to give the death-blow to matter denied the impression of the realism of things. This dissolution of things into mere ideas paved the way for Hume's analysis

of mind into mere impressions and sensations. The way in which Berkeley idealized things, with a sincere purpose to make them real in God, nevertheless introduced a sceptical element into the reality of outward experience. Hume applied this scepticism to the inward life of the mind. There was in Berkeley an illusory undercurrent which finally made mind and God illusory to Hume. The denial of things as real by consequence made ideas unreal. It appeared as though Kant had rescued idealism by his effort to balance things in themselves, appearances, and the categories of the mind. But so unknowable were the things in themselves, that the final effect of Kant was a new wave of idealism. The manner in which Kant endeavored to give unity to experience in the apperception of the ego determined the future. It was stronger in its after-effects than Kant's emphasis on things. Out of the apperception of the ego rose the idealism of Fichte. For him the ego is central as activity, will, vitality; but all data are combined in a great intellectual unity. The ego became absolute. Through it God was interpreted as the universal moral process, and as the ethical world order. The personal God was lost, and Fichte was accused of atheism. As little as Fichte could produce a system congruent with Christianity, so little was Schelling successful. It is true that in his system of identity he limited nature by the ego, but he also limited mind. Finally he fused the two into an identity which was indifference. But this indifference was absolute undetermined reason. It gravitated back to Spinoza. When Schelling began to speculate on religious philosophy he was led to an æsthetic idea. Religion was made a pious feeling of dependence, and God became a series of potencies in the imitation of Neo-Platonism. Schelling's speculations did not favor theism. Hegel completed the great idealistic movement in Germany. He conceived the whole world in terms of consciousness, in

which contradictions were resolved into unity. Thus he approached a monism of reason. To him all being is thought realized, and all becoming is a development of thought. In this development the absolute reality is God; He is the only individual. This individuality of God is, however, not personality. Hegel's religion is a passing phase, for it is the Absolute in personal relation to man. Religion must give way to philosophy where the Absolute finds himself as cosmic consciousness, as complete being, as absolute whole. The idealism of Hegel in the philosophy of religion reinterpreted Christian truths from this angle of rationalistic pantheism. The whole history, therefore, of idealism, shows its danger and prevents us, in the effort to escape from mechanism, from throwing ourselves into its arms. No idealistic theory, especially the most pure theory, is compatible with the theism of Christianity, its appreciation of things, its valuation of the body, and its conception of evil.

A real danger has entered modern theology in consequence of its bowing to idealistic schemes. It supposed that it could escape the materialistic danger in mechanism by making God immanent in the world. But this immanence cannot be maintained without finally injuring the idea of a personal God. It may lift up the grosser aspects of nature, but in doing this it must overlook the cruelties of nature, and the evil and sin of the world. Now Christianity, as a religion of redemption, will always be lowered when evil and sin are depreciated. If the thought of immanence is just to nature and man, it cannot deny their inequalities and wrongs; and then its immanent God becomes very imperfect. We are only safe when we maintain a transcendent God, not a Deistic God absolutely apart from the world, but a transcendent God, immanent by presence and effects, but not in essence and being. Christianity cannot surrender a personal God.

Therefore, it cannot adopt idealistic systems, for it is ideal in purpose, but not in metaphysics. Its metaphysical implications for the world are of a realistic nature. It wants a spiritual God and in the lower ranges a mechanical world. A world merely of ideas is not the world of Christianity. Therefore, a modified mechanism is far more compatible with Christianity than a thoroughgoing idealism. We must, however, not deny the ideal elements. The final values of righteousness and God must remain preeminent.

CHAPTER VI

THE BIOLOGICAL SUPPOSITION

OURS is peculiarly the age of biology. There had been interest in nature and study of nature for many a century, but only since the time of Darwin and with the establishment of the hypothesis of material evolution in nature did the modern science of biology take its real rise. From the second half of the nineteenth century until the present biological science has constantly advanced; it has reconstituted some of the former natural sciences, opened up new avenues of investigation, and annexed in its claims many other phases of thought. Its new points of view not only re-made botany, zoology, anatomy, physiology, and kindred sciences and sub-sciences, but it entered psychology and made its methods biological. It claims to give in the new explanation of mind, from the natural basis of man's past development and from the study of his nervous system and brain, a new solution of man's history, a new theory of economics and of society, of morals and of religion. In fact, it is pressing into every sphere. The successes of biology are, however, not complete. The biologists themselves are re-examining and doubting some of the older assumptions, and are particularly assailing Darwinism.¹ The absolute rule of the biological point of view is also opposed by logicians, who deny that all science is natural. They argue for a group of distinctly non-natural or spiritual sciences, which the Germans well designate as "Geisteswissenschaften." We are also passing, in our general thinking, from the

¹ Cf. Kellogg, "Darwinism To-day."

large influence of the older mechanico-causal idea of life and evolution to a more ideal conception. This ideal conception is claimed in the philosophy of Bergson and Eucken to be the solvent of true science and life. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to examine the purely naturalistic biological ideas, because they still rule and determine much of the thinking in both scientific and popular presentation of the world of nature.

The first result, which followed from reducing life as a mysterious secret to an idea, that can be described in the terms of the chain of secondary causes, was to take life out of the long prevalent scheme of purpose. Since the day of Aristotle the teleological point of view had ruled in the studies of nature, but now the effort was made to find out its actual phenomena as efficient causes in direct material contact. Darwin repudiated the older idea of purpose and opposed the argument from design as it had been stated by Paley. He writes to Asa Gray, in 1860: "But I grieve to say that I cannot honestly go as far as you do about Design. I am conscious that I am in an utterly hopeless muddle. I cannot think that the world, as we see it is the result of chance; and yet I cannot look at each separate thing as the result of Design."² In 1861 Darwin writes to Miss Wedgwood: "The mind refuses to look at this universe, being what it is, without having been designed; yet, where one would most expect design, viz., in the structure of a sentient being, the more I think on the subject, the less I can see proof of design."³ As Darwin grew older, he became more determinately opposed to design. In 1876 he states in reference to the gospels and their evidence: "Thus disbelief crept over me at a very slow rate, but was at last complete. The rate

² "The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin," by Francis Darwin, II, p. 146.

³ *Ibid.*, I, p. 283.

was so slow that I felt no distress.”⁴ And then he continues: “Although I did not think much about the existence of a personal God until a considerably later period of my life, I will here give the vague conclusions to which I have been driven. The old argument from design in Nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so conclusive, fails, now that the law of natural selection has been discovered. We can no longer argue that, for instance, the beautiful hinge of a bivalve shell must have been made by an intelligent being, like the hinge of a door by man. There seems to be no more design in the variability of organic beings, and in the action of natural selection, than in the course which the wind blows.”⁵ This negative attitude of Darwin gradually became the ruling one, although Huxley attempted to adjust the newer biological results to a reformulated idea of final cause and purpose. On the whole, biology excluded any consideration of first and final cause as Darwin had done. It became in some of its advocates, not merely non-religious and non-committal on Christianity; it not only seemed to further the loss of the spiritual sense as in Spencer; but it was actually taken up by a group of decided anti-religious and anti-Christian thinkers like the Germans Moleschott, Vogt, Buechner, and Haeckel. They added strong philosophic materialism to biological research. Consequently the taboo on any question of purpose became more severe.

It may have been of great use in the furtherance of biology to examine phenomena directly and to avoid any interference from the question of purpose. A wrong teleology had injured careful observation from a deductive application of what ought to be in the face of facts. But has evolution been able to show that all purpose in the

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, p. 278.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I, p. 278.

interpretation of nature is finally impossible? If so, it must, of course, forever oppose a religious explanation of the world. The fear of biology at the beginning of its modern period, that religion would becloud and deny its facts, a fear partly justified by the manner of the attack of Bishop Wilberforce, was too great. Because of its fear of the influence of religion, biology also attempted to avoid, as it supposed, all philosophical questions and theories, that might prejudice its investigations. But many biologists failed to see that they had taken a philosophical attitude when they conceived of evolution as causal in the mechanical sense. They began, before life had experimentally been reduced to mechanical terms, to favor a mechanical conception of the universe. In so doing they took upon themselves all the burdens and difficulties of this point of view. In addition they gave a definite coloring to the idea of cause. Cause in the Darwinian theory must be, if rightly construed, phenomenal succession. But this succession was made at the same time to be both causal and phenomenal. The ignorance of philosophy misled the biologists. They did not apparently know that Hume had defined causes to be mere successions, and yet found it essential to make the succession necessary. Mill was put under the same constraint. Necessity must belong to the causal chain, if it is to be causal. If this be so, how can we have accidental variation and progress, and a causal chain? But there is still another contradiction in the causal idea of Darwinism. While apparently it does not place causes in things, nevertheless, by its mechanical conception it mythologizes cause, and must believe that the antecedents are the full *raison d'être* of the consequents. The development of higher inductive logic, whether in Sigwart or Erdmann, who follow Kant, has led the best thinkers to put the foundation of causality into mind. The only escape is ascribing mind to all matter, and this position of

panpsychism has actually been taken by Haeckel.

Because the reigning view of evolution was influenced by a causal notion that necessarily excluded purpose it could not be favorable to any indications that made for a real teleology. The increasing indications of purpose in the ascending scale of beings were passed by. There was no comparison of lower or higher forms from the point of view of complexity of plan. While such examination in reference to plan may have been outside of the immediate aim of evolution, its legitimacy ought not to have been denied. Despite the denial, it remains true, as Professor Ward says: "Comparing the lower forms of life with the higher, it is at once obvious that the non-teleological factors seem more exclusively the efficient ones the lower down the scale we go, while the teleological factors come more clearly into play the higher we ascend."⁶ It is the disregard of purpose which also largely influenced the attitude toward the arguments of Paley. It is true that Paley in his *Natural Theology* approaches the idea of purpose from the older scientific notion of a species. He frequently speaks of contrivance. But it has been overlooked that in the face of his limitations he approaches the conception of growth in the idea of the watch which can produce another watch. There is a real valuation of the relation of mechanism to organism. When Hobhouse in his modern discussion of development and purpose undertakes to argue for purpose, he also begins with the idea of a machine. There is a real parallel between the argument of Hobhouse and Paley. Perhaps Paley's use of design as it was interpreted by the early evolutionists created an unjust prejudice against the actual value of his argument. It must be evident to the student, that though we have shifted our viewpoint from contrivance to organism, and from design to purpose, nevertheless, Paley

⁶ "Naturalism and Agnosticism," Vol. I, p. 281.

does not deserve the criticisms which have been heaped upon him.

One of the great difficulties with the philosophic side of evolution is, that the biologists have not seen the implications of the very terms which they have employed, and have not noted the impossibility of eliminating plan and purpose from the evidences of nature. In the very term evolution itself there lies hidden the thought of advance or progress. We cannot conceive of an evolution which stands still. It cannot move in a circle or return upon itself. There may be intervals of apparent rest or of decline, but the total movement must be upward. Evolution without progress is contradictory. Progress means going somewhere; it is a term which includes aims and ends. It may not be possible to discover purpose at once in things, but purpose certainly appears in evolution. Hobhouse says: "The evolutionary process can be best understood as the effect of a purpose slowly working itself out under limiting conditions which it brings successively under control."⁷ Evolution receives its value from the idea implied in purpose as a necessary element in evolution. Bergson may be correct in part when he denies that purpose appears in the onward flow of life. Nevertheless, he must admit that, as we look back, we find purpose. But if we find purpose in looking backward, evolution cannot be "we're going but we know not where." The fact that in looking backward we seem to have arrived somewhere shows that we were going somewhere. Mere impulse as impulse is not evolution, not progress. Hobhouse has made a real point when he says: "A mere vital impulse may blow like the wind where it listeth, so that none can tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth. But creative or rather plastic mind is that which moves towards ends which are worth reach-

⁷ "Development and Purpose," Intro., xxvi.

ing, and because they are worth reaching.”⁸ Can we have real evolution with its idea of advance without assuming creative mind?⁹

There has been a disregard on the part of evolutionists when they discussed the problem of natural selection to note what it ought to mean and what the difficulties in its way were. The term natural selection was originally a generalization. It maintained that certain forms remained after the struggle for existence had broken the continuous line of development and made it discontinuous. Darwin sometimes used the term to denote the result and not the process. It never was to be conceived of as a force, but only as the description of a process or a result. But the problem is, whether this process can be called and actually is a selection as long as the variations through which it appears are merely of the nature of chance. The Darwinian conception holds that the variations proceed along fortuitous lines. In opposition to this assumption of fortuitousness there stand not only the implied notion of selection, but also the difficulties of a mathematical nature, which arise from the doctrine of chances. According to the formula of chances, which is involved in fortuitous variation, it is exceedingly difficult for the variations to arise and to be perpetuated in the manner in which evolutionism assumes. Not only in the first appearance of an advantageous variation is fortuity over-strained, but also in the transmission.¹⁰ The doctrine of chances will also not allow for the fact of the highest forms. Numerically the average ought to live. Furthermore, Galton has worked out a calculation of regression, which opposes the strong assumption of the accidental variation which general orthodox Darwinism made. Therefore, there is great

⁸ *Ibid.*, Intro., p. xxviii.

⁹ Cf. Part II, Chapter VI, p. 244 ff.

¹⁰ Cf. Martineau, “A Study of Religion,” Vol. I, p. 263 ff.

difficulty in the assumption of slow insensible and accidental variation. There are also difficulties in the actual examination of facts of nature when we suppose changes of a purely accidental and slight character to take place. If every organic structure is the result of slow and gradual accumulation of very small differences, then such a complex structure as the human eye compared with the eye of a mollusk, like the common pecten, is not really explicable. As Bergson¹¹ has shown, it is impossible, when we compare not function to organ, but two terms of the same nature, as organ with organ, to maintain accidentalism. While mollusks and vertebrates may be traced back to a common beginning, yet they developed before there was any eye. How can we explain on the basis of slight accidental changes the same essential parts in the eyes of both the mollusks and the vertebrates? It is only possible, if in such a structure as the eye we have two forms changing point by point in essentially the same way. Professor Watson on this subject rightly concludes thus: "We have, therefore, to suppose that every part of the organ simultaneously develops correlated variations; so that, not only does variation arise accidentally, but equally accidentally there emerge a number of correlated variations; and these on the hypothesis must arise accidentally in two entirely independent lines of evolution."¹²

There is another manner in which by variations natural selection is supposed to have happened. In contrast to Darwin's theory of slow and slight variations the assumption has been made that the variations occur suddenly and simultaneously. Darwin considered sudden variations "sports," or monstrosities that could not perpetuate themselves. But the Englishman Bateson claimed quick changes. His claim acquired great importance after the

¹¹ "Creative Evolution," p. 60.

¹² "The Interpretation of Religious Experience," Part II, p. 164.

experiment of the botanist De Vries, who working on the *Oenothera Lamarckiana*, a species of primrose, obtained new species by mutations in a few generations. He claimed that in the period of mutation many changes in different directions take place. While this doctrine attempts to unify the organism it is still a doctrine of accidentalism. It cannot be used in face of the fact of apparently discoverable slow variations in the animal world. At the same time it does not account for the variation of a similar nature, such as we find in the eye of the mollusk and the vertebrate. In reference to the difficulties which accidental variation has, even on the supposition of the theory of mutation, Bergson rightly argues: "But here there arises another problem, no less formidable, viz., how do all the parts of the visual apparatus, suddenly changed, remain so well co-ordinated that the eye continues to exercise its function? For the change of one part alone will make vision impossible, unless this change is absolutely infinitesimal. The parts must then all change at once, each consulting the other. I agree that a great number of un-co-ordinated variations may indeed have arisen in less fortunate individuals, that natural selection may have eliminated these, and that only the combination fit to endure, capable of preserving and improving vision, has survived. Still, this combination had to be produced. And, supposing chance to have granted this favor once, can we admit that it repeats the self-same favor in the course of the history of a species, so as to give rise, every time, all at once, to new complications marvelously regulated with reference to each other, and so related to former complications as to go further on in the same direction?"¹³

The difficulty in both the sudden and slight theory of accidental variation has arisen from the disregard of

¹³ "Creative Evolution," p. 65.

organic structures. The long line of continuity in mechanical causes to create new species by variation has been emphasized to the detriment of the value of individual organisms. It is true that Darwin realized the fact of co-ordination in organic structures, nevertheless he did not give it adequate place in his whole theory. The co-ordination and inter-relation in the whole and in the parts of single organisms is very difficult to maintain in the light of accidental changes. The different organs are all connected to function for a common end. Where organs are lost they are replaced for the same purpose as the lost organs. Where parts of the tissue can not be replaced in the form of the same organs the tissue of other organs can adapt itself to function toward the same end. The life, therefore, of single organisms, if studied minutely, does not favor chance and accident. In a similar manner, when we compare the anatomical structures of different beings it is impossible to explain the similarity simply as mechanical continuity. The very likeness implies similarity of function, and as an argument in analogy it has elements of purpose.¹⁴ When we approach the study of embryology, it may on the one hand show us in higher structures the repetition of the antecedent lower structures in the early stages of the embryo; but on the other hand, the embryo is, after all its development, an embryo of a definite kind and comes to a definite completion. In view of this difficulty arising from the study of co-ordination, and of the contradictions involved in the assumption of slow or sudden accidental changes, it is very inconsequent and illogical to maintain an accidental natural selection.

There are two additional facts which also create a probability on behalf of a selection which is more than accidental. The one important fact is the occurrence in nature of mimicry. Certain forms are imitations of other

¹⁴ Cf. Chapter III, p. 69 ff.

forms for their self-protection. A typical instance is that of the two types of moth called *Anosia* and *Basilarchia*. The former is avoided by birds because it is unpalatable to them, and the latter, which is palatable, escapes the birds because its coloring mimics that of the *Anosia*. Similar instances of color protection frequently occur in the animal world. They certainly argue in favor of protective plan, and are not explicable as mere accidents. The other notable fact is the occurrence of instinct. It is of course a fact, that no animal has any notion of self-preservation or of its service to its species in its instinctive acts. They are done automatically. The nervous system seems pre-organized to certain reactions. Nevertheless it is still true that instinct reaches certain ends and purposes, even though they are not consciously known by the animal. Their occurrence cannot be explained as accidental.

The insufficiency of accident as a part in variation has led to the theory that variation followed along definite lines. It was the work of the German biologist Eimer to show that transformation is brought about by influences continuously exerted in the same direction. Over against the Darwinian view of fortuitous variation, he apparently demonstrated the theory of orthogenesis, or variation along definite lines. It may not be possible to discover at all times the definiteness in the process, and there may be more accident apparent than orthogenesis allows. It cannot, however, be disputed that the result of the process is definite species and definite forms. Not only is every organism a correlated whole of inter-working parts for a certain end, but organism fits to organism as we examine the result of the process. Consequently in the examination of the whole organic world purpose cannot be denied. Therefore, natural selection, insufficient to explain facts when it is accidental, has led some Germans to suppose a vital force, which expressed itself in certain controlling

and dominant ways. The dominant was supposed to be an ideal shaping power in the organism. It has not been considered possible to prove this theory of dominants or living entelechies. Nevertheless, its value has been to show the purposive nature of organisms. The whole trend in the problem of natural selection has been toward purpose, and consequently natural selection has increasingly gained a teleological meaning. With the teleological import assured there can be no quarrel between the hypothesis of natural selection and the Christian ideal of a plan in nature.

In passing from the meaning of natural selection to another great term, viz., environment, it is necessary in passing to notice two minor terms employed in the biological theory of evolution. The first is survival of the fittest. Forms may survive after natural selection has done its work, or perhaps after environment has produced the forms. But in whatever way survival of the fittest may be used, we cannot eliminate the teleological character of "fittest." The second term is adaptation. This term is far more congruent to the conception of environment, but its coloring is as purposive as survival of the fittest. Both terms, however, are secondary in importance to the conception of environment. The theory of environment, like the theory of natural selection, is also a mechanical theory. It attempts to derive forms from external influences. Not the inner changes of an organism, but the influences of outer circumstances are to determine it. If we take the case of the human eye, referred to above, the theory of environment maintains that the eye is developed by the direct action of the light itself. It is supposed that the light made the first pigment spot and then brought about gradually the complex eye. This theory of environment, however, is not adequate without some added principle. It was Lamarck who believed that living beings dis-

played a certain selective activity, and made an effort to adapt themselves to their environment. They thus modified their structure, and through the use or disuse of organs, transmitted their character to their descendants. But it has been disputed whether acquired character can be handed down. The transmission seems more or less exceptional. While the theory of environment is important and played a part in Darwin's original speculations, his followers, the neo-Darwinians, have almost exclusively emphasized natural selection. Their opponents, the followers of Lamarck, or neo-Lamarckians, have disputed the reign of the almightiness of natural selection. In opposition they have emphasized functional use and environment. Now environment may be interpreted in its manifoldness and indeterminateness as working accidentally. The results, however, have not been brought about in life-forms by the shifting and indeterminate character of the environment, but rather by certain definite influences which produced results of a definite kind. The fact that Lamarck had to add to environment selective adaptation and the functional use of organs does not disprove this contention. Lamarck, moreover, can be only understood rightly on the supposition that his theory must inevitably lead to purpose.

Whenever the idea of purpose has become larger, there has also been more room for the conception of order which allows for freedom. The accidental point of view at all times is more fatalistic. This is the fact because the purposive view implies mind. There has been too much limitation in evolution to the lower terms and not sufficient allowance for the higher terms. Had these been considered as a part in evolution, it would have been juster in its earlier attempts to solve purpose. There could have been no absolutism of natural selection or environment. It must be remembered as Howison says, that "The

whole question, so far as anything more than conjectural evidence is concerned, is man's question: he is the witness to himself for evolution; in his consciousness, directly, and only there, does the demand arise for an explanation of it; in himself he comes upon a nature of mind as directly causal of the form in Nature — of the ideally genetic connexion holding from part to part in it — and of the reality of progress there as measured by his ideal of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good.”¹⁵

It is the maintenance of these higher elements, of mind and its ideals, which must be included if environment is not to be over-emphasized. The abuse of environment has been due, however, not altogether to the students of nature. The popularizers of natural facts and theories have done much to over-state the place of environment. The influences of biological theory, particularly in reference to environment, have controlled some sociologists. In describing society they were not determined by its psychological aspect, and they did not study it in correlation to the ideals of mind, but rather in relation to the pressure of nature. Environment was then made a very large cause in shaping life. The physical surroundings and the economic conditions were described as the real sources of progress or decay, of virtue or vice. In such a description the spiritual and ideal environment was frequently neglected. The whole account tended to portray man in society as the creature of conditions. In opposition to such naturalistic determinism, Christianity, without denying the reality of existing conditions, proclaims the message of faith. This message appeals to the power of personality to overcome conditions, to bear burdens, to conquer temptations and to change the world. Freedom of life through a divine impetus, and the power of divine environment to stimulate and make free personalities, is fundamental to Christian-

¹⁵ “The Limits of Evolution,” p. 42.

ity, and it cannot admit the usual material conception of environment. Environment is a problem for man to solve, and not a slavery to accept. It must be man's purpose, according to Christianity, to understand and change the environment that might unmake him, and guided by the higher purposes of life, to conquer nature, and to abstract from her laws the chance of his spiritual growth.

Another of the great terms of evolution is the term heredity. Heredity is emphasized by some men over against mere environment. It has found its advocates among the neo-Darwinians. In the explanation of what the elements are which are handed on from generation to generation, Weismann studied the constitution of the living cells. He finds that we must maintain a distinction among cells. There is, according to him, a germinal cell through which the character of forms is determined. This he regards independent of the somatic cell by which no characters can be handed on. There have been as strong advocates of the absolute power of heredity as of environment. Heredity has been frequently pressed to the extreme, and conceived of as a mighty non-personal force dominating individual lives and casting them into the molds of necessity. It is true, that the investigations of the Austrian priest Mendel in plant-life have demonstrated the existence and influence of strains of heredity in nature. The extension of Mendel's law has shown itself practicable in the pathology of cases of insanity. Certain definite deviations have been traced back to ancestry. But there has not at all times been an allowance for the separate fact of the psychology of insanity. It has largely been made material and physical. Never, however, has heredity been able to deny the element of purpose. Its very analysis makes it purposive. The more heredity attempts to remove novelty and original individuality, the more it has in mind a definitely calculable result, even though this re-

sult and its cause is made purely material. The difficulty with heredity is its underlying assumption of necessity. It may be conceived in an accidental way, but the calculations of Mendel make it purposive.

The material idea of heredity has found a strong philosophical expression in Nietzsche. It is his dream of the future that the physically unfit shall be removed and the proper conditions for creating the super-man shall be established. By proper heredity physical strength is to be handed down and to show itself in the will toward power. The great problem of mankind is, therefore, the problem of physical betterment. Nietzsche finds no place in his speculations for Christianity. This he believes to be the result of a period of decadent weakness. Its ideal of helping the weak and sustaining the suppressed is to him the hinderance of real progress. Real progress depends upon breeding the real type of man. Christianity must be hated and warred against. Says Nietzsche: "Christianity has taken the part of everything that is weak, low, unsuccessful, it has made an ideal out of the contradiction against the instincts of the preservation of the strong life; it has spoiled the reason of the spiritually strongest natures, inasmuch as it taught them to feel the highest worth of spiritualness¹⁶ as sinful, as leading astray, as temptation."¹⁷ In other words, Nietzsche declares war on Christianity from the point of view of physical heredity. His controlling ideal is the physically perfect man. This same ideal is the motive of the rising science of eugenics. It may not, like Nietzsche, reject all goodness which is not physical soundness; it may allow for the moral and religious beyond it. Nevertheless, the manner in which it stresses physical heredity aids materialism and determin-

¹⁶ Nietzsche opposes humility, but his idea of spiritualness is physical prowess, and thus mental strength.

¹⁷ "Der Antichrist," Erstes Buch, Par. 5.

ism. It has certain facts in its favor, but it uses them without proper limitation. Its dream of a new humanity is through better physical parentage. Spiritual factors do not count in its program.

With all such purely physical definitions of heredity, Christianity is in conflict. It does believe in spiritual heredity, for it has not rejected the solidarity of the race and the unity of man. Through Christ it conceives a new humanity to be possible. But the heredity of the spirit is conditioned by faith. In faith the spirit conquers the flesh. While Christianity allows for original sin, it does not believe in the almightiness of ancestry. The problem of sin for it is spiritual. There can be no lasting sympathy between the attempt of Professor Burton¹⁸ in his effort to explain sin on the basis of natural evolution, and the truth of Christianity. Any such effort must make sin to be of animal nature and give it a physical character. To do this means either that to be perfect man must finally eliminate his physical nature, or, if this be impossible, he must of necessity remain sinful. The first alternative destroys the valuation which Christianity puts on the body and the right of the physical life; the second is a theory of despair, for, according to it, sin cannot be removed. The only escape is to depreciate sin and its guilt. To depreciate sin is to depreciate the redemption. Consequently the effect of interpreting original sin from the angle of animal nature is to deny its seriousness. Only where the spiritual nature of sin is maintained, is there room for the purpose of Christianity with its message of the redemption of the soul through Christ.

But the misinterpretation of heredity must not determine our whole attitude toward evolution. If evolution as a biological theory remains within its limits and knows its sphere, it will not contradict the claims of Christianity.

¹⁸ "The Problem of Evil."

If we avoid a materialistic philosophy in biology, and if we do not make nature all-controlling, we can accept evolution as not in disagreement with Christianity. A conflict can be avoided, if biological science remains sober in its own sphere, and does not antagonize Christianity within its sphere. The only difficulty occurs when evolution demands a control over all existence. If it begins with an originally assumed matter and energy, and passes upward mechanically, claiming the mechanical ultimates as sufficient, it will, of course, contradict a spiritual religion. If the problem of all life is a question of chemistry, conflict must also ensue. In the same manner, if biology has annexed these lower origins and uses them to explain the highest elements, there must certainly be constant opposition between it and the Christian religion. It is necessary that there should be a proper limitation of evolution. The whole question as to the incompatibility of Christianity and evolution depends, as Howison well says, "on the stretch that evolution has over existence, especially over human nature."¹⁹ But, on the other hand, Christianity must be careful not to demand as biblical facts old hypotheses of species. It must differentiate between biblical statement in popular, religious language and the interpretation which tradition has put upon the biblical statement. In this tradition there are elements of past science, which have unconsciously colored the biblical account. Christianity must also treat its documents historically and not be disturbed if the temporal vessels of its religious truths are not shaped scientifically. Were they thus shaped they would fail in their very purpose. It is general, popular, descriptive, child-like language which is universal and lasting. But Christianity must make certain great reservations over against any theory of evolution. It must demand that the doctrines of a personal God, of the final

¹⁹ "Limits of Evolution," p. 51.

spiritual character of life and its origin, and of the divine nature of man's spirit, be not violated.

Although Christianity can allow an evolution as the continuation of creation, it cannot, because of the conception of a personal God, deny a real creation. There can be no toleration on the part of Christianity of any evolution which is its own beginning and continuation, and of any creation which has its origin in a process but not in God. The explanation of creation as purely within evolution, and of evolution as all of creation, is the elimination of the transcendent God as spirit and person. While the development still going on is the unfoldment and continuation of creation, it cannot be identified with the original creation, unless creation be conceived to be nature making itself. But Christianity can believe in no world without the God that makes it. A world that is self-making is also man-making and God-making. The spiritual results of the world are then only an after-effect of the material results. Even a cosmic consciousness is not sufficient. "An immanent Cosmic Consciousness is not a personal God. For the very quality of personality is, that a person is a being who recognises others as having a reality as unquestionable as his own, and who thus sees himself as a member of a moral republic, standing to other persons in an immutable relationship of reciprocal duties and rights, himself endowed with dignity, and acknowledging the dignity of all the rest. The doctrine of a Cosmic Consciousness, on the contrary, reduces all created minds either to mere phenomena, or at best, to mere modes of the Sole Divine Life."²⁰ This sole divine life can not itself be personal, and allows no personality to others.

As little as Christianity can surrender a personal God for the sake of both religion and morals, so little can it surrender the claim that life is also spiritual, and that its

²⁰ Howison, *Ibid.*, p. 7.

origin is spiritual. When life is defined as purely a matter of chemistry, or of the resolution of the cell to lower elements, Christianity must demur. The material conception of life has endeavored to annex the problem of the origin of all life. While up to this time every effort has finally failed, nevertheless science is hopeful of solving the question of the beginning of life in a chemical and continuously material manner. Should science succeed in producing life in the laboratory, should the present efforts of keeping tissue of apparently dead bodies alive lead to further results, these would of necessity need to be considered in their limitation. It would be necessary to prove not only the continuance of life from organic structure, but living tissue would also have to be created, and organic structures found through organization of such tissue. Even should this proof be given, it would not demonstrate absolutely that life is self-generating. The germs of life would only be discovered further down in the scale of beings. The solving of the problem of physical life would demand a rearrangement of our conceptions. What we call non-organic matter would be found to be living, the conception of life would be extended, and its origin would be found to be possible below cellular form. At present, however, there is no such necessity. The reduction of life to its first occurrence cannot define all life. If the higher ranges of moral and religious life are the mere consequents of the physical life they lose their worth. However much Christianity can permit science to search for the traces of physical life, it cannot agree with any materialization of all life. Were all life material, and were its last origins not in God, its ends could also not be in God. The denial that God is the author of life removes the underpinning of faith. It injures the place of Christ. Christ cannot have life in Himself, He cannot be life and resurrection, He cannot be the Word through whom all things are

made and sustained, He cannot save from death, if all life is primarily non-spiritual and material. Christianity must maintain the spiritual origin and the final spiritual aim of life, because its God is life, and its Saviour is life.

The third great reservation which Christianity must make is the divine origin and nature of man's spirit. It cannot allow that man is merely a creature of the earth. He is dust and to dust he shall return. To the earth he is linked, but also to heaven. If his highest life as well as his physical basis is merely animal, he cannot be truly God's child. His ancestry lies in nature alone, unless God has given him of His own life. The denial of this truth makes man's psychic life a material result. It does not allow for the separateness of his mind. But even if man's separateness of mind be conceded, and this mind is the result of cosmic mind, there cannot be a genuine individual soul with moral responsibility and religious freedom. No matter how limited may be the attainments of a psychology that observes merely phenomena, the Christian religion must still demand a real personality, a living soul, and a spirit coming from God and destined to return to Him. It cannot permit the mere scientific analysis of observable elements of mind to stand in the way of the belief that man is in God's image, and has in him God's life.

A tendency has appeared in philosophy which idealizes life. Its representatives are Bergson and Eucken. The ideals of Bergson find their center in the conception of a living impulse which causes life to course through the universe. Life is the one great essential moving reality. Matter has been thrown aside by life and is its remnant. All action partakes of life. May there not be life in chemical reaction? May not the geologic deposits speak of life? The soul of all energy is life; the one all-absorbing reality is the stream of life. Alongside of Bergson stands Eucken with his idealization of life and his faith

in life. He sees life as a spiritual stream. Above all economic life, above all cultural, moral, and religious life, there is the one real divine actuality which can make humanity. Into this divine, eternal, peaceful and joyful life, humanity must be lifted up. Through it alone arises all productivity.²¹

If this new philosophic tendency is rightly limited, and if the ideal of life is spiritually conceived, Christianity can employ them. If life is not merely an intuitive abstraction, or a pantheistic continuity, but if behind and above the conception of life maintained by this new vitalistic philosophy the real ground of life is sought, then we can approach the religious affirmation. Perhaps Christianity can employ the new terminology and ideal of life for an expression of the message of John. Up to the present time the ideals of St. Paul have largely dominated historical Christianity. Its future may demand a fuller statement of the idea of life, which can be found in the conception of the Word in St. John. His wonderful gospel, that deals with great and fundamental thoughts, readily lends itself to an interpretation of Christianity around the central fact of life. A new synthesis is possible and within reach of the Christian faith, if it can employ the new philosophy of life, purged of its difficulties, as an earthen vessel into which it pours its eternal message of life and salvation. Should this synthesis be made, then the best biological thought will be absorbed into Christ; nature will receive the sanctification of the Spirit; and the human spirit will rejoice to find in all life the earnest and promise of its own reality in the Christ who is and has life eternal.

²¹ For further discussion of this vitalism, see Part II, Chapter VI.

CHAPTER VII

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SOLUTION

THE rise of the new psychology has given large results to modern thinking. When the old psychology, which divided up the mind into faculties and rested purely on introspection, was displaced by the new method of observing the functions of the mind through the correlation of physiological and psychological data biology had conquered psychology. It sought to bring about the removal of psychology from its former alliance with philosophy. The first impetus in investigation was given through the effort of Weber to state the law of the relation of the external stimulus to sensation in a mathematical proportion. It was the philosopher Fechner who further quantified Weber's law, and thought that he could find in it a solution of the relation of body and mind. It is true that in the English philosopher, Hume, we already observe the indications of the functional psychology, which so largely stresses sensations and impressions. There is quite a parallel between him and some of the latest psychological work in its mere phenomenalism. Says Prof. James Orr: "When even so good a psychologist as Prof. William James is found commencing with a 'sensation' which, even as we look at it, becomes transformed into an 'object,' and ere long is part of a 'world' of such objects, which by and by are themselves posited as the 'causes' of the sensations we began with, — when such a writer can satisfy himself with 'cognitive sensations' and the treatment of self as 'a stream of mental states,' and conclude that 'the states of conscious-

ness are all that psychology needs to do her work with,' and that 'metaphysics or theology may prove the soul to exist, but for psychology the hypothesis of such a substantial principle of unity is superfluous'—it may be felt how far Hume is from being obsolete, and how imperative is the need of recurrence to his drastic, but at least consistent, logic."¹ It was not, however, the psychology of Hume and the just inferences of a philosophic nature which he drew that made the new psychology; but the German thinkers, stimulated by the researches of Wundt, brought about a change. The greatest influence, however, has been exerted, not by the German formulations, but by the more materialistic efforts of Bain; and finally it was the subtler work of William James which largely fixed the view-point of modern psychology, and introduced the psychological ideal.

The careful examination of the senses, the classification of associations, the observation of reaction time, the testing of memory and imagination, the analysis of consciousness as a stream, the study of nervous structure and of the brain—all these and many similar investigations not merely produced a new psychology, but also aroused the mind to push forward the province of psychology, and thus led to the largeness of its application. There arose a pedagogy on a psychological basis, which differed from the psychology which Herbart had combined with his philosophy. The new psychology was not philosophical; it was physiological. The physiological psychology studied the child and its mind. It noted the growth of child-mind from the point of view of the functioning of nervous system and brain, and finally from the standpoint of the whole physical nature of the child. By comparison psychology reached down into the animal mind, and sought to analyze it. In the beginnings of such study,

¹ "David Hume," p. 12. Cf. also pp. 148, 159.

and in the type of work which Romanes did, the animal mind became very human; but the later researches have fixed a larger gulf between man and animal in their mental possibilities. The new psychology studied abnormal conditions, and annexed psychiatry. It sought new methods for detecting criminals. But its application was not restricted to these spheres; it was applied to the testing of men in their fitness for a vocation, to the examination of scientific management, to the increase of economic efficiency, and to the development of good salesmen.² The social life was also annexed; the relations of men to each other in common consciousness and mob-mind, the value of social instincts, and the extent of social will, were examined.³ In a most extended manner Wilhelm Wundt planned his "Voelkerpsychologie," and included in it the study of language, of art, and also of myth and religion. But the bearing of psychology upon religion, particularly in America, was not so much influenced by Wundt as by investigations in America itself. About ten years ago there arose a specific psychology of religion. The treatise which did more than any other work to found this new department of psychology was "The Varieties of Religious Experience," by William James. A smaller essay by James on "The Will to Believe" made an equally strong impression. The name of the new department of psychology of religion was coined by Professor Coe. An authority of equal importance with Professor Coe is Professor Starbuck. But these two leaders have quite a following; and the number of treatises and articles on psychology or religion are very many. They include not only such English books as those by Leuba⁴ and Ames,⁵ but also a discussion of the whole method by

² Cf. Hugo Muensterberg, "Psychology and Industrial Efficiency."

³ Cf. William McDougall, "Social Psychology."

⁴ "A Psychological Study of Religion."

⁵ "The Psychology of Religious Experience."

the German Professor Wobbermin,⁶ and the publication in Clark University of "The American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education." Thus the new psychological point of view has fully entered into the sphere of religion. The former history of religion, and the previous philosophy of religion, though not neglected, have been less stressed than the psychology of religion. The psychological point of view has claimed to be the first and foundational need.

In many ways the psychology of religion has been of service to religious faith. It has established the fact that religion was a real experience of the individual and of the race. By its analysis it has aided the history of religion. By tracing religious ideas and attitudes, ceremonies and cults, back to the mind of man it proved that religious experiences were humanly real. There has been no effort to interpret the psychological existence of religious data as illusions. Modern psychology of religion has not favored in its direct statements the older charge of the self-deception of man in his religious experiences. What the study of mind has discovered as illusions does not include the usual, normal facts of religion. Therefore, prayer, conversion, sacrifice, worship, and faith have been examined for their real mental elements. In the earlier treatises of James the feeling and will were made central. Starbuck also emphasizes feeling, and this is equally the attitude of Stanley Hall as far as he touches religious experience in the study of adolescence. The general emphasis in much of American religion on conversion, and the importance ascribed to evangelism, favor the examination of religious experience from the emotional standpoint. There was a disregard of other elements in the religious life. But in the latest work of Leuba and Ames, there is an emphasis upon religion as including the entire psychical life. Ames states: "The clear apprehension of the

⁶ "Die Religionspsychologische Methode."

concrete relation of religion to the total life process furnishes a corrective for the erroneous view that within the individual religion is due to some unique faculty or instinct."⁷ It is true that this attitude is directed rather against an older claim, but it equally furnishes a departure from the narrower attitude of previous discussions. It is necessary, as students now realize, to study the whole psychological nature of man in its relation to religion.⁸ The psychology of religion must claim the total individual and society. If a specific center is to be found a truer approach may be possible from the point of view of religious belief, which is so central a phenomenon in faith. This attitude has been taken by Professor Pratt⁹ and Professor Lindsay.¹⁰ But even these investigations into belief ought not to be taken from a smaller angle than that of the total mental equipment of man. Mere will and mere feeling as well as ideas in themselves are inadequate for the description and explanation of the reality of religion in the soul and in society. Religion is connected with the very essence of individual need, want and aspiration, and with the leading forces in the life of society.

The psychological point of view has been of service in emphasizing that there is not only a circle of the directly conscious life, but that it fades out into the subconscious. One of the most remarkable facts in the later stages of modern psychology is the general acceptance of the subconscious. On the one side, subconscious facts are those which show the fading away of consciousness into the reflexive and automatic elements of human life. The conscious fringes out into the subconscious, in which there are the psychical traces of memory, the processes involved in the action of instincts, the residues of great feelings and

⁷ "The Psychology of Religious Experience," p. 289.

⁸ Cf. Galloway, "The Philosophy of Religion," p. 54 ff.

⁹ "Psychology of Religious Belief."

¹⁰ "The Psychology of Belief."

emotions, and the total of human personality and experience not immediately in use. On the other side, it has been supposed that subconsciousness has not only a lower margin, and an outer human margin, but an upper margin, through which remarkable psychic experiences can enter consciousness. Many undeniable experiences gathered by The Society of Psychic Research, even after a just criticism has eliminated much material, create a high probability in favor of direct transference of thought, of telepathy, and of second sight. These phenomena, in which direct appearances of others are included in the form of visions and phantasms, do not seem capable of a merely subjective explanation. It is this peculiarity which has moved some psychologists to believe that transmundane forces operate upon the mind within our general world.¹¹ Through subconsciousness it has been supposed that we could not only better understand the continuity of a man's religious life through the influence of memories, past emotions, and his total character, but also to find a foundation for the great mystic experiences in religion, for the fact of divine inspiration and for the instreaming of God into human life.

There is, however, a very great danger in founding the religious life on the subconscious experience. To set the subconscious over against the conscious elements creates a division in the human mind. The total result of this division is liable to reduce religion to blind forces rising up in man's mind.¹² It may lead to a mere philosophy of the unconscious. When it escapes making religion a result of personal projection it may fall into the error of considering it the effect of mere natural force or energy. If the instincts and memories are too largely stressed we

¹¹ Cf. James, "Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 524.

¹² Cf. Hocking, "The Meaning of God in Human Experience," p. 527 ff; Watson, "The Philosophical Basis of Religion," p. 150 ff.

cannot understand how they develop into religious motives. The mind must first have direct religious truth before it can interpret the blind strivings of the subconscious in the direction of faith.¹³ There has as yet been no adequate proof of any spiritual communication except between living men. The few extraordinary cases reported have not demonstrated any objective, personal or non-personal reality back of the subconscious experiences. In fact the phenomena of spirit communication have generally been unveiled as deceptions. No true mediumistic information has been guaranteed.¹⁴ Consequently any assumption of the possibility of direct communication between living men and disembodied spirits is unfounded. In the same way, there is no psychological demonstration through the subconscious that the divine eternal Spirit has reached man's spirit. No matter how strongly we believe out of our own religious experiences in the communication of God with man, we cannot prove it with any satisfaction through the study of the subconscious. The real source of religion cannot justly be discovered in subconsciousness; but direct conscious convictions, conscious feelings, conscious impulses and forces, and external historical occurrences, the influence of our surroundings and education make the religious life of most men. Not even the great founders of religion and its great prophets can be explained apart from history. Their new revelations, even though they be in the form of dreams and visions, are not of such a nature as to justify subconsciousness as the real source or medium. It is, therefore, not fair to confuse directness of religious conviction and knowledge, and the intuitive acknowledgment by conscience of religious truths, with the phenomena of subconsciousness. The fact that logical argument and reflective speculation cannot

¹³ Cf. Galloway, "The Philosophy of Religion," p. 61.

¹⁴ Cf. Report of Seybert Commission, University of Pennsylvania.

find religious truths does not imply that the only alternative is to assign religious truths to the sphere of the subconscious functioning of the human mind. Professor Ames properly remarks: "In any case no scientific inquiries into this marginal field of our experience support the claim that the subconscious self is in any way the peculiar organ of religion. It is the massive encircling *milieu* of custom, tradition, sympathies and tastes within which any kind of clear consciousness exists."¹⁵ But while we must finally admit that there are no proofs strongly in favor of the subconscious as the only medium for religion, nevertheless the failure to find scientific reasons for assuming the incoming of the divine above the limit of our consciousness does not do away with the fact that we do experience the divine. It is still possible that the future may disclose what we have not yet been able to establish.

While the psychology of religion has brought some real advantages to the study of religion, and while it has moved men and will continue to influence them on behalf of a careful and valuable scrutiny of the mind in its relation to religious experiences, yet Christianity, using what is good but also noting what is deficient, has certain great reservations to make and certain objections to urge. The first of these is directed against the new effort of the psychology of religion to aid in settling the long debated question of the origin of religion. The settlement is supposed to be possible within the range of the mind and its subjective limits. The psychology of religion has attempted to justify some of the speculations of the anthropologists. It has strengthened the claim that religion began with a condition of spiritism or animism. Some there are who agree with the old idea of Petronius that fear made the gods, while others allow for reverence. It is in magic with its appeal to the extraordinary and un-

¹⁵ "The Psychology of Religious Experience," p. 294.

usual that Frazer finds the solution. Professor Ames attempts to discover it in social needs mentally apprehended. Now it is always assumed in all these investigations, that the lowest impulses and desires in savage tribes are the most primitive. Without a due investigation of historical religions and their course, which is generally from a primitive purity to degeneration, the development is conceived of as an advance along a stright line. Such a procedure is due to the influence of Darwinism, which has subtly affected psychology. This appears in the manner in which psychology seeks to explain too much through instinctive endowments. The Darwinian interpretation overstresses the problem of origin, and, therefore, when psychology is affected by it, it does not seek primarily the real analysis of what is central in religious experience and what is common to all forms of faith. On the contrary it operates on the presupposition that the physically and religiously lowest tribes show the clearest traces of primitive faith. In the examination of the religion of the lowest tribes and of the savages there is no just reckoning with the fact of the existence of the great gods. In many wild tribes there are thoughts of great gods, which seem to be too early to be explained as later additions, and which seem to be too little in the foreground to be reckoned with as later developments. The idea of these gods is not congruous with the conjectures of the low motives and ideas of primitive belief.¹⁶ As far as psychology has entered into these problems of origin it has not pursued them purely on a psychological basis; but it has aimed to help anthropology by first accepting the anthropological hypotheses as to the best sources for primitive religion.

In addition to this error of method it can also be justly objected, that the very attempt to determine the origin of religion on a psychological basis is defective. It empha-

¹⁶ Cf. Andrew Lang, "The Making of Religion," Chapters X to XV.

sizes the merely subjective, but Christianity claims an objective revelation and communication of God to man. It cannot allow that religion is merely a subjective creation of the mind. The universal psychological fact of religion must be traced back to historical origins. The psychological character of religion is a result which demands a prior explanation, but it is no cause which truly creates an effect. When religion is made real merely as a mental fact a corresponding loss is sustained in the exclusiveness of the emphasis of the psychological point of view. With this emphasis the purely descriptive and phenomenal side of religious life is put before us; but there exists no guarantee that there is more to be looked after and sought after than phenomenal reality. Psychology is after all largely descriptive, and description is not real explanation. Consequently, if religion cannot proceed beyond psychology it must remain a description of mental phenomena, and must dwell within the realm of appearance. The only escape would be to accept the philosophic position that phenomena are the only reality. In any event, there would be created an element of doubt and scepticism. This cannot help being the outcome when the total problem of faith is restricted to psychology. If religion is no more than a fact of the human mind, its real problems are not answered. To restrict faith to the mind is to assume that religious realities beyond the mind are either unnecessary or unknowable. The former cannot be maintained without the unfounded and unproved assumption, that mere mental assurance without objective fact is adequate. The latter lands us in the agnosticism of Spencer. Consequently, psychology by its very limitation, if this limitation is made essential to the study of religion, must lead us into uncertainty and doubt.

To make religion mentally real is a vital necessity, but to make it solely real through mind is to lead us into ideal-

ism. If we identify the religious problem with the psychological we may be logically brought to an idealistic point of view. But this point of view may become very damaging to faith. With all the glamor of idealism, with all its beauty of appeal, it can never overcome the human feeling, that it lives in an illusory world. The strongly idealistic faiths, like Buddhism, must make the world Maya or unreality. Everything is at last Maya but mind. Should we draw the one conclusion from psychologism it would end in the illusionism of mind and nothing but mind.¹⁷ But modern psychology has not drawn this conclusion, but in its connection with the physiological side of mental functioning it has chosen the alternative against idealism. It is true that no science can completely draw all the consequences of its position. Psychology, however, has chosen the metaphysical alternative to idealism. The physiological point of view has actually tended to make psychology materialistic. It is, of course, true that no psychologist to-day clearly states that the mental life is an after-effect, or epiphenomenon of material movements. There has been no effort at an open materialism since Mr. Huxley said: "Let us suppose the process of physical analysis pushed so far that one could view the last link of the chain of molecules, watch their movements as if they were billiard-balls, weigh them, measure them, and know all that is physically knowable about them; . . . we should be as far from being able to include the resulting phenomena of consciousness, the feeling of redness, within the bounds of the physical science as we are now. It would remain as unlike the phenomena we know under the names of matter and motion as it is now."¹⁸

¹⁷ Cf. also Chapter V, p. 99 ff.

¹⁸ "Science and Morals," *Fortnightly Review*, December, 1886. Quoted by Baldwin, "Handbook of Psychology, Senses and Intellect," p. 2.

Nevertheless in the escape from such a theory that mind is the result of matter, modern psychology has not freed itself from a materialistic incubus.

If we look at and compare a number of modern psychologists we shall see whither they lead. According to their accepted theory they are parallelistic; in other words they accept parallel lines of mind and matter which never meet. Practically the largest space is given to the physical explanation and the physiological hypotheses. There is much detailed description of the nervous system. The human brain is carefully studied and the fact that mental actions are localized in the brain is made much of. On the contrary, there is no report of facts adverse to localization, and no estimate of the fact that the brain is shaped by a man's mind, his character and experience.¹⁹ Human consciousness is reduced to the terminology of human behaviour and action. There is a detailed investigation from a physiological point of view of the senses. These are studied far more carefully than the higher elements of the mind. They are diagrammatically examined, classified and mapped out. Much space is also given to the instincts which are studied comparatively and in relation to the animal world. Human habits are explained through the tracts which are formed in the nervous system and the permanent modification of the brain structure, but there is no allowance for mental dispositions. Association is viewed from the angle of the brain connections. Feelings, according to the prevalent theory of Lange and James, are primarily due to physiological functioning. We first cry then feel sorry; we first laugh and then feel glad. All our emotions are described as taking their rise from bodily conditions. The will is built up out of reflex motions; its choices are ascribed to motives. Desires are not placed before us so much as

¹⁹ Cf. W. H. Thomson, "Brain and Personality."

mental wants as they are portrayed as nervous tensions. Concepts and ideas take up small space in the average psychology. And finally when it comes to the treatment of the self, this is not the approach to the continuity and determination of the mind, but it is rather a mere stream of experiences, a connection between mental phenomena, and a bundle of sensations, feelings, emotions, volitions, ideations, which may split up into various centers.

Thus the total impression created by the average modern psychology is not ideal, but on the contrary material. Practically parallelism in the science of psychology has not really kept matter and mind truly parallel. Parallelism, if it were to be real, would have to stand for a correspondence not only in general, but also point for point. It cannot mean absolute disparateness. But an actual correspondence has never been really proved. All parallelism has after all led to a connection. The assertion of a real causal independence of matter and mind has been an assumption which has usually led either to the dropping of one or the other term, or to the positing of some larger unity as the foundation of both. In general, this larger unity has not been the absolute substance of Spinoza which had an ideal character. The final outcome has been to revert to materialism and a material series. Huxley, who was quoted above, in a clear statement of parallelism, must after all admit: "The feeling we call volition is not the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act."²⁰ Similar attitudes have been taken more or less clearly since Huxley. We are still under the rule of a psychology whose total effect does not make for the real independence of mind.²¹

²⁰ "Collected Essays," Vol. I, p. 244.

²¹ Cf. Ward, "Naturalism and Agnosticism," Lectures XI and XII; and for a very full and thorough treatment cf. Ludwig Busse, "Geist und Koerper, Seele und Leib."

The reigning conceptions of what is central in the religious experience are dominated by the parallelistic psychology. Among many students of the religious phenomena in the mind feeling is made central. The classic expression of religion as feeling is that by Schleiermacher, who defined religion as the feeling of absolute dependence. But with Schleiermacher feeling as a psychical condition was regarded from the ideal point of view. But the modern psychologist must always base his description of feeling on nervous and physical conditions. He may with Hume believe that the ideas of religion arose from fear, and with Ribot he may hold,²² that religion is "fear in its different degrees, from profound terror to vague uneasiness, due to faith in an unknown, mysterious, impalpable Power." He may say with Hermann Ebbinghaus, "Fear and misery are the parents of religion; and, although it is propagated in the main through authority, it would long ago have become extinct, if it were not born anew out of them all the time."²³ It is true that the psychologist may add the tenderer emotions and include awe as well as other feelings,²⁴ but the question always remains what will be the psychological nature of the feeling. Even if we follow Hoeffding and make feeling a condition determined by the fate of values in the struggle for existence, or with Tiele conclude that the essence of religion is adoration, the nature of the religious emotion is not determined. It has, however, been determined by the more direct studies of psychologists like James and Starbuck. We cannot forget in James' discussion of the varieties of religion, that all his ideal terms rest on his peculiar theory of emotions which is not ideal. Starbuck clearly holds that religion is a feeling adjustment to the deeper things

²² Ribot, "The Psychology of the Emotions," p. 309.

²³ "Psychology," translated and edited by Max Meyer, p. 191.

²⁴ Cf. Leuba, "A Psychological Study of Religion," p. 129.

of life and has a specific nervous mechanism. In his psychology of religion he lays large stress on conversion with its nervous accompaniments, and on adolescence with its sex coloring to explain religious growth. He frequently refers to the large place of sexual feeling in religious differences. This same material side of the mind as explanatory of faith, this same emphasis on food and sex in the social development of religion, is also found in Ames.²⁵ He after all reduces all ideas, even the highest, to biological considerations; for he says,²⁶ "In the idea of opening a certain door, analysis shows that the idea is the awakening of definite sensations of muscular strain, the partial reinstatement of actual movement, or of activities in vision, hearing, pressure, or the like. In more complex ideas or concepts, such as justice, truth, evil, eternity, similar content always exists. There is therefore no sharp break between mental and physical activity, between idea and deed. It is impossible to separate the ideational process from the bodily factors. There is consequently a pronounced tendency for descriptions of mental process to eventuate in physiological or biological considerations." The gist of this statement is to reduce ethics and religion, and ethical and religious ideas to muscular antecedents, and eventually, therefore, to biology. Religion would then be a consequence from material antecedents and causes, both in the individual and in the race. The impression cannot be escaped that this is the end to which we are brought by drawing the last conclusions of the new psychology of parallelism. Christianity is then the child finally of certain food and sex notions, and these in turn are brought about by specific physiological structure. Biology is thus the key to Christianity, and we are not free but again subject under a new guise to the old

²⁵ "The Psychology of Religious Experience," p. 33.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

materialism.

It may appear that we escape this conclusion if we follow the emphasis of James upon the will to believe. Is it not true that convictions and belief grow out of a living will? Have we not the guarantee of freedom of the mind in this conception of the will? But let us not be deceived. Were we dealing with Kant, we would be in the realm of freedom, when we deal with the will. For Kant there is nothing finally good but the good will. In it man fulfills the demands of the categorical imperative. The will is strong and a revelation of real reality. Stoic as Kant's conception of the will may be it is ideal and free. But James needs the will, because he holds that our passionate nature influences us in our opinions, and that there are "some options between opinions in which this influence must be regarded both as inevitable and as a lawful determinant of our choice."²⁷ In other words, elements of feeling lie back of the will. We cannot wait, thinks James, in moral and religious questions till all the evidence is in. Consequently, as moral and religious doubt is unsatisfactory, the will must throw itself into the balance. Where it exists it can help to create the fact. The decision is of course always a chance but it is more satisfactory, according to James, to take the risk on behalf of religion. "We cannot escape the issue by remaining sceptical and waiting for more light, because, although we do avoid error in that way *if religion be untrue*, we lose the good, *if it be true*, just as certainly as if we positively chose to disbelieve."²⁸ Religion then is a gambling of faith, brought about by desire and will, and based upon satisfactions. It works and gives certain satisfying results; therefore it is accepted.²⁹ A similar theory of

²⁷ "The Will to Believe," p. 19.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

²⁹ Cf. The pragmatic basis of this view, Part II, Chapters IV and V.

will is maintained in the apologetic treatise of Prof. Eleanor H. Rowland,³⁰ in which faith is argued for as the safer risk to take. There is no deliverance in any such theory of will, which after all rests on the biological assumption of proper functioning, even though it has lost its material terminology.

The psychological emphasis must finally disallow all ethical concepts their own value. It reduces them to genetic products of the mind, and the genetic concept overpowers the valuation. But if there can be no independent worth in moral ideas, there can also be no separate value and no independent worth of religious ideas and ideals. Struggle as we may, we can obtain no vital independence and no freedom for faith. Christianity is hemmed in to the charmed circle of movements, reactions, reflexes, instincts, associations, and habits. These are first, and, therefore, no strong and lasting meaning can be attached to religious thought. It will be under the thralldom of psychology and of psychological phenomenalism.

The new psychology also desires to absorb logic. It regards ideas only as important in their concrete connection. Their function, it claims, is to mediate; and they cannot be considered formally. Their true worth is only found as they are described in psychology. With the elimination of logical normativeness, and through its absorption into the merely descriptive process, all standardization of truth falls to the ground. Whatever is, is so. This is the watchword of psychological realism. When such an implied or expressed abolition of logic is applied to religion, it must eventuate in denying that any standard of truth can exist except a flowing, changing measure of probability. Consequently no religion can make any real claim to permanent and final truth, for there is no valid logical standard. Laws of thought are only laws of mov-

³⁰ "The Right to Believe."

ing mind. It is true that the logic of religion is not the formal logic of science; it is the living logic of the soul. Nevertheless it has its standards, and the doubt as to all standards affects it very much. Another result which will come to religion through psychologism must be that there can be no theology which is not the outcome of psychology. Religious psychology claims to furnish the real data for all theological science. There can then be no religious truth and experience with its own validity. No biblical theology can have any standard meaning, it only describes the mind of the author or the religious aspiration of the time in which the biblical books were written. Neither norm nor authority remain. There are no fundamental biblical doctrines. Consequently there is no foundation for any dogma. Dogma is deceptive, for it is merely descriptive of the mind of the Church at a certain age. Finally religious truth is neither altogether true nor altogether false. Eventually along this line of thinking Christianity is merely probable. The standards have fallen; authority is gone; all is process and practice. In these alone are to be found the remnants of the faith to which the soul can hold.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SOCIAL TREND

IT is quite noticeable in some of the later treatises on the psychology of religion, that we find a large emphasis on the social factor. The introduction of this element is indicative of a marked peculiarity of our age. We are living in a social age. The latter half of the nineteenth century has led to a constantly increasing conception of human life as social. A number of factors have contributed their quota to this result. In order to understand the present social view it may be well to contrast it with the attitude of the eighteenth century. The attitude of the eighteenth century, which in some of its results reached into the first half of the nineteenth century, was that of individualism. It made possible such a figure as Robinson Crusoe, who when stranded on a desert island could construct all his life about him, and reach a civilized basis without a history back of him and without a social tradition. The characteristics of the fiction of Robinson Crusoe appear in other forms of thought of the eighteenth century. The voice of Rousseau called the individual man to return to nature. His message was not social but individual. Voltaire attacked the corrupt society through the brilliant wit of his individual point of view. The French Revolution, which we recognize as a class movement, was thought to be the revolt of the individual against the decadent conditions of society. Its doctrines had an individualistic trend and its doctrinaires were individualistic in character. If we turn to the German enlightenment we find the same characteristic. Lessing

appeals to individual reason and its rights. The great German philosopher of the eighteenth century, Leibniz, bases all his thinking on individual centers. Look where we will the outstanding elements of the eighteenth century are individualistic. Society, as Rousseau thought, was the result of a contract which started with the rights of the individual.

The nineteenth century, particularly beginning with its second half, developed the sense of solidarity and the conception of the community. The opposition to considering man as the center of the universe, which we find earlier than the nineteenth century, and which Montaigne so brilliantly satirizes,¹ received new impulse through the discoveries of physical sciences. The geocentric idea and the anthropomorphic idea were more and more set aside from the point of view of the universe. When the universe became the controlling notion the value of man in his individual capacity, power and importance was lowered. With the coming of Darwinism and with the increasing acceptance and growth of its hypothesis, a very strong additional influence was added to advancing physical science. This influence helped to push aside still more the conception of man as a separate, spiritual entity. He was incorporated into the total scheme of nature and was studied in connection with all the species. His descent was not the descent of the individual, but the descent of man as a part of nature. Therefore, the type became dominant and the individual was more or less forgotten. Spontaneity was overlooked and generic forces and conditions were made all-powerful.

While the study of nature was thus dethroning man from his place of eminence, as a little lower than the angels by asserting that he was only a little higher than the animals, there arose a new study of history. The great

¹ "Essays," II, XII.

historians, Niebuhr, Ranke, Curtius, Momsen, Freeman and others, wrote history from a more or less conscious philosophy of history. None of the great historians viewed history as the story of the lives of great men. They did not find its essence in hero-worship, and the conception of Carlyle as to history was not seriously considered. History was made the resultant of great forces. Ranke found in the development of mankind divine ideas; it was thus that he changed Hegel's great conception of the philosophy of history as a movement of reason. Later historians have, however, interpreted the impulses of history as psychological forces. But the latest conceptions regard all history as explicable on economic grounds. They attempt to show how in the very dawn of history the problems of food and clothing, and the manner of the occupation and vocation of men shaped their history. Economic considerations, economic difficulties and pressures are made the elements which explain great nations, mighty empires, and devastating wars. While in Germany under Professor Lamprecht's leadership the economic ideal is interpreted in a cultural and, therefore, at least semi-ideal manner, in America and England history is regarded as the development of man driven merely by material economic desires and thoughts. These, together with racial elements, constitute, it is held, the final forces of human history. Out of them grow every aspiration and every thought of man. Man is considered fundamentally to be economic.

The regnancy of the economic conception in history followed the growth of the great economic treatises. Although England had its Adam Smith in the eighteenth century, it had its Malthus and its Mill in the nineteenth century. Germany had its great economist Roscher, who was followed by many brilliant intellects. America contributed its Carey. Everywhere the study of economics

took a hold upon men, and to-day it is perhaps one of the most widely studied and eagerly desired subjects of study. In addition there gradually grew out of economics the new science of sociology. It is true that the French philosopher, Comte, had suggested the study of human society, and had coined the name of the science. Nevertheless the real impetus to modern sociology was the study of man in his economic group relation. It was the science of economics, therefore, which led beyond itself to sociology.

There are, however, other forces than the merely intellectual consideration of economics which brought about the rapid rise and universal interest in sociology. There came about a number of conditions in society which necessitated a study of its problems. Among these may be noted, the great industrial revolution, by which the home ceased to be the center of industry and manufacture; the rise of the factory system through the invention of machinery and the large differentiation of manual labor; the growth of great cities, the changes of commerce, the founding of ever new industries, the development of combinations and trusts, the organization of labor unions. Such and other elements began to change human society and made it increasingly an industrial society. Agricultural conditions rapidly gave way to industrial conditions and surroundings. Consequently the isolation and separateness of agricultural life became displaced by the combination and union of men, and their aggregation and massing in great centers. Thus man became socialized in his life. But the changes of the mode of life produced new and unexpected evils. The congestion of city life, the character of association in industries, the detriment to the home, the pressure which machinery with its rapidity exerted against the older virtues of stability and steadiness, the increase of the nervous strain which demanded more

exciting relaxation and pleasure — such and similar influences produced great difficulties in society. It was the growing consciousness of these difficulties and evils which led to the great development of sociology and to the demands for social reform.

While this socialization of man was going on there arose in the middle of the nineteenth century the theory of socialism. It was the brilliant intellect of Marx in his great treatise, "Das Kapital," which traced all evils to capitalism. The rescue was supposed to be found when labor, which alone was supposed to produce value, would be freed from the incubus of capitalism. This liberation was held to be possible only through society. It was supposed to be the duty of society to own and control the great means of production. While it is true that French speculators like Saint Simon and Fourier also advocated socialistic theories, the real rise of modern socialism, after all, begins with Marx. The socialistic parties have grown in every country and have found able exponents. The growth of socialism is explicable only through our industrial age. Whether it be conceived of as a great movement of society leading by slow stages of evolution to larger economic adjustment and truer social justice, or whether it be demanded as a revolutionary force in the unrest and ferment produced by the new conditions of society, at all events it is both a result of a social age and also an influence toward greater socialization.

Over against the socialism of a theoretical and practical kind, and in contrast with the claims for social justice and reform we find a very decided individualism advocated by certain great thinkers. The strong and pessimistic individualism of Ibsen, the consistent call of Nietzsche for the great individual, the mighty super-man, the half-cynical and half-realistic demands of Bernard Shaw, and the unbridled egoism of Stirner,—all of these have not

overcome the regnant social tendency. Despite the demand for a great intellectual liberty and for the unlimited right of individualistic hypothesis in science, art, morals, and life, the trend of all this modern individualism is toward naturalism. The one common feature of the protesting individualism, is that it seeks mere will for power's sake and desires to live out its own impulses. Consequently it battles in vain against the social tendencies, and is enslaved by its own naturalism. The modern wild individualism with its vagaries has no love for society. And because it lacks a true foundation for its individualism, it cannot but succumb. Its desire is not the desire of a Goethe, who sought freedom for his own development. The self-emphasis and egotism of Goethe with all its weaknesses was cultural, but the latest egoism is that of animal desire.² Consequently it cannot deliver man, but with all its hopes of liberty leads him to naturalism with a bondage greater than that of human society. Its protests against society are not only against its evils, but also against its morals. The freedom it seeks is the freedom of animal passion. Therefore, it is no real counterbalance to the social trend of the present, and it cannot overcome the economic and social enslavement because it has no solid leverage for its claims.

The social point of view has also entered religion. It is made the basis for an explanation of great religious movements. In part the psychologists of religion have like Ames endeavored to find its origin in social conditions and the common need; and the advance of religion is also supposed to be the result of social forces. There are two characteristic efforts which are indicative of the present. The first is the attempt of Professor Royce to solve Christianity from the ideal of the community, the second is the endeavor of Professor Patten to put religion on an eco-

² This is well illustrated in Wells' "The New Machiavelli."

nomic basis. Professor Royce sets out to explain the foundation of both morals and religion from the viewpoint of loyalty. Loyalty he conceives to be the attachment to a cause; and it is the fidelity, genuineness and consistency of the attachment which is most vital. Out of this effort to describe the spirit of loyalty as adequate to give us a philosophy of life, and a religion free from superstition, there was developed not only the idea of a specific religion of loyalty, but also the conception of the real problem in Christianity. Professor Royce believes that it is necessary to find out what Christianity most essentially is and means and what are its permanent and indispensable features.³ The first central idea, in Professor Royce's opinion, is not Christ, the Master, but the spiritual community. Christianity, which is one result of mankind to find the way of salvation, rests fundamentally on a social idea. Says Royce: "And we may here state this first Christian idea in our own words thus, namely, as the doctrine that 'The salvation of the individual man is determined by some sort of membership in a certain spiritual community,— a religious community and, in its inmost nature, a divine community, in whose life the Christian virtues are to reach their highest expression and the spirit of the Master is to obtain its earthly fulfillment.' In other words: There is a certain universal and divine spiritual community. Membership in that community is necessary to the salvation of man."⁴ The second great notion, sharply contrasted with the first, is the overwhelming moral burden of the individual. This "includes the doctrine that of himself, and apart from the spiritual community which the divine plan provides for his relief, the individual is powerless to escape from his innate and acquired character, the character of a lost soul."⁵ In the discussion of this second idea, the funda-

³ "The Problem of Christianity," Vol. I, p. 20.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

mental conception is that of treason to the common cause and to the community. To save the individual from this burden and to grant him escape, the divine plan of redemption and atonement is necessary. This atonement cannot consist in mere forgiveness. Treason must be triumphed over through the community or "through some steadfast loyal servant who acts, so to speak, as the incarnation of the very spirit of the community itself. This faithful and suffering servant of the community may answer and confound treason by a work whose type I shall next venture to describe, in my own way, thus: First, this creative work shall include a deed, or various deeds, for which only just this treason furnishes the opportunity. Not treason in general, but just this individual treason shall give the occasion, and supply the condition of the creative deed which I am in ideal describing. Without just that treason, this new deed (so I am supposing) could not have been done at all. And hereupon the new deed, as I suppose, is so ingeniously devised, so concretely practical in the good which it accomplishes, that, when you look down upon the human world after the new creative deed had been done in it, you say, first, 'This deed was made possible by that treason; and, secondly, *The world, as transformed by this creative deed, is better than it would have been had all else remained the same, but had that deed of treason not been done at all.*' That is, the new creative deed has made the new world better than it was before the blow of treason fell."⁶ By such a deed of creative love on behalf of the community the reconciling will of the servant of the community has brought about the elimination of the treason and made the new divine community. In this construction of Royce it is of course noticeable that he has been under the influence of Hegel. The three ideas in their relation remind very forcibly of Hegel's conception of the movement of reason,

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 307 ff.

in the thesis, the antithesis and the reconciliation. The positive and the negative are resolved into unity. The influence of Hegel is also noticeable in the minimizing of evil. The world seems to be the better for the treason, because it is the occasion for the exercise of the reconciling love which makes the community better. There is, however, this difference between Hegel and Royce, that for Hegel the ideal is the state, for Royce society. But if we eliminate the peculiar Hegelian coloring of Royce's idea of Christianity, it is expressive of the trend of the age and meets the demands of much of the thinking of the age because it is social. It stands broadly for a whole group of men who would interpret Christianity as valuable only when it serves the community. The fundamental notion of Christianity would then be that of a new humanity and a great brotherhood. Its activities would be philanthropic and creative of larger human life. Its program would include the overcoming of the individual or the groups of individuals who treasonably oppose humanity. Its service would be in the end social and political betterment, civic virtue and righteousness. Consequently the whole value of Christianity would be in the creating of a new society.

Distinct from this idealistic conception of Christianity as fundamentally social, is the economic point of view of Professor Patten. For him the aim of Christianity is to bring about the age of co-operation and love. But it is to affect its aims on an economic basis. As far as Christianity serves the best interests of a just economic development, so far is it valuable. Professor Patten has expressed his fundamental principle in this striking way: "Sin is misery; misery is poverty; and the antidote to poverty is income."⁷ Allowing for the effort in this statement to attract attention and to arouse discussion, it nevertheless

⁷ "The Social Basis of Religion," p. xviii.

makes sin dependent upon unjust economic conditions. Adequate economic opportunity and proper economic surroundings would overcome the evil. If every one had a sufficient income as indicative of his opportunity to earn and to live, temptation and sin would be overcome. Professor Patten here speaks for all those who believe that the difficulty of surroundings are creative of wrong. He is at one with the sociologists who desire to save mankind through improved surroundings, and with the socialists who find that capitalism is the root of all evil. The necessity then of religion would be to create the spirit of solidarity in human goods and possessions, in human opportunities for earthly comfort and ease. Whenever Christianity is interpreted as finding its completion merely in the betterment of external conditions, it receives such an economic interpretation. Christ is the representative of a purely social religion.⁸ If the end of Christianity is to help in the abolition of child labor, in the solution of the problem of better housing, in the elimination of tuberculosis, and in the creation of a better physical race, its purpose must be merely economic. There are those who endeavor to uphold this viewpoint of Christianity by claiming that Christianity was the historical result of a decadent age, and that it answered to the great cry of the socially depressed. It became the religion of salvation, it is claimed, through its emphasis of brotherhood. A pure Christianity, if this be its origin, must, therefore, serve the social and economic interest. The welfare of society must be the fundamental conditioning factor.⁹

The advocates of socialism, as far as they make any claim to be religious and do not follow the atheism of their great leader, Marx, endeavor to find in Jesus a social re-

⁸ Cf. Patten, "The Social Basis of Religion," p. 193 ff.

⁹ For a sober opposite view, cf. Peabody, "Christ and the Social Question."

former. His advice to the rich young man to sell all things which he had; His sad comment, that it is easier for a camel to pass through a needle's eye than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God, are emphasized as opposing the possession of capital. We are asked whether it is not true, that Lazarus, the poor man, is the saint, and Dives, the rich man, the sinner. Does not Jesus say, according to the real original and genuine account of St. Luke: "Blessed be ye poor: for yours is the kingdom of God"?¹⁰ Labor is exalted and Jesus Himself is the carpenter. Was not the early Church socialistic, as it appears in the communism of the congregation at Jerusalem? Was not Paul a tentmaker and laborer? What was the message of the earliest letter of the New Testament, if not the message of the choice of the poor?¹¹ The whole trend of early Christianity is, therefore, held to be social. Its spirit of love is interpreted as true co-operation and helpfulness in external poverty and depression. The modern application of Christianity ought to seek a return, we are informed, to its early principles, and it ought to sympathize with the laborers who are oppressed. Its function ought to be to create a new society in which there is no competition, and in which labor receives its due reward.

With influences like these all about Christianity, reinforced by the desire of a large group within the Church that Christianity should enter the field of social reform, and by the demand that the Church ought to become a mighty philanthropic agency, it is necessary to obtain a clear conception of the function of Christianity in reference to the strong social tendency of the present. It is true that Christianity at its inception had deep sympathy with the poor and oppressed and found among them many of its adherents. Its comforts appeal strongly to the

¹⁰ Luke, 6:20.

¹¹ James, 2:1 ff.

downtrodden of every type. The central teaching of Jesus makes much use of the idea of the kingdom of God. In the parables which portray the kingdom there is a constant background of a social nature. The kingdom is a vineyard of labor, a feast of joy, a large wheatfield, and a net in which many fish are caught. These and similar pictures certainly portray the common social side of Christianity. It can also not be gainsaid that the early Church was seen to be, by those that observed its gatherings and life, a new society in which love and brotherhood reigned. When St. Paul sees the Church in its greatness, into which the fullness of God is to enter, he pictures it as a great spiritual temple of living men and women, as an organic living body, in which all differences of class, race and sex are obliterated, and in which mankind is unified through the cross of Christ.¹² It cannot be denied that early Christianity contemplated an early return of Jesus for the judgment of the world. Then there would be a new heaven and a new earth. Then the meek would inherit the earth and the saints rule. Despite the fact that Christ claimed His kingdom to be not of this world, the hope of His return presaged His reign as King of kings and Lord of lords. Social injustice and wrong would cease, for there would be no sin nor anything unclean in the new Jerusalem. The hope of Isaiah as to the glorious reign of peace, when the swords would be beaten into ploughshares and the spears into pruning-hooks, would then be realized. We cannot read and combine pictures and teachings like these without admitting that there is a strong social element and a deep social undercurrent in Christianity.

But with all due allowance for this fact, it is well to realize that Christianity, even as far as it is social, is not moved by economic interests. While John the Baptist directly named social wrongs and demanded their change

¹² Cf. Ephesians, 2:11 ff; Ephesians, 3:6; Galatians, 3:28.

when he spoke to the Pharisees and the soldiers,¹³ Jesus promulgated no social program. He was no divider of goods, and in His view capital was only Mammon because of its spiritual danger. Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea were not rejected by Him, nor were Matthew and Zaccheus thrown aside. Christ opposed the love of money but not its mere possession. He attacked the insincerity of the ruling classes, but not their goods. Dives was finally lost because of his unbelief and not because of his wealth. The early Christian Church had among its members people of standing and wealth. The communistic experiment of the congregation at Jerusalem was purely voluntary and not a law; it failed and proved that the quick economic application of spiritual love was unsuccessful. A very clear evidence of the relation of early Christianity to social conditions and evils is found in the attitude of St. Paul when he returned the fugitive slave Onesimus to Philemon. The slave was returned as a Christian to be treated by his master as a brother. In this way through spiritual brotherhood the social evil of slavery was inwardly overcome, but St. Paul had no social program for the external change of society through the doing away of slavery. This was not the function of Christianity; it might follow as an effect but it was not the immediate aim. It is only by misinterpretation that Christianity can be made a social or economic movement against the social order of its day. It had social effects but it was not a social propaganda. Its social results are due to its religious claims. It is social as far as religion is social, but it is not economic. It does not announce a new world of bread, but a new faith and life through the Word of God. The interests of its life are not to feed the thousands with bodily bread, but to provide men with the spiritual Bread from Heaven. The ideals and aims of Christianity are not earthly satis-

¹³ Luke, 3:7 ff.

factions ; it does not deal with new surroundings, but with a new soul. It seeks to eliminate sin and then to reform society, but not to change society as a means for the removal of sin. There is in Christianity no acquiescence in the idealization of mere material comfort ; and it has no sympathy with an ideal economic state as the solution of man's deepest problem of happiness, righteousness, and peace. Its kingdom is within, its ideals are altogether spiritual. The hope which it cherishes is not a new economic condition and, therefore, a new mankind, but a new spiritually redeemed mankind and, therefore, a new society of a spiritual order.

Christianity cannot sympathize with the suppression of the individual in any strongly social scheme. The society which Christianity found in the old world was one of classes. In it were the rich and the poor, the free men and the slaves, the Jew and the Greek. The Greek and the Roman States were also marked by classes and castes. One of the mightiest problems in the later Roman Empire was the problem of the slave. But Christianity began, over against all class-calculation, and as against all massing of men, with the declaration of the infinite value of the soul.¹⁴ One soul outweighed the whole world in worth. One sinner to be saved meant more than all the rest of men.¹⁵ Even the parables which portray the Kingdom with a social background add the necessity of individual selection. The common vineyard of the Kingdom was the opportunity for dealing with the individual laborer. At the marriage feast man after man was scrutinized, and the unworthy individual was removed. The Kingdom was the infinitely valuable treasure obtained by the purchaser of the field ; it was the priceless pearl sought and found by the single, seeking merchant. The highest valuation,

¹⁴ Cf. Mark, 8:35, 36.

¹⁵ Cf. Luke, 15.

therefore, of the Kingdom was obtained through the individual. In the net which caught the fish of the Kingdom there was to be a separation by individuals. From the great field of the Kingdom the tares were not to be prematurely removed out of consideration for the wheat. The fear that any wheat might be destroyed was stronger than the benefit to be derived from an immediate and sweeping elimination of the tares. There was to be no social purification which might damage the individual. Jesus everywhere deals with individuals. Of course, His individualism is not the naturalistic individualism of the present, nor the philosophic individualism of our time.¹⁶ He seeks the individual to make the individual a saved personality. Christ has no hope of the masses as masses. They do not grasp Him and understand His message. He must hide from them His deepest truth through the parables. It is only the few seeking disciples who are ready to receive the mystery of the Kingdom. Christ's hope is not in the many and in society but in the select and chosen few, singly found, singly saved and trained. Christ holds that many are called and few are chosen. The whole Magna Charta of the spiritual freedom of faith rests upon this valuation of the individual which Jesus established. Any loss of it for the sake of a social scheme would be subversive of Christianity. While Christianity is not the faith of self-centered individualism, it is the faith of the true individual, who is to be developed into a holy personality, and of true society through the saved and sanctified individual. To remove the soul and its salvation from Christianity would be to remove its heart.

Christianity has no quarrel with a historical point of view if its philosophy does not eliminate the individual. Historical deeds, when man is involved, can not be justly described without the personal factor. The personal fac-

¹⁶ Cf. Warner Fite, "Individualism."

tor need not mean that history is simply the action of its great leaders and heroes. We have come to realize that there is a large place for the common people. But if history does regard the many it cannot reduce their development to a mere biological, economic or social evolution, without destroying the soul of history and emptying it of its moral import and its divine guidance. History to remain real and fully concrete must include the highest aspects and strivings of man and cannot see in these merely resultants of the struggle for existence, the selection of sex and the fondness of food. History must allow for the development of true personality. When history is thus conceived as finally a vital development in time, in which man's personality grows and expresses itself in manifold deeds and acts, then it is possible to speak truly of the historical point of view in religion. Without the personal factor man could have no history of religion; without it there could be no growth in faith or life. It is the personal man who makes possible the conception of the personal God who speaks to man and deals with him. The problem of the personal man as it leads to the personal God opens up the whole question of the historical attitude in religion. It opens it up but does not complete it; for otherwise it would mean, that the divine is merely a temporal growth in the history of man. When the historical enters religion it is yoked to a mystery. The temporal cannot originate the divine, the historical cannot beget the eternal. But — and here the mystery enters — will the historical cease if the divine enters the human, and the eternal the temporal? Christianity answers, no. It emphasizes the idea that the eternal God has entered into time, that the complete has come into human incompleteness, the perfect into the imperfect, the being into the becoming, the unchanging rest into development. Thus the historical point of view in Christian truth grows out of the incarnation.

Its reality must determine the philosophy of the history of Christianity. Consequently no other ideals or principles can rule. It is the Word made flesh who forms the spiritual starting-point for the history of Christianity.

PART TWO
THOUGHT AND TRUTH

CHAPTER I

THE FINDING OF TRUTH

THE leading aspects of thought open up to us a further problem. When the modern attitudes of thought are correlated to Christianity another question still remains. It is the problem of testing thought. The logical procedure of the present and the ruling ideals have been discussed. Are these adequate to the truth of thought, or do we need a fundamental examination of the character of truth and of its deepest nature? The present philosophical trend is inclined to answer that we need a special examination of the formal character of truth. The general determination of the methods of thinking are not sufficient, but they must be seen from a specific angle. Their inner validity must be considered. It is through validity that thought and truth are united, and we realize how they belong together. Thought may err and be incorrect, and the logic and reasoning of thought may be misapplied. In fact, corrective points of view have been emphasized in the whole discussion of the first part. But the whole problem of truth and thought must be more definitely centered. The aim of thought is to attain truth. Now how is this truth attained and found?

Mankind has always been engaged, though through many a path of error, in seeking truth. It is, however, not the actual quest of truth which interests us. The discussion of the last decades, brought about through pragmatism, turns about the character of the search.

This more formal question as to how truth is found and established has led to the alignment of men into two great parties.

On the one side there have gathered those who believe in the existence and absoluteness of truth before all searching and finding. They identify truth and reality. For them the logical quest is only an appearance and a shadow. Their first assumption is, that what is, is. The idea and ideal of truth, which is all-embracing, exists prior to all experience, and eternally above and beyond all human search. In this attitude the absolute pantheist and the absolute idealist in substance join hands with the mystic in asserting and re-asserting the old conception of absolute being under new forms and expressions. It will be necessary to examine the newer statements of the old philosophic notion of being and reality, and to note their bearing upon Christianity.

Over against the absolutist of every type and the mystic of every kind there have arisen the pragmatist, the vitalist, and the neo-realist with their apparently new positions. All of these emphasize with Lessing that the search after truth is greater than the possession of it. With the pragmatist the problem of truth is most central, and he has much to say in descriptive elaboration of how truth functions. The philosophy of life, which Bergson and Eucken advocate, also pays attention to the problem of truth, even though its main emphasis is laid on the fact of life, and its main contention is on behalf of the idea of life itself. The neo-realistic school has likewise found it necessary to declare itself on the problem of truth and error.

While pragmatism has stirred up the question, how is truth found, and has sought to reduce it to a psychological problem, the starting point of the psychological problem of truth lies further back. The new claim and accent of the descriptive study of mind, to solve what truth really

is and means for man in its formal aspect and in its essential features, is a resultant of the whole movement of modern philosophy. When Descartes began to resolve doubt by placing the emphasis of certainty in the thinking ego, he centered the whole problem of all things in consciousness. Despite the thorough-going pantheism of Spinoza, which depersonalized thinking and made consciousness the factual result rather than the thinking source of reality, the new emphasis of the ego maintained its force. The monads of Leibniz were conceived of as ideal and thinking centers, and they led modern thinking to realize the importance of the individual mind. With Leibniz as a background Kant formulated for the modern age in most distinct manner the problem of how we know. In this formulation he was, however, more stimulated by the scepticism of Hume as to the possibility of any certain knowledge beyond impressions, than by the personal idealism of Berkeley. Kant set himself the task of answering the question of truth by means of logic. Thus there arose the whole modern epistemology, which claimed to be separate from the distinct sciences of psychology and formal logic. The foundations of knowledge were sought after and examined. The answers which epistemology suggested were to make a basis of truth by carefully showing, what we know, and what we can know, and how we know. But it did not aim to answer these questions by examining the phenomenal processes of the mind, but by finding the very nature of knowledge. This science of epistemology absorbed the interest of thinkers everywhere.

But the newer attitude which pragmatism represents raised serious objections to the ruling epistemology. It claimed that epistemology began generally with a metaphysical assumption and doctrine, and then it determined logic and psychology from its assumption, and combined them with its metaphysics. The newer accurate examina-

tion of psychological phenomena set the current against philosophical epistemology. Psychology desired to have knowledge examined in its process. The generalization from the processes of knowledge was to point the way toward a doctrine of truth. Truth was then to be considered as more than a philosophical or even a logical problem. The logical and philosophical considerations were to be made secondary to psychology. As the processes of actual knowledge in the human mind include feeling and will these were made parts of actually functioning truth. It was in this way that the newer attitude on truth arose. The absolutists who made truth fundamental before all finding of it, and who claimed that it could never be really realized in the world of appearance, were set aside. There was equal opposition to any epistemologist, who, from some ideal of truth found in examining the heart of knowledge, framed a metaphysical doctrine upon a metaphysical examination. Nor was the emphasis in the newer doctrine put on the mere finding of the truth as something to be discovered, but it was also asserted that frequently the finding and the quest made the truth. Between the dilemma of this assertion and that of the existence of truth prior to all quest we stand to-day. Is truth existent, and shall we find and discover it, or is truth the result of a process and is it crystallized out of many truths slowly discovered in the search?

CHAPTER II

THE ABSOLUTIST AIM

IT has often been supposed that the absolutist is the best friend of Christianity. His conception of truth as existent, eternal, actual in its constancy and being, and his identification of truth with absolute, infinite and individual reality, seem not merely truly religious, but also most favorable to Christianity's claim of exclusive and final truth. Does not the absolutist pierce the veil of the visible and audible and tangible, and lead the mind to the unchanging realm of existence beyond the "this," the "what," and the "now" ? But Christianity will be compelled to learn through the examination of the present expositions of absolutism, that the result of the newer absolutism is not different in its effects and influences from the influence of Hegel and early Hegelianism. When Hegel reigned the power and vitality of the Christian idea of God were lost, because the Absolute was as much deprived of real personality by Hegel as it had been by Spinoza. All the emphasis on the uniqueness and individuality of the Absolute did not guarantee His real personal existence. The doctrine of God's personality was not asserted. And the Christian dogma of the Trinity was interpreted as an intellectual movement, but not as a living, throbbing, feeling, willing unity of co-equal, eternal persons. The atonement became a moral and speculative fact, and was not a historical and spiritual occurrence. Through its optimism of abstract being Hegelianism removed the sting of sin, which it declared to be unreal and

passing, a discord to be dissolved into unity. With the neglect of a real distinction between sin and holiness there went hand in hand the loss of a really deep and actual difference between truth and error in mankind.

It has been particularly the difficulty of a clear distinction between truth and error which the latest absolutism, that rests on Hegelianism, has brought to light. The idealism of Professor Bradley, in his great book on "Appearance and Reality," makes it very clear, that while perfect truth and reality are identical in their absolute harmony and individuality, there is no real cleavage between truth and error in our human experience. Truth as we seek it and find it finitely is not fundamentally separate from error. Only when completed is truth reality and fullness of existence. Professor Bradley says: "Perfection of truth and of reality has in the end the same character. . . . Truth must exhibit the mark of internal harmony, or, again the mark of expansion and all-inclusiveness. And these two characteristics are diverse aspects of a single principle. . . . But, in the second place, harmony is incompatible with restriction and finitude."¹ Therefore, all finite relations are only degrees toward the truth and possess a side which is at the same time error.² Error is only finite and false appearance; it is discrepant with reality. To eliminate error there must be a progress toward full reality. In his later work, "Essays on Truth and Reality," Bradley, in order to bring out clearly the expansion of partial truth toward all-inclusiveness, and to emphasize the process toward complete harmony, differentiates truth and reality only to merge them again finally. He says: "Truth claimed identity with an individual and all-inclusive whole. But such a whole, when we examine it, we find itself to be the Universe and all

¹ "Appearance and Reality," p. 363.

² *Ibid.*, Chapter XVI.

reality. And when we had to see how truth fails,³ as truth, in attaining its own end, we were being shown the very features of difference between truth and reality. And in passing over into reality and in thus ceasing to be mere truth, truth does not pass beyond its own end, nor does it fail to realize itself. Hence, being the same as reality, and at the same time different from reality, truth is thus able to apprehend its identity and difference. But, if this is so, we seem to have reached the solution of our problem.”⁴ “And thus, if we are asked for the relation of truth to reality, we must reply that in the end there is no relation, since in the end there are no separate terms. All that we can say is that, in order for truth to complete itself into reality, such and such defects in truth itself would have to be rectified.”⁵ In other words, truth completed is reality. It resolves itself into absolute unity and harmony, and becomes finally and really truth in reality. This is a logical process in which every contradiction is resolved into absolute non-contradiction beyond identity and difference.

Meantime, however, in our experience, there are grades of truth and error. “To be more or less true, and to be more or less real, is to be separated by an interval, smaller or greater, from all-inclusiveness or self-consistency.”⁶ On the other hand, “error is truth, it is partial truth, that is false only because partial and left incomplete.”⁷ “Error consists in the deviation of the idea, whether by excess or defect from that reality at which

³ *Essays on Truth and Reality*,” p. 114 ff. Truth is claimed to fail in its finite process, (1) because its contents cannot be made intelligible throughout and entirely; (2) failing thus truth fails again to include all the given facts. These failures are in truth as it seeks to arrive at its standard of all-inclusive completeness.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

⁶ “*Appearance and Reality*,” p. 364.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

it aims.”⁸ Thus error and partial truth are identical, and partial error is also partial truth. The aim in either is toward a coherent and consistent whole. The higher the structure and the more complete the system which relates everything internally to the absolute whole, the nearer we are to the truth. “If we could reach an all-embracing ordered whole, then our certainty would be absolute.”⁹ But while this certainty is not reached by us, it is nevertheless true that the Absolute works in and through us. However, this working is only partial. “Truth is an ideal expression of the Universe, at once coherent and comprehensive. It must not conflict with itself, and there must be no suggestion which fails to fall inside it. Perfect truth in short must realize the idea of a systematic whole.”¹⁰

In full accord with Professor Bradley is Mr. Joachim in his book on “The Nature of Truth.” He holds that an ideal experience, which is the absolute total, the whole in perfect unity, is being fulfilled and found through finite approach to ideal, final truth. The final truth is contained in the notion of coherence, which is inner and logical, and leads to the whole. “For the ideal of absolute truth, by reference to which we are measuring the relative degrees of truth in the various systems of judgments, and (through them) in the single judgments, is the completely individual, self-sustained, significant whole. The truth, we seem to see, emerges in its perfect completeness as an individual meaning with an internal logical connectedness and articulation. Its articulate connexion demands discursive expression as a system of judgments. Its individuality requires self-containedness or complete self-coherence of the system. And this seems to be the ideal,

⁸ “Essays on Truth and Reality,” p. 258.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

which human knowledge involves and partly attains; though it can never be adequately, fully, or finally embodied within the actual knowledge of finite subjects.”¹¹ In the approach to the ideal and to reality “systematic knowledge, which is to represent this ‘reality,’ will include negative as well as affirmative judgments on the same level of significance.”¹² The negations do not exclude the positive instances, but only serve to throw into relief positive judgments. Just as truth in its progress needs negation, it also needs error, and it requires error as the road to truth. Error is isolation and partakes of the character of fragments, but still it performs a positive service. Finally Joachim, although he cannot doubt the unity and wholeness of truth, finds a real insoluble problem. This arises not in the immediate recognition of the truth, nor in the immediate recognition of various judgments or systems of judgments as more or less true in approximating the one standard, but it does arise from the immediate experience of truth when the thinker endeavors to raise immediate certainty to the level of reflective knowledge. In other words, an ideal of logical, perfect harmony, held as a belief cannot be logically and reflectively defended in discursive and analytic argument. Despite this failure, which makes it impossible to apply the ideal of truth in actual thought and life, Joachim is not moved to test any other conception of truth.

Professor Royce endeavors to approach this problem from a somewhat different angle, but the final result is the same. He begins by differing from what he designates as critical rationalism, which seeks truth as the empirically verifiable truth. It is the purpose of Royce to find as the truth “in a completed experience the whole meaning of a System of Ideas.”¹³ According to Royce experience is

¹¹ “The Nature of Truth,” p. 113 ff.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 138.

¹³ “The World and the Individual,” Vol. I, p. 61.

truly interpreted not as partial, broken, and finite, but as an absolute, total, whole experience. Experience in its completeness is made the Absolute. The meaning of the Absolute is Truth. But this meaning can not be reached except through the whole, full apprehension and comprehension of the System of Ideas. Truth is finally a harmony sought and really intended in all finite meanings, but it is found in them only in part. The incompleteness makes the meaning partly true and partly erroneous. But through this finiteness there is working out the Whole, toward which we are tending. In every idea the important element is the meaning. An idea is any state of mind that has a meaning; and a meaning is the partial fulfillment or the relatively complete embodiment of a purpose. Purpose is the real internal core of the meaning of the idea, which we want and but partly attain. When all ideas with their meanings, i. e., their internal purpose and aim, are in a complete system, we have the truth and experience as absolute. Such an Absolute is our ideal, our goal of striving, but never our finite, actual possession.

The longer we study the modern absolutist and Hegelian position, the more certain fundamental ideas stand out despite all minor differences. All absolutists emphasize system and harmony in the complete and absolute wholeness. Such a system and harmony is essentially intellectual. It is true that Professor Royce emphasizes the conception of purpose, but, nevertheless, he does not become clearly voluntaristic, and he does not throw the accent like Schopenhauer on the will. He still remains an intellectualist. Through the intellect and its ideal of logical totality the modern absolutists attempt to find reality. Their striving is to discover traces of reality in appearance, and they hold that the finite, though only as a shadow, reflects the Infinite. They start from the whole and struggle to express how the part guarantees

the whole, the incomplete the complete, the seeking the finding, and the striving the goal. All absolutists are idealists and accept and believe in an ideally complete, harmonious Universe.

The idealism of the absolutists is not out of tune in its tendency with Christianity. Christianity, as well as absolutism, has the ideal of harmony in a more than finite God. The belief in a universe where error is to be at last a passing phase, where finally, despite all finite imperfections, every idea must come into unity with the great and final purpose and intent of the Universe, possesses the desire of Christian optimism and hope. The conviction that there is a truth, whole and complete, before and beyond us, which is more constant than Professor Royce's idea of a completed experience, seems to fit in admirably with the Christian idea that Truth is as God is. It begins with an all-embracing ideal, lofty and inspiring, and offers a strong motive for our seeking and wanting the Truth. In wanting and seeking it we are seeking the complete; the Truth is making us, and we are not making the Truth. This belief, that behind all our feeble attempts there is absolute harmony, furnishes us with a real religious inspiration. We make so many sacrifices, we give up so much, we contribute such value to our little truth-seeking and our relative truth-finding, because in it and through it Truth itself, with its high perfection and its joy of completeness, is laying hold on us. Does not such an ideal of truth, which can be at once artistic and scientific, accord with Christian thinking? Can not Christian thinking find in this philosophic creed, an expression of the perfect mind of God working through our minds, and of God's ideas finding their fulfillment through our thoughts and ways? The ideal of a perfect truth before all human search is a belief in divine Wisdom and Providence, and in the power of a divine Ideal in human thought.

In addition to the agreement in the main tendency between Christianity and absolutism in accepting absolute truth, there is also a unity of ideals in the effort to reach the Absolute, as far as this Absolute means God. It is true that Christianity has no philosophic name for God. The terms Absolute and Infinite are not fundamentally religious terms, but they are philosophic. While, therefore, Christianity as religion cannot be just if it starts out from the philosophic ideas of the Infinite and Absolute, it nevertheless cannot accept a mere limited and finite God. It is, therefore, in sympathy with the idea of some sort of an absolute and infinite God in its theology. It cannot admit objective limitations in God.¹⁴ Consequently any philosophy which starts from the Absolute and Infinite creates a predisposition in its favor in the mind of the Christian thinker. But while Christianity is thus in consonance with the ideal of an Absolute, we shall find that when absolutism defines its Absolute, and gives meaning to it, Christianity must differ as we shall see further on. Thus Christianity is favorable to the tendency of absolutism, to the purpose which it seeks, to the spirit which seems to move it, but not to its full argument and its reflective exposition. Christianity can estimate the strivings of absolutism, its great faith, its optimistic hope, but it cannot accept its worked-out philosophy as a creed.

The first discrepancy arises because Christianity cannot accept truth as a purely intellectual ideal. In it the word of Christ: "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life," has given truth a vital, full, personal meaning. The ideal of truth in Christianity, consequently, includes in truth the satisfaction of the heart as well as of the mind; it implies the right of feeling and will, and not only of the intellect. As far as Christianity attempts to define its truth it cannot be ruled by any mere philosophic exposi-

¹⁴ Cf. below, Chapter V, p. 236.

tion of an intellectual order. Its system of truths and its scheme of doctrines are controlled by the living facts of faith, but faith is not modified through the demands of the unity of an intellectual system. It is true that in the exposition of the Scriptures the Church early fixed a rule of faith, and that it constantly employs the analogy of the faith believed. But neither the rule of faith nor the analogy of faith are aught else but the original, normative Christian revelation in its essence, both as communicated and experienced, though the form is credal. They determine by their living content and not by their logicity. Where they have been philosophically colored, and where the desire to be consistent has entered in as controlling, a wrong trend has taken hold of Christian truth and injured the Scriptural normativeness and the Christian life. Consistency and thoroughness of system, logical non-contradiction and harmony are not the essentials in Christian truth. Christian truth because it is living is frequently, like life, non-logical. Christianity at its best, which is its truth in vital relations, cannot, therefore, be judged by logical categories, and in it the law of absolute identity dare not make its truth mechanical in opposition to its vital nature.

In all the newer treatises of the absolutists one feature of Hegel's philosophy is constantly present. All absolutists agree with their master in stressing the Real as the Universe, and the Universe as Individuality. It is, however, particularly Bosanquet who builds all his speculations on the one, total, complete, perfect Individuality.¹⁵ But we would be very much mistaken and altogether misunderstand and misapply this idea of Individuality, if we were to interpret it as synonymous with personality. Personality as conceived by the absolutists is a limiting and finite

¹⁵ Cf. "The Principle of Individuality and Value"; also "The Value and Destiny of the Individual."

determination. In this conception they follow Spinoza, who sees in personality a determining idea. But a determining idea is supposed to be a negation of full reality. Consequently Individuality, the Universe, the Absolute cannot be personal. Bradley says: "The highest Reality, so far as I see must be super-personal."¹⁶ This super-personality does away with God's individuality; He is made a part of nature itself. "The Maker and Sustainer becomes also the indwelling Life and Mind and the inspiring Love";¹⁷ He is no external Person beyond the Universe. Its Individuality is He. The reality of God is His presence in the world and in the individual soul. This presence is He. Bradley honestly confesses as a result: "But how this necessary 'pantheism' is to be made consistent with an individual Creator I myself do not perceive."¹⁸ The Universe, therefore, is eternal and sustains itself; it is the Individuality, it is God. Never in any proper sense is God an individuality, a person, and, therefore, He cannot be a Creator. With such a result Christianity as a theistic religion is utterly out of tune. If Individuality is the Universe, if pantheism is correct, there can be no God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Bradley in part goes beyond Spinoza; he is not willing with Spinoza to really identify God and the world. To him God is less and less real than the Universe. He is not willing to decide categorically between the real and the unreal without allowing for degrees of the real. If this right of assuming degrees of the real is denied him, he denies the reality of God. In his own words this is his conclusion: "Now, if I am forced to take reality as having thus only one sense, I must reply that God is not real at all any more than you and I are real. Nothing to

¹⁶ "Essays on Truth and Reality," p. 436.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 436.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 436.

me in this sense¹⁹ is real except the Universe as a whole; for I cannot take God as including, or as equivalent to, the entire Universe. This answer is the result of forcing me to reply to a question which I regard as erroneous. But if, on the other hand, I am allowed to hold to degrees in reality, the conclusion at once is different. God to me is now so much more real than you or myself that to compare God's reality with ours would be ridiculous."²⁰ From this discussion we can conclude nothing else but that God is not the absolute reality, although he is more real than we are. He is far more real than men, but He is not the Real, the Absolute, the Individuality. The total Real is only the Universe as a Whole. The Universe guarantees God's reality, not God the reality of the Universe. He is not all in all, but some in the all of the Universe.

In an effort to find the philosophical basis of religion, Professor Watson argues for what he calls Constructive Idealism, which he attempts to differentiate from the pantheism of the absolutists. He claims that pantheism fails in conceiving the divine as equally manifest in nature and in mind, and that it robs the finite of its worth. For his thinking there must be degrees of God's manifestation and the finite must be recognized. Nevertheless he admits this agreement between pantheism and Constructive Idealism: "The point of agreement between them is that both affirm that the world can have no reality apart from God, and therefore that the finite as such has no existence."²¹ Even in this attempt we at last lose the finite; and while Watson does not make the Universe God like Bradley, his putting the reality of the finite into God is only the reverse, and leads to the absorption of all things in the Whole. It must end in taking away real personality and

¹⁹ This applies to absolute meaning.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 448.

²¹ "The Philosophical Basis of Religion," p. 444.

individuality from God because man as finite personality can have no real self-existence. Neither the God of Bradley nor the God of Watson is the God of Christianity.

Due to the inferior place which personality occupies in the thought of absolutism and of any system which approaches absolutism, it is quite natural and necessary that a doubt should arise about personal immortality. This doubt appears in the discussions of McTaggart when, to overcome the difficulties of the problem of immortality, he says: "To meet such doubts as these it would be necessary to construct a complete metaphysical system. We should have to determine what was the general nature of all reality, and whether that nature involved the existence of finite selves."²² The manner in which McTaggart believes that reality is determinative of the finite selves indicates where we shall arrive through a doctrine of reality like that of absolutism. But we are not compelled to remain within inference alone. Bradley clearly says: "The main demand of religion is for the assurance that the individual, as one with the Good, has so far conquered death, and that what we call this life with its before and after is not the main reality. If and so far as it is necessary in the interest of religion to represent this fundamental truth in the form of prolonged existence, I approve and I adhere to such a doctrine. But for myself I feel the gravest doubt with regard to such a necessity."²³ The doubt of Mr. Bradley is no mere personal whim, although he thinks it to be due to a defect of his temperament and imaginative power. He does not seem to see the result of his own logic. Therefore, he continues and admits, "Wherever after due consideration it is found by any man or any set of men that religion calls for a genuine individual personal existence after death, I am on the side of

²² "Some Dogmas of Religion," p. 110.

²³ "Essays on Truth and Reality," p. 438.

such a doctrine. I think that the belief, so far is right, and under this condition, may be called true. Exactly what its truth comes to in the end, however, I think that we cannot know, and, so far as we are religious, I am sure that we ought not much to care.”²⁴ In this wavering attitude, Bradley after all is finally compelled to take back what he has doubtfully granted. His philosophic absolutism has led him to a religion of the Total, the Universe, in whose interest, of course, personal immortality is not a matter to care for very much. Wherever the Universe is the Real, we cannot find any sure foundation for the permanence of the individual soul. It is perfectly natural, and a legitimate result of pantheistic absolutism to oppose or at least to doubt personal immortality. In this attitude it must contradict the high valuation which Christianity places upon the immortality of the single soul.

Absolutism with its effort to find the Whole, the Eternal, in every part and every finite self is apparently at first sight favorable to the Christian idea of incarnation. It seems to support the presence of the Real behind the phenomenal. Bradley writes: “Behind me the absolute reality works through and in union with myself, and the world which confronts me is at bottom one thing in substance and in power with this reality. There *is* a world of appearance and there *is* a sensuous curtain, and to seek to deny the presence of this or to identify it with reality is mistaken. But for the truth I come back always to that doctrine of Hegel, that ‘there is nothing behind the curtain other than that which is in front of it.’ For what is in front of it is the Absolute that is at once one with the knower and behind him.”²⁵ Strong, however, as this admission is, it must not be forgotten that the substance and power of reality is only present in appearance and in

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 439.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

varying degrees. Appearance, according to the whole system of Bradley, is not reality, but only partial and erroneous reality. It cannot at once, if we are consistent, be reality and not reality. Nevertheless, this contradiction lurks in the idea of Bradley that there are degrees of reality in appearance, and that the substance is partially evident in the shadow. But finally appearance rather hides than reveals reality; it conceals reality behind a changing world. The actual reality is the total, invisible Universe. There is and must be a constant discrepancy between what is and what appears, for the part at its best cannot be the whole.

Now the Christian conception of incarnation cannot be clothed in the garments of appearance and reality. Its fundamental idea is rather that of revelation than of concealment, and its purpose is not to hide but to disclose a mystery. Christ claims to be the revealer of the Father; in Him the Father is apparent. He says: "He that seeth me seeth Him that sent me."²⁶ The incarnation brings God nearer to us, while the appearance of the absolutist hides the reality of the Absolute. For the Christian incarnation is the approach and way to God; and this approach is through the personality of Jesus. The absolutist, however, begins with the total Individuality, the whole Universe, as the Reality, and then attempts to find it in the world of appearance. His ideas, therefore, obscure but do not aid in grasping the Christian claim that God is manifest in Christ.

The difficulty, which was indicated at the very beginning of this chapter, when it was shown how the absolutists fail to distinguish definitely between truth and error in their finite form, must again occupy us. While the assertion of the absolute existence of Truth was seen to contain an element favorable to Christianity, nevertheless,

²⁶ John, 12:45.

there is a larger amount that is unfavorable to Christian truth. If it be true that there is no real distinction between finite truth and error, so that error is partial truth, and developing truth is partial error, there arises a great difficulty in making any finite statement. Then we shall have no right to claim any strong superiority for any finite truth or any truth finitely stated. But Christianity like all religions must demand both clearness and authority for its message. It cannot come to men with a doctrine of salvation, which it claims as final, if this doctrine does not possess a certainty adequate to its claim. Therefore, Christianity in stating its essential truth must quarrel with any conception which will make even the human statements of divine truth purely relative and uncertain. It is true that Christianity admits that we have and bear the divine treasure in earthen vessels, and that we only know in part; nevertheless despite the vessel and despite the partial knowledge, we do have the treasure and we do know. The assertion that there are grades of truth in the communication of the divine, and that in the world of finite appearance truth and error cannot be really separated, must impair the claim of Christianity to have the final message for the souls of men. Of course, if this claim is surrendered and if Christianity is only relatively true, there will be no quarrel with absolutism. But as long as Christianity does not surrender its Christ as the Truth, it cannot be satisfied with the theory of truth which the absolutist accepts. He possesses no guarantee how far the relative truth is real truth other than mere abstract totality, identity, and non-contradiction. Christianity cannot bow to such a standard, and must maintain its own claim of certainty in its message.

Closely connected with the failure to distinguish between truth and error is the failure to distinguish fundamentally between evil and good. A very strong contra-

diction arises between absolutism and Christianity, in the assertion of absolutism that evil is only the partial, the incomplete, and the logically disarranged. Even as the partial and incomplete evil is a part of a whole, and belongs to the Universe. It is supposed to be over-ruled and to serve a higher good end. Upon this final outcome the claim is built, that evil is unknowingly good, and that as discord it disappears if the harmony is made large enough. It must fall within the Absolute, but in it "The collision and the strife may be an element in some fuller realization."²⁷ The Absolute resolves evil finally. "The Absolute is the richer for every discord, and for all diversity which it embraces; and it is our ignorance only in which consists the poverty of our object."²⁸ If evil is in the Absolute and a passing phase in it leading to a higher unity and fullness, then there can be in evil no absolute opposition to goodness. Goodness must be as relative as evil. Such a relativity must be absolutely opposed by Christianity, for it ill accords with the emphasis of salvation as a delivery from sin. The way in which Christianity contends against evil, and the estimate which it puts upon its seriousness, will never allow evil to be considered as a mere discord. The belief of Christianity is that sin is not merely a discord, nor a blemish, but condemnable selfishness and opposition to the love of man and God. It is high lawlessness which God hates, and to remove which God's Son became incarnate. Therefore, sin is a reality totally foreign to God; it is a fact in human life to be eliminated, and not a disharmony to be resolved. If Christianity would abandon this conception of sin, it would be necessary to undervalue goodness. It is goodness which absolutism does not value as ultimate.²⁹ In its Absolute it does not

²⁷ Bradley, "Appearance and Reality," p. 202.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

²⁹ Cf. Bradley, "Appearance and Reality," Chapter XXV.

place moral distinction; the Absolute is fundamentally amoral. Consequently there is no final place for the good. Thus Bradley says: "Good and evil reproduce that main result which we found in our examination of truth and error. The opposition in the end is unreal, but it is, for all that, emphatically actual and valid. Error and evil are facts, and most assuredly there are degrees of each; and whether anything is better or worse, does without any doubt make a difference to the Absolute. And certainly the better anything is, the less totally in the end is its being over-ruled. But nothing, however good, can in the end be real precisely as it appears. Evil and good, in short, are not ultimate; they are relative factors which cannot retain their special characters in the Whole."³⁰ In other words, the Whole is more fundamental than the Good; and, therefore, greater than the idea of a holy God. The Whole, the logical Total is the Real, but this Real is not the Good and not God. If absolutism emphasizes this result of its thinking it must destroy all morality and religion. If the good is not absolute, if the ethical is not higher than the logical, then all virtues and faith are undermined. Ideals cannot be maintained through a belief in a logical Whole, in a Universe, in an Individuality, in which moral and religious distinctions do not ultimately exist. This Whole is a creation of human abstraction, it is an idol of the concept which man has made and in his ignorance worships. The Christian conviction is that of a holy and loving God, in Whom the Good in its fullness and richness exists as real, absolute and eternal.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 430.

CHAPTER III

THE MYSTIC ABSORPTION

WHEREVER absolutism is discussed as a method of approaching the problem of truth, there the claim of mysticism must also be considered. In many respects absolutism and mysticism differ. Absolutism uses logic, mysticism intuition; absolutism relies on reasoning, mysticism on feeling; absolutism shows how relative is the world of appearance, mysticism seeks practically to escape from it. But finally absolutism and mysticism agree in their emphasis of the One and the Absolute. In their main tenet they belong together. It is true that Professor Royce¹ attempts to bring together mysticism and realism, but though there are points of contact between them, mysticism after all approaches far more closely to absolutist idealism than to realism.

It is impossible and not within the limit of our purpose to discuss mysticism in all its bearings. We are only concerned with its claim to be able to find the truth. Its other qualities and characteristics are important for us only as they grow out of and are connected with this claim. The side of mysticism which concerns us is what James calls its noetic quality. He says: "Although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem to those who experience them to be also states of knowledge. They are states of insight into depth of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect."² This knowledge, however, of an intuitive nature bears with it a sense of authority. It

¹ "The World and the Individual," Vol. I, Lectures 3, 4, 5.

² "Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 380.

exists first of all for the individual who has the mystic experience, but its truth with its remoteness and abstractness claims a general value. Mysticism believes that it reaches the ultimate which is the final object of pure reason. The mystic in his approach to what is finally reasonable in the Absolute does not at the outset reject reflection. He allows all facts to be known before he shows their illusion. Says Royce: "His doctrine has the honesty of reflective thought about it. He tells you where his own paradoxes are to be found."³ "The mystic asserts that the real cannot be wholly independent of knowledge."⁴ The knowledge, however, of the mystic does not remain in the reflective stage, for reflection is not of value any further than to lead you to analyze your own experience. In this analysis mysticism rises above mere perception of conscious abstractions and seeks reality within the realm of vital knowing. Its message, according to Royce, is this: "'Know,' says Mysticism. '*The truth is nigh thee, even in thy heart. Purify thyself. In thee is all truth. How shall it be except as known and as one with the Knower?*'"⁵ But such high knowledge of experience is found "not through a cultivation of what we ordinarily call Reason, but through a quenching of Reason in the very presence of the absolute goal of all finite thought."⁶ Reason is merged into intuition; it is absorbed into the immediate recognition of Being by that degree of abstraction, which finds the unity of Being not through definitions but through feeling. It is the concentration of reason in feeling. Through this concentration the self, with whose knowledge mysticism begins, is lost in the immediate feeling of its unity with God.

³ "The World and the Individual," Vol. I, p. 189.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 189.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 179.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 155.

The path from reason to the immediacy of feeling necessarily emphasizes the subjective in man. Mysticism claims to be no speculative projection, but an actual, vital, inner experience. In this experience large stress is placed upon the Self or the Soul. It is only in the Self or Soul that truth can be found. The Soul, which is the real Self, is whither men must go to seek and secure truth. Therefore, no external letter, but only the inner light leads to the truth. Thus the mystic declares that "within yourself lies the sole motive that leads you to distinguish truth from error, reality from unreality, the world from the instant's passing contents."⁷ But if experience, real, inner, felt personal, experience is needed, this experience itself is not the truth. Through it absolute Being reveals itself.

Finally in our inner feeling we know not as knowing ourselves, but the Knower knows in and through us. We ourselves are lost and Being exists. Royce thus defines the deepest character of mysticism: "I have said, more than once, that the essence of Mysticism lies not in the definition of the subject to which you attribute Being, but in the predicate Being itself. This predicate in case of Mysticism is such that, as soon as you apply it, the subject indeed loses all finite outlines, lapses into pure immediacy, quenches thought, becomes ineffable, satisfies even by turning into what ordinary Realism would call a mere naught."⁸ Naturally when Being thus predominates and absorbs the mind and heart it cannot be defined. It becomes ineffable.⁹ By mere negative terms of high feeling the mind seeks to remove all limited and finite words and thoughts,¹⁰ to reach the great positive and undefinable Absolute which is not a conception but the absolute unity of all reality.

⁷ Royce, *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 189.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 177.

⁹ Cf. James, "Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 380.

¹⁰ Hocking, "The Meaning of God in Human Experience," p. 369 ff.

Before this unity man becomes passive and silent. God, the One, is seen face to face as silence fills the soul. In this lonely stillness the Absolute alone is left, while man is resigned and lapses into dormancy, idleness, emptiness, nothingness.¹¹ The silence of the soul may lead into quietism, and in some types of mysticism to unconsciousness. Personal unconsciousness is the last step in the purification of the mystic. While not all mystics reach this final stage, and while not all claim this final stage, nevertheless there must be such a disconnection from the world, that all desires and conflicting perceptions may be eliminated and the soul live in the illumination of the Absolute.¹² The goal is at all times the absorption into the One. God is this One, the supreme, all-pervading, indwelling power, in Whom all existence has synthesis and oneness. His center is everywhere and His circumference is nowhere. He is not nature, not the universe, not mind, not reason, not feeling and not will. He is Being, He is Reality. "For the mystic, according to the genuinely historical definition of what constitutes speculative Mysticism, to be real means to be in such wise Immediate that in the presence of this immediacy, all thought and all ideas, absolutely satisfied, are quenched, so that the finite search ceases, and the Other is no longer another, but is absolutely found. The object which fulfils this definition, and which is therefore worthy to be called real, is of necessity in itself One and only One."¹³

There is much in mysticism with which Christianity can agree. But the question is this, whether mysticism has the method of finding truth which Christianity can accept. The occurrence of mystic elements in Christianity is no

¹¹ Cf. James, "Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 381; Hocking, "The Meaning of God in Human Experience," p. 382 ff; p. 402.

¹² Cf. Hocking, *Ibid.*, p. 397.

¹³ Royce, *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 144.

proof that Christianity is essentially mysticism. Like all religions, Christianity has had its great mystics;¹⁴ it is not, however, like Brahmanism and Buddhism, essentially and unconditionally mystical. It cannot be shown that the many utterances in the sayings of Christ and in the words of the apostles are genuinely mystical. Of course, we can put a mystical coloring on some of the experiences of Christ, if, e.g., we explain the temptation and transfiguration of Christ, not as historical outward occurrences and facts, but as descriptions of ecstatic inner experiences. But such an assertion and such an explanation of Christ's temptation and transfiguration destroy their vital objectivity. If this be maintained, these experiences cannot be mystic because they cannot be subjective. As soon as we attribute to them historical revelatory character, they must become essentially non-mystical.

Similarly Christ's word in reference to His spiritual presence,¹⁵ His beatitude for the pure in heart, who shall see God,¹⁶ and His saying "The Kingdom of God is within¹⁷ you,"¹⁸ are spiritual facts and not necessarily mystic experiences. Of course, if spiritual facts are in themselves mystical experiences, then the two can be identified. But these spiritual facts emphasized in Christianity lack the important elements of mysticism, as, e.g., the merging of reason into feeling, and the absorption of self in God. There are, however, among spiritual facts in Christianity, those which approach a mystical type; but

¹⁴ Cf. Inge, "Christian Mysticism"; W. Major Scott, "Aspects of Christian Mysticism"; E. C. Gregory, "An Introduction to Christian Mysticism"; W. K. Fleming, "Mysticism in Christianity"; Rufus M. Jones, "Studies in Mystical Religion."

¹⁵ Matthew, 28:20.

¹⁶ Matthew, 5:8.

¹⁷ Strictly speaking it is not "within" but "in the midst of you."

¹⁸ Luke, 17:21.

even in these we must observe what Fleming is compelled to admit: "The aim of Christianity is catholic; it is meant to embrace human nature as a whole and not a specialized function of it."¹⁹ With this reservation in mind we must admit that, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in believers, and through Him the indwelling of the Father and Son in us, and the real inner union and communion of God with us, are in large measure mystical and inward.

The spiritual experiences have not made the message, nor the life of the apostles and the early Church mystical. While Paul has his visions and is lifted up into the heavens, where he hears unspeakable words, he does not glory in this experience, nor make it the basis of his Christian life.²⁰ While he glories that the Father revealed the Son in him,²¹ as a basis for his preaching he refers to his commission and not to his message. Paul does say: "I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave Himself for me."²² But in this statement we find that the life of Christ in Paul is one which conserves Paul's personality and does not absorb him. He grasps the Son of God by faith, and faith requires two personalities. From the manner in which Paul thus interprets the inner life of Christ in his own life, light is thrown on the truth of the indwelling of the Spirit, and the so-called "mystical union" in Christian life. These experiences never do away with the separate personality of man over against God. Man is not absorbed into God, and consequently we have no pure mysticism. It is rather the religions of India which exhibit a pure mystical absorption.

¹⁹ "Mysticism in Christianity," p. 27.

²⁰ Cf. II Corinthians, 12:4.

²¹ Galatians, 1:16.

²² Galatians, 2:20.

St. John like St. Paul is no mystic in the strict and full sense of the word. Despite his apparently mystic terms, as, e. g., life, light, new birth, he has the equally important historical term, "witness," which implies external testimony and occurrences. John may exhibit in the Apocalypse a symbolism which lends itself to mystic uses, for mysticism loves symbolism and delights in allegory. On the whole, however, John bears a historic message. Fleming, while favoring the interpretation of John in a mystical manner, must admit: "That by this very insistence on a historical revelation, he (John) counterpoises the strong mystical tendency in succeeding ages to regard the Gospel story as a kind of drama merely, correspondent to a more vital reality."²³ It was in a later day that mysticism crept into certain types of Christianity. The one character through whom very largely the mystic influence entered Christian thought was Dionysius, the Areopagite, who is really the father of Christian mysticism. But Dionysius is largely indebted to the neo-Platonist Plotinus.

While primitive Christianity is, however, not essentially mystic, it can approve of certain elements in mysticism. The first of these is the emphasis on a real knowledge of the divine which is not the result of reason. Christianity has always favored a communication of divine truth from without and from within, not through the processes of logic, but through direct intuition. In this intuition truth is directly received and immediately recognized. Christianity emphasizes the conscience as that part of man which receives and preserves Christian truth.²⁴ It does not demand as essential to truth a logical proof or a consistent scientific foundation, but it holds to the possibility of real knowledge otherwise gained than by reflection. In this

²³ "Mysticism in Christianity," p. 38.

²⁴ II Corinthians, 4:2; I Timothy, 3:9.

respect it favors mysticism. The point of dispute among Christians is, however, whether such knowledge, as mysticism asserts, is finally of the nature of feeling. It is not ratiocinative purely and simply, but this negation does not necessarily imply the assertion, that the immediacy and authority of Christian truth is shifting and transient like the coming and going of feeling. Such an assumption is not adequate to the intellectual and volitional elements of Christian truth. The latest result of the best psychology of religion does not approve of affection or feeling²⁵ as the primal element in religious life, but it rather argues for the total mental life.

The second characteristic in which Christianity and mysticism agree is the strong emphasis on the soul. The soul or self of mysticism never remains purely psychological, but it is always given a religious meaning. The process of knowing that leads to feeling, and the essential dwelling in feeling, is in most of the interpretations of mysticism a religious act. Now Christianity favors any philosophy which makes much of the soul and the value of the individual in contrast with the world and its passing show. Christianity believes that this world and the fashion thereof perisheth, but that the soul liveth forever.

Again Christianity is in harmony with the belief of mysticism that there is a real inner revelation. While inner revelation is not the only kind that Christianity knows, it nevertheless accepts it and approves of it. The revelation which is the basis of the communication of truth to others may be made through historical acts and deeds of great personages, but men are also inwardly moved by the Holy Spirit. They have visions and dreams, and receive truth through the organ of the soul. Christianity also holds, that such revelation, which has now become objective, and is guaranteed through the sources of early

²⁵ Cf. above, Part I, Chapter VII, p. 130.

Apostolic Christianity, is the medium through which God communicates with the soul. In this communication it is not the letter which counts, but the spirit. The revelation becomes real in the human soul as God adds through the conveying Word the enlightenment of His Spirit. Thus there is a real communion of God with the soul. In consequence the assertion of an actual inner life and a real inner experience, which mysticism constantly dwells on, is acceptable to Christian faith and to Christian ideals, if there is also a dependence on God's objective revelation.

But after all these agreements, some very serious objections must be made by Christian thinking against mysticism. First, Christian truth opposes the subjectivism of the source of truth in mysticism. No matter whither mysticism leads, it mostly regards the inner intuition and light as the origin of truth. It is out of the self that the truth is born. We must pass through the path of reflection and reason to find feeling. When we have reached the state of feeling we shall really know. Consequently feeling is the guarantee of the process of knowing truth. There is a subjective character despite all absorption of the self in mysticism. Mystics frequently speak as though their condition was the guarantee of the truth. The emphasis on the reception of truth is lessened by the strong subjective element. Consequently mysticism frequently deals in a rather arbitrary manner with what appears to contradict its inner light. It has a prejudice which arises from the projections and imaginations of the feeling self. In its individualism it is really a half-brother of individualistic rationalism.

On the other hand mysticism is not true to the individual. Individualistic in process it does not preserve true personality. The self is to be absorbed into the One. But, first of all, the self, like the individual ego of the absolutist, is a part and a reflection of the One. The

One is found in the soul. When mysticism asserts the loss of self in the One it denies the separateness of man from God. Despite all struggle to remain theistic, mysticism, even in most of its Christian representatives, has a pantheistic tendency.

When mysticism simply asserts the One, it can be combined not only with an ideal unity, but it can also give poetic color to a materialistic pantheism. Such a mysticism appears in the naturalistic pantheism of Maeterlinck. His interpretation of life is thus summed up by Professor Dewey: "The natural kinship of man's intellectual and moral life with nature, naturalistically reported and accepted; the mutual interpretation of unconscious instinct, blind passion, and conscious luminous reason; the unfathomable and equable character of our immediate, ordinary, commonplace experiences, so that our experience has no goal save itself — these ideas define his interpretation of life."²⁶ In these ideas Maeterlinck combines Walt Whitman with Emerson, the naturalism of the first with the mystic pantheism of the second. Mysticism, therefore, is no guarantee of ideality in itself. Its doctrine of the One may combine with idealistic or materialistic pantheism.

When mysticism has an opportunity to work itself out as in Brahmanism it arrives at Nirvana. Its zero may claim a positive quality as does Plotinus in his One, his Absolute, and Being. But mysticism in its consistent forms can have neither a personal nor a triune God. One can color the belief in a personal God, or in a Trinity, with mystic fervor, but it is impossible to be either a real unitarian or trinitarian mystic. The God of mysticism always tends toward impersonalism, even though the mystic may believe that he has a personal God. The intuition of the mystic is often a philosophy of ignorance produced by unbridled imagination. Therefore, the claim of the

²⁶ *The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. IX, p. 778.

mystic contradicts the implication of his own position. He thinks he has a personal God, but he is really absorbed into impersonal Being.

Mysticism believes in passivity, sometimes to the degree of unconsciousness. It is a religion of rest and not of work. On the one hand it revels in the joy of its inner experience, on the other hand its tendency is ascetic. It flees the world and seeks escape from the life of sense without. Real life for it is rest from the pressing and changing beauties of actuality about us. Out of such quietism which only seeks personal peace no ethical result can legitimately follow. It is only as the mystic leaves his dreams that he can live in the world. Mysticism seeks to save itself and in its deepest asceticism it is selfish. The love of God and the life in the One is sought by the mystic as a haven of peace, but it does not with the consistent mystic become a motive for an active, helpful life. The soul loses itself in God, but the life of the soul remains inactive and contemplative. Mysticism is no faith which conquers the world, redeems man, changes conditions and transforms civilization. It is destructive of a Christianity which is active, missionary and progressive. Where it actually obtains in its real meaning, Christianity has no mission to control the world, sanctify literature, inspire art, baptize science, and glorify culture. Mysticism in its truest aspect is the religion of monasticism. It is true that monasticism actually became active and forsook its mysticism. But as consistently mystic monasticism despised the world. It lived and died to itself. A Christianity with a life to be lived, a message to be given, and a world to be gained for Christ can never be mystic. The more mystic man is the less ethical is he, and the less ethical he is the less Christian faith can affect him, and make its purposes real in his life. It is of the very na-

ture of Christianity to have and demand strong ethical results; it is religio-ethical and ethico-religious. These two can never really be divorced in any vital Christian ideal.

CHAPTER IV

THE PRAGMATIC PROGRAM

THE whole problem of truth and the effort to determine it logically and to define it formally is due to the modern pragmatic movement. The meaning of pragmatism is the theory, that truth is the result of practice and that it is eminently practical. Its origin has thus been described by Professor James: "It was first introduced into philosophy by Mr. Charles Peirce in 1878. In an article entitled 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear,' in the *Popular Science Monthly* for January of that year Mr. Peirce, after pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that, to develop a thought's meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance. And the tangible fact at the root of all our thought-distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve — what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all. This is the principle of Peirce, the principle of pragmatism. It lay entirely unnoticed by any one for twenty years, until I, in an address before Professor Howison's philosophical union at the University

of California, brought it forward again and made a special application of it to religion. By that date (1898) the times seemed ripe for its reception. The word 'pragmatism' spread, and at present it fairly spots the pages of the philosophic journals."¹ The reason why Professor James' resuscitation of Peirce's initial idea of pragmatism was effective lies deeper than the great influence of the scholarship of James. His interpretation that the real logical method and the nature of truth are found in the active functioning of thought tested by its results and effects; his use of pragmatism on behalf of pluralism or the theory of the many; and his advocacy of radical empiricism, were not in themselves sufficient to advance the cause of pragmatism.

In the same way we cannot explain the vogue of pragmatism through the acute logical discussions and discrimination of Professor Dewey and his followers. Dewey emphasized experience as immediate, and claimed that in it knowledge and truth are experienced relations of things, and that neither have meaning outside of such relation. For Dewey: "Like knowledge itself, truth is an experienced relation of things and it has no meaning outside of such relation, any more than such adjectives as comfortable applied to lodging, correct applied to speech, persuasive applied to an orator, etc., have worth apart from the *specific* things to which they are applied."² It was not through such and similar novel ways of stating pragmatism that it gained its hold. As little as to James and to Dewey can we ascribe the credit of the spread of pragmatism to the efforts of Professor Schiller. It is true that his defense of pragmatism added to its modes of statement and to its ethical applications. He coined

¹ "Pragmatism," p. 46.

² "The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought," p. 95.

the word "Humanism," as representative of pragmatism, over against a theory of absolute truth which did not regard man. Through him and his pupils "Personalism," or the theory of living individual persons as functioning and creating the truth, arose. He strongly accented the human meaning of truth and the human making of truth, and he stood for the right of feelings, beliefs, and hopes as elements of truth both in our general experience and in our religious life. But even these points of view of Schiller are not adequate to explain the spread of pragmatism. Nor can the combined influence of James, Dewey, and Schiller be considered the reason why pragmatism spread and grew as it did.

The real explanation of pragmatism and its method, is that it interprets ruling tendencies of the present age. It is empirical in an age of the search after details and of laboratory methods in science; it is pluralistic in an age of many separate opinions and ideas, but not of great overruling passions and commanding ideals; it is experimental and hypothetical in its theory of truth in an age of unrest, trying out many expedients in literature, science, art, economic life, morals and religion. Because the will to do is prominent in our active age, pragmatism has a voluntaristic coloring. As intellectualism has its great problems and is strongly reminded of its limitations at the present, pragmatism gravitates toward feelings and becomes humanistic. It is against all that is ultimate and final in a changing age, and it keeps man conscious of his part in the making of ideals. The very God of the age is to be limited by experience and to be found in the searching of men. It is quite explicable also why pragmatism in an empirical age caters to utilitarianism and gives its approval to what works best. What works best leads to the description of processes, therefore, pragmatism is descriptive, and it is by no mere accident that its form is

psychological. Because it is psychological it derives its logic from psychological observation. Truth is not found by means of the old logical norms. At all times its logical method is psychological. But psychology is its method and its starting point because of the emphasis put on the functioning of truth. Functioning is fundamentally a biological term and indicates that the psychology of pragmatism is biological. Pragmatism has fully adopted the biological point of view in modern psychology. The adoption of this view and the biological standard of pragmatism is the outcome finally of the modern emphasis on biology with its evolutionary point of view. Pragmatism has been begotten in an age which still feels, despite all opposition and change of hypotheses in biology, the influence of Darwin. The evolutionary standpoint is really the leading point of view in pragmatism. Out of this point of view others follow, and, therefore, it deserves to be considered first, as controlling and shaping the whole theory of pragmatism. All other elements will be seen to be conditioned by it.

There is entire agreement among many more or less pronounced pragmatists, that the pragmatic method is the best logical exposition of evolution. It is an entirely representative statement when De Laguna says: "Pragmatism is the first whole-hearted attempt at an appreciation of the significance of Darwinism for logical theory."³ He admits that the development even of the highest mental forms in ideas is essentially a development of interests. Consciousness is necessary for the control of conduct. "The function of consciousness in the biological organism being the control of conduct, it is only in and through the performance of that function that its development is possible. If we examine into the use and context of a newly developed idea, we find that we must recognize: (1) its rela-

³ "Dogmatism and Evolution," p. 123.

tion to the relatively simple idea from which it has sprung, as well as to the contrasted idea from which it has been distinguished (and, perhaps, soon also to the more complex ideas to which it in turn gives rise); and (2) its relation to the conduct to which it prompts — briefly and crudely — its genetic and functional relations.”⁴ In this whole discussion consciousness and ideas are interpreted in a purely biological manner. Origin and function are made entirely determinative of the action of consciousness and of the movement of ideas. It is out of the movement of ideas in a genetic and functional manner that meaning is supposed to grow. Schiller is in entire agreement with De Laguna and definitely states: “Evolutionism, the great scientific movement of the nineteenth century, is at length investing the last well-nigh inaccessible stronghold of ‘pure’ metaphysics, and systematically grappling with the ultimate abstractions which human thought has recognized and respected for ages, but has never succeeded in rendering really useful and intelligible.”⁵ The result of this invasion and its influence is defined by Schiller in the same terms of functioning and process. The underlying conditional definition of evolution is thus given: “The essence of Evolutionism” is “the doctrine that the world is in process.”⁶ The whole general aspect, therefore, of pragmatism as one of function and process rests on Darwinian assumptions. Through them the origin and the successive steps of thought and truth are explained. But it is not only in this fundamental manner that evolutionism has influenced pragmatism. The specific terms of evolutionism, variation, selection, survival of the fittest, and adaptation are employed to illustrate the movement of thought in the finding of truth.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

⁵ “Studies in Humanism,” p. 224.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

The very idea of variation is that of a constantly proceeding change. Minute variations are the basis among observed facts through whose accumulation and progress evolution finds its point of departure. Nothing is by supposition without the chain of constantly proceeding variations. It is altogether on the same ground that pragmatism finds knowledge and truth wholly within the variation of ideas, feelings and volitions. These reacting and being reacted upon constitute experience in and through which the functioning of thought works its way out toward truth. The fact which is emphasized is not fixity but movement, not a firm truth but variation of mind. Dewey says: "Once admit that the whole verifiable or fruitful object of knowledge is the particular set of changes that generate the object of study together with the consequences that flow from it, and no intelligible question can be asked about what, by assumption, lies outside."⁷ In other words, there can be no recourse to any logical norm or any eternal principle behind truth. Any such effort is supposed to be an unjust abstraction from the existing course of events. It is out of the changing events and the set of variations within experience, as it touches the mind, that truth must be found. By test and trial, by elimination and survival, man must finally establish his truths and his knowledge.

Pragmatism is not only favorable to the use of variation as rightly descriptive of the process of truth-finding, but it is also friendly to the idea of natural selection. In life-forms the struggle for existence explains how the unfit are eliminated. It breaks down the actual continuity of forms, and thus brings about the result of the remnant of selected forms through a purely natural process. By a very similar selection the thoughts that remain after the struggle for existence in experience are those which are valuable as elements of truth. Truth "happens" in the

⁷ "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy," p. 14.

conflict of experience. The selection in our mind may be mediated by attention, or voluntary selection, but finally, according to most pragmatists, the selection is attained in a more indirect manner. We keep as truth what proves valuable and what is finally existent in our experience. Professor Schiller, in consistence with the pragmatic idea, has expressed the concept of selection thus: "A human mind initially commences its career in a jumble resembling a chaotic rag-bag. It finds itself containing things valuable, worthless, and pernicious, dreams, illusions, fancies, delusions, incongruities, inconsistencies, etc., all jostling the materials for what are subsequently construed as realities. If, therefore, anything approaching a harmonious life is to be constructed out of such stuff, a large amount of selection is necessary. The pernicious contents must be kept under and as far as possible eliminated; the worthless and useless must be neglected; and so chaos must be turned into something like cosmos. This we do by selectively attending to what turns out to be valuable, and by ignoring those elements in our experience which we cannot use." ⁸ In other words it is use after trial that determines the selection. What persists is valuable. Purpose is sometimes admitted in such selection, but, after all, the selection is purely natural in its character, and is determined by use and value.

It is very evident that when variation and selection are ruling ideas, that survival of the fittest must also be included. In the logic of pragmatism it is the very survival, the verification of truth as it answers human uses, which constitutes truth as truth. If there were no survival of certain ideas after the trying-out of human experience, there could be no remaining truth. Never can that be truth which has not stood trial and test and come out victorious. Sometimes an apparent truth may live for a

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

time, but it will not finally survive a closer search and a fuller knowledge. Its failure to survive causes it to cease to be a truth. Whatever is not a strong survival and forms a basis for belief and action, and whatever is not approved by the effects of belief and action, is not really true. Truth never lies back of experience as a great ideal or motive. It is only the usable, valuable, satisfying experience which survives. Survival in the evolutionary sense is always the essential precondition of all the various phenomena of life. It is also, according to pragmatism, the precondition of all truths as living facts.

But when survival is a precondition, it needs, prior to it, adaptation. Evolution cannot maintain survival without the supposition of the adaptation of life-forms to their environment, whether it stresses selection or environment. This hypothesis of adaptation, which biology so largely employs, is also applied to knowledge and to truth by the pragmatist. While consciousness seems to interfere when merely reflex adjustment and habitual adaptation fail, it only interferes for a time and retires again. Its whole concern is to aid the proper adjustment of conduct and it has no value in itself. Finally it is itself conduct and action, and all that it does, even in the highest idea, is to mediate proper adjustment. Ideas themselves only live as they are adapted to the conditions of life. Truth constituted through ideas is the adapted remainder of our experience out of which we can explain other possible experience. Truth, therefore, is the deposit of real experience. But this deposit is formed only after the response to environment is successful. Ideas are true when they properly meet the call of the surroundings. Says Dewey: "So I beg to remind you that, according to pragmatism, ideas (judgments and reasonings being included for convenience in this term) are attitudes of response taken toward extra-ideal, extra-mental things. In-

stinct and habit express, for instance, modes of response, but modes inadequate for a progressive being, or for adaptation to an environment presenting novel and unmastered features. Under such conditions ideas are their surrogates. The origin of an idea is thus some empirical, extra-mental situation which provokes ideas as modes of response, while their meaning is found in the modifications — the ‘differences’ — they make in this extra-mental situation. Their validity in turn is measured by their capacity to effect the transformation they intend.”⁹ If this transformation is really effected the idea that has vital adaptation is true. Consequently not some inner ideal, some light beckoning man on, forms his ideas and ideals, even the highest of them, but ideas and ideals are only the adaptive resultant called forth by environment. Their success in meeting the condition of environment, which determines their workableness, stamps them as true.

It is very apparent from all this, that since pragmatism finds in the general idea and the specific terminology of evolution a basis adequate to explain its conception of knowledge and truth, it is fundamentally biological. But biology to it means not merely biology as a natural science, but such speculation as may be built upon it starting from experience. Every trace, however, of an ideal determination of life is generally avoided. Perry rightly says: “Pragmatism means in the broadest sense, *the acceptance of the categories of life as fundamental*. It is the *bio-centric* philosophy. And it must be added at once that the pragmatist means by ‘life,’ not the imaginary or ideal life of any hypothetical being, not the ‘eternal’ life or the ‘absolute’ life; but the temporal, operative life of animals and men, the life of instinct and desire, of adaptation and environment, of civilization and progress.”¹⁰ It is true that in this conception of life pragma-

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

¹⁰ “Present Philosophical Tendencies,” p. 197.

tism is not compelled to advocate a mechanical or chemical idea of the origin of life. It everywhere prefers to rest on the actual biology, it even adds a feature of purpose at times, for we can have no truth as value without the implication of end or purpose. But whatever notions it finds in life do not lead it to an ideal point of view. It always remains purely natural, and its idea of purpose is a purpose altogether immanent in man and the world. And, therefore, Perry is entirely correct when he characterizes pragmatism thus: "It may even in a sense be called 'naturalistic.' For it identifies reality with 'this world,' with the sort of thing that is going on here and now; and regards perception as the most reliable means of knowledge."¹¹

The biologism of the pragmatist finds its expression and realizes its outcome in the psychological attitude. The problem of knowledge and of truth is placed wholly within the limits of the phenomenal process in the human mind. The mind, conditioned by the physiological structure of man, is considered from the viewpoint of biology. Consequently the psychological analysis of knowledge is altogether the analysis of a function. There is no admission at all of any theory of knowledge on a normative basis. Truth, consequently, is also a question of procedure and result, and it can never be determined by standards or norms which logic establishes. There is no legitimate place for logic; its abstractions are supposed to be hindrances and not aids. Schiller defies the logician "(1) to produce his 'pure' thought; (2) to account for the *movement* of thought by anything but an appeal to psychological motives, desire, feeling, interest, attention, will, etc.; (3) even to describe what he conceives to happen in strictly logical terms and without constant recourse to psychology."¹² Logical coherence is analyzed by Schiller

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

¹² "Humanism," p. 51.

as interest. Identity is supposed to be due to association. Schiller believes that thought without interest to set thinking into motion is no thought at all. He endeavors a fundamental criticism of all logic.¹³ His attitude truly represents the endeavor of pragmatism to absorb the older formal logic into psychology. The tendency of pragmatism is anti-logical, and opposes older logical positions.

Professor Boodin in his book on "Truth and Reality" proceeds from the mind as instinct and the categories of intelligence to the truth process. While he conceives the truth process to involve ideation, feeling, and will, he defines it purely in a psychological manner thus: "It is the realization of an idea, selected and fixated by the will, which has a definite hedonic value, as the process fails or succeeds of realization. The truth process is self-realization — the whole self striving to realize a definite end — the will to know."¹⁴ After truth has been given this voluntaristic attitude, which is characteristic of pragmatism,¹⁵ Professor Boodin discusses its morphology and form. The determination of the form of thought is supposed to be found, when one begins with the hypothetical judgment which is the trial stage. From the hypothetical judgment one can pass to the categorical judgment and to full affirmative and negative assertion. Judgment and assertion are always a part of a concrete situation. "Judgment is always a process, with beginning, middle and end, the developing of a drama of determinate interest. The traditional names of judgment we have found to be mere stages, artificially isolated from this concrete process. Judgment, inference and concept again are not different activities. Inference is merely the expansion of the judgment into its reasons, machinery in its realization."¹⁶ In this proc-

¹³ Cf. Schiller, "Formal Logic."

¹⁴ P. 85.

¹⁵ James, "Pragmatism," p. 46.

¹⁶ Boodin, "Truth and Reality," p. 98.

ess and expansion, which is movement and phenomenal connection, thought seeks its identity.

The psychological attitude of Boodin is fully shared by Dewey, who claims: "All the distinctions of the thought-function, of conception as over against sense-perception, of judgment in its various modes and forms, of inference in its vast diversity of operation — all these distinctions come within the thought-situation as growing out of a characteristic antecedent typical formation of experience; and have for their purpose the solution of the peculiar problem with respect to which the thought function is generated or evolved: the restoration of a deliberately integrated experience from the inherent conflict into which it has fallen."¹⁷ The whole description of Dewey shows us that the estimate of thought is by no means logical in the usual sense of the term. Thought is altogether a functioning, and its movement is the important part. It must then follow "if thought's nature is dependent upon its actual conditions and circumstances, the primary logical problem is to study thought-in-its-conditioning; it is to detect the crisis within which thought and its subject-matter present themselves in their mutual distinction and cross-reference."¹⁸ Thought is altogether considered in its correlations as it appears in the phenomena of the mind. It is joined to its contents not by any standard of logic, but only by psychological considerations. "Thinking is adaptation *to* an end *through* the adjustment of particular objective contents."¹⁹ It is the particular contents working themselves out which make the truth. The whole process of thinking is supposed to lead from sense to image, from image to logical functioning. "The complexity of the thinking process resides in consciousness also; it resides in the imagery, the stimuli, the mere symbols, if you like,

¹⁷ "Studies in Logical Theory," p. 47.

¹⁸ Dewey, "Studies in Logical Theory," p. 63.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

that have 'come' to consciousness. As soon as the complexity begins to be *felt*, as soon as any discrimination whatsoever begins to be introduced or appreciated, at that instant the sense-content, the quale, of imagery begins to have a logical function. . . . It is only as the sense-contents of various images are discriminated and compared that anything like thinking can be conceived to go on."²⁰ It is perfectly explicable that on such a basis conception is altogether to be accounted for by psychological reasons. There can be no real distinction between logic and psychology. Logic has unduly limited psychology.²¹ These clear statements, which deny separate logical standards, entirely justify Professor Pratt's description: "We have noted the emphasis placed by pragmatists upon the concrete, psychological nature of our human truths. These do not, they insist, dwell apart in a Platonic realm; they are all of them concrete mental facts, they are of such stuff as dreams and feelings and sensations are made of."²²

Out of this theory, which constantly emphasizes the psychological attitude, there grow a number of peculiar terms in which thought is characterized, and in which truth is supposed to be related to thought. The first of these terms is the description of knowledge as a process of leading. The manner in which thought flows on is described to be the result of leading. Agreement is supposed to result through proper leading which justifies itself by its direction and outcome. "True ideas lead us into useful verbal and conceptional quarters as well as directly up to useful sensible termini. They lead to consistency, stability and flowing human intercourse. They lead away from excentricity and isolation, from foiled and barren thinking. The untrammelled flowing of the leading-process, its gen-

²⁰ Professor Gore, "Studies in Logical Theory," p. 201.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

²² "What is Pragmatism?" p. 84.

eral freedom from clash and contradiction, passes for its indirect verification; but all roads lead to Rome, and in the end and eventually, all true processes must lead to the face of directly verifying sensible experiences *somewhere*, which somebody's ideas have copied." ²³ The important thing is, that after all the flowing of thought ends in the sensible experience. The proof of truth is altogether practical and we are conducted through a present idea successfully to truth if the idea runs off prosperously. It is in this manner that pragmatism supposes that we find the agreement of truth, and it is out of such leading that the kindly light of moving ideas guides us into truth.

Because knowledge is a leading, a leading from the confused to the clear idea, from separation to unity, its prospects always lie ahead. The leading is a leading away into the future. Thought is supposed to look to ends, for ends and aims are what action wants. If thought is essentially not static but dynamic it must be determined by its future result. Thought, as active and functioning, must be purposive and look to the future. It is the success of its venture which makes its functioning truth. Therefore, the pragmatic method means: "*The attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts.*" ²⁴ There is, therefore, no way of deciding truth in the present without regard to its future consequences. Truth must be found by a teleology of action. The end makes true and justifies the means.

Pragmatism in this attitude of moving toward the future, and in this position which looks towards ends, must define knowledge as a truth-seeking and a truth-finding. The truth-seeking becomes a truth-finding when it reaches proper satisfaction. The end of all the process of

²³ James, "Pragmatism," p. 215.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 54 ff.

thought, as it aims at truth, is to give real satisfaction. The only ends that can be acknowledged are those that satisfy. It is in this way that the ends become real purposes. Purposes are real and true when they possess the quality of answering to a want, whether it be a want of sensation, of perception, or of idea. The satisfactions vary with the situation and the need. But even the highest ideals are finally nothing but satisfactions. There is no other standard or criterion. "The criterion proposed is *satisfaction*, and primarily every kind of satisfaction. In so far as a theory, idea, judgment gives us any kind of satisfaction, so far forth it is true; in so far as it runs counter to this and produces dissatisfaction it is false."²⁵ There is no other test but just the way in which truth satisfies and fits in to the experiences which constitute our lives. "*Ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience.*"²⁶

It is due to the reference which thought has for the future, and it is owing to the emphasis on satisfaction, that it must be supposed, that thoughts properly functioning make the truth. Truth is not any quality or property which inheres in ideas. The only thing that makes ideas true is that truth happens to them. It is the outcome which establishes the truth of an idea. An idea becomes true when we can assimilate it, confirm it, corroborate it and verify it. It is false if we cannot do this. "*It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process; the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication. Its validity is the process of its valid-ation.*"²⁷ By verification the ends are satisfied, by

²⁵ J. M. O'Sullivan, "Old Criticism and New Pragmatism," p. 269.

²⁶ James, "Pragmatism," p. 58.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

validation the leadings of thought are established. Thus, and thus only, through the immediate and concrete process of verifying leadings do we attain the truth. "*Such simply and fully verified leadings are certainly the originals and prototypes of the truth-process.*"²⁸

On the whole Schiller agrees with James in his emphasis upon the making of truth. But Schiller assigns a greater place in the process to man himself. His theory becomes real humanism, because the verification is a procedure into which human feelings and volitions enter together with ideas. Truth-finding is no process of a mere intellectual order. It has the warmth of human nature, because in truth man seeks and finds satisfaction. The problem is not whether we can construct an unexceptionable theory, but whether we recognize the importance of subjective activity in the making of truth. "It must frankly be admitted that *truth is human truth*, and incapable of coming into being without human effort and agency; that human action is psychologically conditioned; that, therefore, the concrete fulness of human interests, desires, emotions, satisfactions, purposes, hopes, and fears is relevant to the theory of knowledge and must *not* be abstracted from."²⁹ Truth is not independent, but thoroughly dependent on human life. There can be no real absolute and transcendent truth. Life offers to us problems. We must distinguish between the right and the wrong solution of these problems. It is this situation of life which presents to us truth in its inception as ambiguous. The ambiguity of truth presents us with a claim which we must either accept or reject. "*Truth, therefore, will become ambiguous.* It will mean primarily a claim which may or may not turn out to be valid. It will mean, secondarily, such a claim *after* it has been tested and ratified, by proc-

²⁸ James, *Ibid.*, p. 206.

²⁹ "Studies in Humanism," p. 182.

esses which it behooves us to examine.”³⁰ In this examination the claim of truth is validated when truth actually works. It is by no process of formal logic that we can establish it, but only by its own inherent workableness. This workableness will aid us to separate it from what is false. But a part of the workableness is the very fact that truth yields satisfaction and answers to real human interests. By its workings, when the claims are really verified, truth itself helps to make reality. It is not the initial state of truth that counts, but what truth finally and really makes out of the data of human experience.³¹

When we have considered how truth establishes itself, how it makes reality, how it answers satisfactions, how it looks to the future, how it is successful in its leadings, we are ready to acknowledge that truth is useful. The reduction of truth to the test of usefulness demands careful consideration. The standard of utility advocated, as a test of truth, by pragmatism is not necessarily a narrow one. Utility need not be employed in an unideal sense. Consequently the utilitarian standard, which follows from pragmatism, is not to be immediately identified with earlier utilitarianism. The conception of use in most pragmatic discussions is far wider and more balanced, than the same idea in the utilitarianism of morals, which Bentham and Mill introduced into English thought. But, after all, the theory of resultant, satisfactory ends as validating truth, and the hypothesis of its successful operation in justifying a claim, give truth a strong utilitarian color. Truth is not finally a vital credit, but it is a usable cash value. Its importance is its expediency in the long run and to meet all wants. “‘*The true,*’ to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as ‘*the*

³⁰ “Studies in Humanism,” p. 144 ff.

³¹ Cf. “Studies in Humanism; The Making of Reality,” p. 421 ff.

right ' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving." ³² When we have arrived at such a definition the balance of the broader idea of use in pragmatism has been lost. The moral standard of expediency has led us back again to the utilitarianism of a Mill. Not all pragmatists, however, will fully admit the identification of the right with the expedient. Nevertheless, not one can get away from the implication of the practical consequences implied in the pragmatic program. Utility may be broadly defined, but finally it sinks again to mere practical expediency which can be applied to every kind of idea. James, who has been most outspoken and clear in indicating the last result of pragmatism, applies the standard of use to religion and theological ideas. He says: "*If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much. For how much more they are true, will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths that also have to be acknowledged.*" ³³ The standard of usefulness is discussed more cautiously by Boodin. While he admits that truth may turn out to be useful, and that the utilitarian motive has been important in the investigation of truth, he denies that the usefulness of any search in science and life makes it true. He claims: "But the statement that truth is, on the whole, useful is a conclusion and not a part of pragmatism as an epistemological criterion." ³⁴ Doubtless this is correct. Utility is not the initial standard of the process but its consequence. However, in as far as it is a real and admitted consequence it points to the testing of all claims of truth by their outcome in the procedure of experience.

All the special and peculiar psychological definitions of

³² James, "Pragmatism," p. 222.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

³⁴ "Truth and Reality," p. 191.

truth emphasize that truth is purely within experience. It has been constantly necessary to assert and to re-assert this limitation of truth. The emphasis upon experience and its workings is as fundamental to pragmatism as the evolutionary point of view. Of course, this experience need not be at all times material. The earlier pragmatists emphasized conduct and behaviour as a result in a purely perceptual and sensible manner. This reduction to the external and material has never been fully removed from pragmatism. Nevertheless, it must be admitted, that some of the pragmatists have put a larger emphasis on the ideal side. None have absolutely denied it. It has been definitely stated by Boodin: "There is a conduct of the understanding as well as a conduct involving certain perceptual events as its outcome. The procedure may be entirely of a logical kind as in formal logic and pure mathematics. But here, too, the idea is true only as it terminates consistently in its intended result."³⁵ There is an ideal termination of the process of thinking admitted in these words of Boodin. Nevertheless the result is reached not through the validity of the axiom, or principle, or law, but the trial and the experience make it true. Consequently truth is included within the limits of experience. It is conditioned by the situation in which men are. "*Hence the criterion of the truth or falsity of the meaning, of the adequacy, of the cognitional thing lies within the relationships of the situation and not without.*"³⁶ We are to remain totally within the elements that experience offers, and we have to do only with its values. By no other way can we explain thought or truth. "Is it not clear that the reason that there is a dialectic of *thought* is because at bottom *thought is a part of the total process of an efficient desire and effort to*

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

³⁶ Dewey, "The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy," p. 107.

effect a change in experienced values?”³⁷ In other words, when experience becomes interpreted in the human mind and the human mind acts upon it, there arise certain values. In these values lies the problem of truth. When they possess the power to work, to satisfy and to agree, they are true. A true value meets a situation. Truth and falsity do not belong to any facts in themselves. They are not mere existences, but they are found when assurance and belief enter in. It is through belief and assurance that a meaning is found. The fulfillment of use, the answer of satisfaction, the completion of purpose, the reply to the claim, the ending of the leading, these constitute truth and give lasting meaning. Things, percepts, feelings, volitions, ideas,—all tending to ends and actions and purposes are relations whose meanings can furnish truth. When the proper assurance has been answered and consciously satisfied we have truth. Truth is an experienced relation of things and gives them real meaning. Falsity is equally a situation, but one which does not satisfy. “*Truth and falsity present themselves as significant facts only in situations in which specific meanings and their already experienced fulfillments and non-fulfillments are intentionally compared and contrasted with reference to the question of the worth, as to reliability of meaning, of the given meaning or class of meanings.*”³⁸ Thus truth works itself out and justifies itself. It gives meaning to life in and through the flow of life itself.

³⁷ Moore, “Pragmatism and Its Critics,” p. 93.

³⁸ Dewey, “The Influence of Darwin,” p. 95.

CHAPTER V

THE RESULTS OF PRAGMATISM

INTERESTING and suggestive as the program of pragmatism may be in itself, its theories concern us and become important for us in their results. When the results are examined the question at once arises, what is their bearing upon the truth of Christianity. Pragmatism has been received most variously by different types of thinkers. While some have accorded it a high place as the best ally of Christianity, others have assailed it as a most dangerous enemy because of its emphasis on actuality, its endorsement of evolution, and its trend toward utility. A careful and just estimate must lead us to the same final judgment which we find necessary in reference to all the modern methods of thought. We shall be constrained to mediate between wholesale adoption and complete rejection.

In as far as pragmatism is an evolutionary theory and uses the terms of a biological hypothesis, it can be used in appreciating Christianity as a developing religion. Of course we must exercise great care not to confuse the usability of biological terms in Christian truth with their basal bearing on the determination of Christian truth. Perhaps the relation of biologic terms to Christianity is more of an illustrative character, and, if rightly balanced, of a comparative nature, than of a fundamental and constitutive value. If we desire to tell the story of Christian truth in the Church and in the world, we may employ the formulas of variation, struggle, selection and survival. There is a sense in which biological evolution has dis-

covered fundamental points of view, which, if properly modified, do in part obtain in the development of thought and truth. To the degree in which Christianity employed human thought and the vessels of human thinking it is affected by the relation of biological terminology to thought. After Christianity had announced its first message it did not rest with the mere proclamation of this initial truth, but it compelled men's attention and called forth their statements about it. Some, like the early Gnostics, endeavored to submerge it in other systems of religion and philosophy. Some, like the great Apologists of the second century, sought to save its distinctness, even though they were compelled to state it through the medium of Greek thought. Thus whatever the medium, Christianity was shaped according to a number of varieties.

Through a continuous selection there arose standard Christianity with its orthodoxy. It had at first to struggle for its existence, but it survived despite all opposition because of its fitness to meet the needs of man's cry for salvation. Its fortunes at times wavered; but has it not succeeded? As far as we trace it historically and are compelled to judge it in its force among men, it has lived by best meeting the conditions and situations of a religion that can and shall live. There can be no quarrel, therefore, on the part of fair-minded Christianity, about allowing a delineation of its history and of the growth of its truth along the lines of the pragmatic emphasis upon development. A generalization from the facts of Christian history allows us to see the worth of the application of pragmatic evolutionary terms, even though these terms do not describe the actual motive forces.

When pragmatism applies the psychological test it has offered a valuable and usable medium. Through pragmatism the advantages of the psychological view¹ have

¹ Cf. above, Part I, Chapter VII, p. 129 ff.

been furthered. It has rendered real service in classifying and differentiating religious phenomena, and it has aided in the study of the religious consciousness. The psychological point of view, as it has applied the biological attitude, opened up the possibility of a real research into the effect of different types of religion and of different kinds of religious life upon the whole of man's life. As far as pragmatism favors psychology it has helped to make the study of religion in the human mind not a mere abstract, philosophic procedure, but a living, concrete analysis. Pragmatism has carried forward the scientific analysis of spiritual life, and has done this most successfully when most careful in its collection of data and in its observation, and when least influenced by a metaphysical bias. Through careful psychological analysis pragmatism has advanced the application of inductive reasoning² to the truth of Christianity. The manner in which inductive modes of thought, which were most largely advanced through modern psychology and biology, have become the ruling ways of thinking, can only be welcomed by Christianity in so far forth as it desires and uses the facts, the data, and the living growth of the human mind. With these before it Christianity can more clearly and definitely show its bearings and the influence of its truth upon man.

The attitude of pragmatism towards verification has an element through which it can be brought into harmony with Christian ideals and claims. When truth is portrayed as the outgrowth of a claim, and as verifying itself through its own development, is this viewpoint altogether objectionable? Can we not rather use this idea and may it not serve to show how Christianity is its own defense? In its unfoldment and history Christianity has constantly gained strength and has become its own evidence, because its truths met the demand, and satisfied and

² Cf. Part I, Chapter II.

answered the need of man. The claim which Christianity made to be *the* religion was established as Christianity was tried out in history. It is through the comparison of its history with the history of other faiths, it is through the study of its results and effects that it has justified itself. The immediate verification and validation of Christianity to the conscience is also an establishment of its truth in and through the experience of the recipient. When Christianity is received it validates itself. Its assurance of grace and its power of salvation work out immediately and establish the heart of man. And in the long run the apologetic of Christianity is best found in the manner in which Christianity has validated itself, and through which it is still verifying itself among men. This test is its defense, and to this test men naturally look. The good tree can be known in no other way than by its fruits. It may be good, but men do not know it to be good until it bears fruit.

The pragmatic conception of satisfaction, which is a particular application of the idea of verification, also contains a true point of view. Christianity argues that its offer of salvation satisfies the human soul, and with the claim of this satisfaction that will be received Christianity presses forward. It is certainly true that Christianity interprets satisfaction in the highest sense, and it makes the supreme satisfaction of man to be the satisfaction of his soul. It constantly puts forward the fact of this satisfaction as a basis for accepting its message. While there may be some who interpret Christianity's proffer of satisfaction in a selfish sense, there are others who realize that even spiritual satisfaction should not be the main motive. Nevertheless even these advocates of a Christianity, in which man does not primarily seek the salvation of his soul, do not deny the final attainment of a satisfaction. Now such a procedure in Christianity

is entirely pragmatic. It is a result of the practical leading of Christian truth that it renders satisfaction, and in rendering this satisfaction Christian truth has become really useful. The practical outcome and utility of Christianity as an evidence and an establishment of its claim is indicated even in the sayings of Christ. He says of men that claim to be prophets, "Ye shall know them by their fruits."³ His own doctrine He submits for its establishment to the test of its results and effects. To obtain these results men must accept the condition of practically acting in accord with Christ's teaching; then, in the doing of this teaching, it will become established as certain in the mind of the doer as the truth of God Himself. Christ says: "My doctrine is not mine, but His that sent me. If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself."⁴ The same test of results is applied when, in keeping with this principle announced by Christ, emphasis is placed upon the ethical character of Christianity. Its faith works through love, its love does good. There is no standard to be applied finally to man but the standard of the deeds of love.⁵ This is purely and simply the pragmatic standard. The fact that Christianity works now and will work hereafter is its appeal and justification. There is no peculiar term of the pragmatic attitude which cannot readily be employed by Christianity as a defense of its truth in the practical working out of it.

Again and again it has been borne in upon us, that the truth of Christianity is not merely intellectual. When pragmatism asserts and reiterates the contention, that feeling and will are elements of truth, it presents a theory of truth which Christianity regards with favor. There

³ Matthew, 7:16.

⁴ John, 7:16, 17.

⁵ Matthew, 25:35 ff.

can be no living faith in Christianity which does not receive the impetus of the feelings, no matter how temperaments may differ. In the same way the will is an essential element in all trust and faith. When Professor James accentuates the will to believe he has found, despite many difficulties inherent in this attitude, the very heart of faith. Faith as defined in the New Testament is confidence and trust, and its psychological center is will. Though there is more in faith than mere will, and though it embraces knowledge and feeling, yet without will faith is impossible. Even if we interpret faith in itself, not as living trust, but as intellectual assent, nevertheless even this assent demands an attitude of will. Therefore, the pragmatic method, reasserting the voluntaristic element in faith, is in agreement not only with the evangelical, New Testament conception of faith, but also with that idea of it which makes it an assent to the creed of the Church. There is no interpretation which can overlook the fact of will in faith. It is through emphasis on will and faith that pragmatism has derived its humanistic trend. By the valuation of the will pragmatism has made truth a living reality and found a just basis for the element of faith. With such a valuation Christianity and religion can remain no abstractions. Christianity must be in thorough sympathy with any opposition to the interpretation of religion as intellectual, which is the basis of absolutism. Consequently it approves of the pragmatic attack upon the absolutist. It has entire sympathy with Schiller,⁶ when he distinguishes absolutism and religion. The rejection of the intellectualism of absolutism, of its pantheism, of its denial of evil, and of its detraction from the reality about us are entirely agreeable to Christianity.

Pragmatism has also helped us in reasserting the doctrine of values. It is not the originator of the idea of

⁶ "Studies in Humanism," p. 274 ff.

values. The neo-Kantian philosophy of the modern period was most instrumental in introducing the thought of value. From this philosophy it crept into theology through Ritschl, even though he claimed to have divorced philosophy from religion. But it is pragmatism which, at least in America, has done most to introduce the idea of value. Now while there is a danger in contrasting value with existence, it is nevertheless true that the mere assertion of existence without value cannot aid Christianity. Religious facts and religious truths, like moral facts and laws, and like æsthetic judgments, and like logical abstractions and formulas, cannot be maintained and held to be mere existences. The very nature of a religious reality, whether God, the soul, freedom, sin, grace, falls short of what it is, if it is not more than the assertion of an existence by the mind. It is not sufficient to say that God is; He cannot really be God unless His existence has a meaning and value for us. Whether men want to do so or not, they always evaluate in every confession of Christian truth. Those thinkers are entirely astray who forget that the message of Christianity, its claim of truth, the demand of its history, are all calls for a judgment of special value. The worth and value of Christianity is its defense. Not merely that Christianity is what it is, but that it gives what it gives, makes Christianity the religion it is. Christ always calls for an evaluation of Himself; He demands that men declare for Him or against Him; and such a declaration is not the mere acceptance of His existence, but the confession of His divine Sonship and of His Messiahship. He cannot be what He is to men unless He is a value. He must become their life, their light, their truth. In all this becoming lies His meaning and value, and without it men do not have Him. Similarly in all the truth and history of Christianity an equal demand is made upon us to accept it as a worth and as a value.

Out of pragmatism with its opposition to a mere fixed truth and universe there grows a new appreciation of freedom.⁷ In the theory that things are constantly moving and changing, that they are becoming, and that truth is that which works out in man's development, we are offered a real opportunity of choice.⁸ Men are not supposed to be merely determined; but as they take part in the making of truth and reality they can really decide. Their decisions are not illusions though their choices are not unrestricted. Though character affects them and habits must be accounted for, yet both character and habits are under the control of truth-shaping man. The moral demands of freedom and of obligation to do one's duty are justified. At the same time science is not set aside, because the empirically free acts arise continuously out of the given situation. The choice that has been made is, after its making, found to be intelligible. But whatever choice we take, the alternative may also seem intelligible because it is equally natural and calculable in human experience and its living and connected course. With the possibility of such freedom, but not unreasonable arbitrariness, imbedded in the conception of experience, Christianity can agree. A place seems to be made for man as a growing personality, who can highly value his own soul freely over against the world and as separate from, though not independent of, God. The accountability of man remains in balance with the justice of God. Man can be justly punished because he has his own choice. Through such ideals we can maintain the free inter-relation of God and man, of Father and child. In the development of life man finds God and God leads man, but He does not control him through an absolute decree. No matter what God

⁷ Cf. Schiller's *Essay on Freedom*, "Studies in Humanism," p. 391.

⁸ Cf. James, *The Dilemma of Determinism* in "The Will to Believe," etc., p. 175 ff.

may foresee, He cannot determine man without man's responsibility, unless the choice of man is abolished. The newer attitudes of Christianity favor such a redefinition of the problem of freedom and necessity, of predestination and faith, as to conserve both God's justice and man's responsibility. In the balance of these the moral demands are more justly satisfied than in any absolute theory of election. This solution of Christian thinking rests on a pragmatic basis. It regards freedom as necessary and as discovered in the life and experience of men.

Pragmatism, because it opposes a pantheistic universe, is necessarily moved to accept an attitude of pluralism. It is clearly and openly pluralistic over against any theory of monism, which absorbs all personalities into a unitary existence or reality, whether this be defined to be matter or mind. Christianity can also not allow the absorption of human souls into God, or their submergence into the world. It believes in many separate spirits. From these it sets God apart as the highest Spirit. Consequently Christianity favors any philosophy which maintains a theistic attitude. Any hypothesis which allows for a coordinated world, and a God, not the world, as well as a world not God, is far more favorable to Christian truth than any speculation of idealism, in which all separate entities are made subservient to a single substance. With a single substance posited there can be no relatively independent man and no absolutely independent God. Unless there be separate personalities it is impossible to maintain the true individuality of man, and it is impossible to believe in God or in the Christian Trinity.

The maintenance of separate personality has been particularly favored by the development of modern "Personal Idealism." This personal idealism has grown up under the influence of pragmatism. It is most clearly argued out by Professor Rashdall in his essay on "Personality: Hu-

man and Divine," which is included in the series of essays entitled "Personal Idealism" edited by Henry Sturt.⁹ According to Professor Rashdall, the fundamental elements in personality are not merely a feeling but a thinking consciousness which has a certain permanence. The permanent thinking consciousness distinguishes itself from the objects as things and as other persons. Personality also possesses as its most important element and its most essential attribute the power to will and through will to originate. This idea of personality is not at all satisfied by any form of consciousness below the human, but it is not even adequately fulfilled through the human consciousness. It is only in God that personality finds its fulfillment, but this fulfillment does not do away with the human selves. There is an independence about personality which dare not be denied. The mistake in the monistic idealism is "the assumption that what constitutes existence for others is the same as what constitutes existence for self."¹⁰ We must take this attitude: "A *thing* is as it is known: its *esse* is to be known: what it is for the experience of spirits, is its whole reality: it is that and nothing more. But the *esse* of a person is to know himself, to be for himself, to feel and to think for himself, to act on his own knowledge, and to know that he acts. In dealing with persons, therefore, there is an unfathomable gulf between knowledge and reality. What a person is for himself is entirely unaffected by what he is for any other, so long as he does not know what he is for that other."¹¹ "The essence of a person is not what he is for another, but what he is for himself."¹² But the being for itself does not ex-

⁹ Two other books resting on the same basis are, "Personality and the Christian Ideal," by Buckham; "Personality, Human and Divine," by Illingworth.

¹⁰ Sturt, Essay of Rashdall, "Personal Idealism," p. 382.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 383.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 383.

clude from personality the not-self. When the not-self is a thing it is not real apart from what it is for me and for other selves. "When the not-self is a person, the knowledge of that self is part of my experience, and so (if you like it) in a sense part of me; but that does not show that there is not a something which he is for himself, which is no part at all of me, and which is as real as I am."¹³ This independent self is no doubt in relation with others, but it never loses itself in them. There can be no self which entirely covers another. This is true even if that self be God. "The knowledge of the finite self by God does not exhaust its being as is the case with the mere object. It is the knowledge of them that is in God. God must know the self as a self which has a consciousness, an experience, a will which is its own — that is, as a being which is not identical with the knowledge that He has of it."¹⁴ Such knowledge of God is of course infinitely deeper and completer than any other selves can have of each other. This is the result of the fuller personality of God. "God must then, it would seem, know other selves by the analogy of what He is Himself; He could not (it is reasonable to infer) have created beings *wholly* unlike Himself. His knowledge of other selves may be perfect knowledge without his ever being or becoming the selves which He knows."¹⁵ He can penetrate into human life without that human life being contained in Him. It is through ideals of human personality like these, indicated by Professor Rashdall that Christianity finds it possible to maintain its belief in separate human souls, in God the Creator, and in God's personality. In as far as the pluralism of pragmatism favors these conceptions of separate personalities it is in harmony with Christian truth.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 385.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 386.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 387.

But after all these aspects of pragmatism, which are favorable to Christianity, it is necessary to pass to the examination of other aspects, which are inimical to Christian truth. The fact of development has frequently been stated in such a naturalistic manner as to injure the spiritual content of Christianity. There exists in pragmatism a trend to see and stress the merely natural side of development and progress. Because the finding of the truth is in the process, it is through the process that truth is made. Now while Christian history and its development shows that truth has assumed many forms, and that it cannot be explained apart from human receptivity, yet Christianity can never grant that the receptivity produced the reality of truth. The changing forms of the Christian message are not the explanation of its essence. If it is true that the human experience made Christianity, then Christianity must surrender its claim to be really supernatural. It is not supernatural without a history into which the supernatural descends, but it is also not historical and a natural development without a deposit of the eternal. The stressing of development and evolution is liable to deeply injure religion. Eucken rightly doubts whether any naturalistic evolution is congruent with Christianity. It cannot satisfy the claim of the eternal reasonableness of religion within its sphere. While religion is not reason it is reasonable. The inner reasonableness cannot be found in the confusion of development and history in which both the reasonable and the unreasonable occur. The very substance of Christianity is denied when development claims to be the solvent of the truth of Christianity.

The naturalism of most pragmatists hinders them from giving real value to the separation of the psychological facts from the biological facts. While in theory they adhere to the parallelism of modern psychology, they

finally reduce phenomena of the mind too largely to the objective external biological data. This appears in the manner in which survival in the biologist's sense is made an end of consciousness. We agree in great part with DeLaguna when he says: "For in the rise of consciousness a second end (in the sense above defined) emerges, namely, the satisfaction of desire or happiness. That happiness does thus operate as a determining condition in the psychological selection by which the more complex mental processes are developed, is well known and none have illustrated the fact better than the pragmatists. Their fault, as we conceive it, has been a failure to distinguish accurately between the conditions of happiness and those of survival."¹⁶ In other words the biological attitude has crowded out a just psychological fact. In a similar manner the biological and physiological coloring of the psychology of pragmatism has hindered the proper estimate of consciousness in other directions. The reduction of ideas and ideals, of thoughts and conceptions, to mere actions and mere functions has aided in overthrowing the real worth of the psychological. Consequently the psychology of pragmatism has become material. Because of its material and naturalistic tendency it is detrimental to a spiritual conception of mind. When the spiritual idea of the mind is lost there is no adequate basis in human nature for religion. Consequently pragmatism in its materializing of mind has injured its best observations and inferences derived from the psychology of religion. It has injured the idea of the soul, of the conscience, and of the character of man. The studies of religious experience and their varieties, when they were observed in feelings and in the will, brought them closer to nerve action. Religious ideas became subservient to feeling and will, and this subservience was aided by the nat-

¹⁶ "Dogmatism and Evolution," p. 137.

uralistic conception of both feeling and will. Christianity demands against all such notions, that man's spiritual nature remain intact and that it be given an ideal value.

Another difficulty with the pragmatic theory is the manner in which it seems to restrict the working out of truth to the basis of perception. There is no real place for ideas. Because these are depreciated, there is no real way of explaining some very fundamental notions of the human mind. We are entirely at sea when we attempt to derive the axioms of mathematics,¹⁷ or to unfold the conception of causality. The failure of pragmatism to furnish a foundation for ideas, because it is too much entranced by perception, has also led to the denial of the separateness of logic. Pragmatism has no real logic, but only a descriptive psychology. Now Christian truth demands a norm and a standard. The demand of a standard cannot be upheld, if there is no value, from the point of view of truth, for any logical norm apart from its psychological derivation. The psychological conditions of a standard do not explain its essence. If they are stressed we shall finally have a standard which always moves and shifts, but a shifting standard is a perishing standard. The mere occurrence of any fact is sufficient in the theory of pragmatism to justify it, if it does not actually disagree with another experience. Now this matter of mere practical agreement or disagreement may be a working basis and a provisional platform, but the standard of truth demands a higher justification. Christianity cannot abandon its claim, that there is a fixity and a certainty about Christian truth which is due to its own inner nature. Therefore, no change of interpretation and no varieties of experience can decide as to the final worth of Christian truth.

The pragmatic theory of the workableness of truth, of

¹⁷ DeLaguna, *ibid.*, p. 155.

its satisfaction, and of its utility, which has a favorable side, also has a very dangerous implication. It seems to rest truth on the possibility of its being tested. A claim and a truth which cannot be tested can never be established. Now Christian truth claims to be ethically right and justifiable on its own foundations. It works, it satisfies, and is truly useful, because it is what it is. The truth is the cause of the workableness, not the workableness the cause of the truth. Many religious truths, because they are supernatural, are above man's possible experience. They cannot be tested in themselves. Their unity with other truths is possible through a Christian system of truth, but the unity of such a system is a merely logical expedient. A logical expedient is not the satisfaction which experience must give. Therefore, pragmatism would be compelled to eliminate many transcendent ideas of Christianity. Some truths may not at all appear practicable. They must be believed to become practical, but the belief does not make them so. If, e. g., we take the Christian teaching of non-resistance, the opposition of Christ to the notion of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth," and His commendation of suffering evil, it seems that the practical life of man, his struggle for existence, and his necessity of self-preservation contradict the claim of non-resistance in every way. There is no satisfaction to be found in it, and it is not at all usable in the world, but if, prior to all verification and in the face of difficulties, Christians would become sufficiently Christian to accept the value of the ideal of non-resistance the ideal would transform the world. In other words, it would not be the workableness which would establish the truth, but the truth accepted would make its way. With all its emphasis on the will to believe, pragmatism has not solved the problem of the power of Christian truth. It has failed in its solution, just because it has no independent

ideal of truth. There is an element of unbelief or of agnosticism in the theory of pragmatism in as far as it claims that only verification is truth. The acceptance of the ideal can be translated into action, but it is not the translation and the success of the action that make the ideal. Great religious ideals are not taken up by men because they work. But they work because they are believed. And a true belief is not a blind venture, for there is an inherent reasonableness in a great ideal. Great ideals and great ideas create true reality because of their inner truth and reality. The weakness of pragmatism is the conception that only what has received a certain endorsement and proof can be true. It has transferred the principles of the scientific laboratory to the realm of spiritual values. It has reduced the inner certainty of Christian truth to the uncertainty of a human experiment.

It is necessary for Christianity when it admits that its judgments are values to know more about them than that they are values. If values are only values, it is easily possible to declare the question of their existence irrelevant or to doubt existence and its necessity. Now, as was maintained above,¹⁸ the truth of real religion is never the mere statement of existence, e. g., God is, Christ saves, etc. But if we believe in God we must be assured that He exists. Christ our Saviour dare not remain a mere estimate of what He is worth to us. The maintenance of a religious value suffers if its existence is uncertain. Any theory of truth, therefore, which demands that religious judgments are to be tested by their adaptability to and their existence within human experience alone, and which does not begin with the belief in the existence and reality of truth before and beyond human experience, will fail to satisfy the demands of Christianity. The estimation of value

¹⁸ P. 222.

through test alone makes truth ambiguous. It can then only become certain when it is established by the thought and experience of men. This appears clearly if we quote again a very characteristic statement of Schiller, in which he says: "*Truth, therefore, will become ambiguous. It will mean primarily a claim which may or may not turn out to be valid. It will mean, secondarily, such a claim after it has been tested and ratified, by processes, which it behooves us to examine.*"¹⁹ As long as truth, consequently, remains a mere claim and is not ratified, it must always be regarded with some suspicion. We shall not be able to know whether the claim is really and actually true. "We shall tend to reserve this honourable predicate for what has victoriously sustained its claim."²⁰ In other words, apart from truth through the experience of men truth is doubtful. Such an assertion will fit human generalizations and human assumptions in scientific experimentation and in deducing certain results from life, but in religion the prime assumption must be that God is true though all men be liars. The submission of divine truth to human experience is for the sake of humanity and not for the sake of truth. It cannot be claimed, if Christian truth is to remain pure that its validity and permanence is due to human testing. It may be necessary in the human reception of divine truth to show its real harmonization with the demands of the soul and of life, but such harmonization is not the establishment of the fundamental verity of Christian truth.

A logical theory, which can possess no firm certainty before it has been tried out, and whose hypothesis of truth allows truth to have only as much validity as it has practicability, can never furnish a basis for strong moral postulates. Now an ethical religion like Christianity must

¹⁹ "Studies in Humanism," p. 144.

²⁰ Schiller, *Ibid.*, p. 145.

hold to the certainty of its moral principles and demands. The persistence in emphasizing the certainty of moral principles in Christianity arises from the fact, that its ethics are not due to the assumptions of a mere speculative theory, but that they are founded on the sure foundation of a truth divinely communicated. As long as Christianity claims a specific revelation, the assurance of the right and truth of its moral system is not subject to the uncertainties of experience. A virtue like mercy is true, therefore, not because mercy is practicable, but because mercy is an eternal reality in God who is merciful. Even though mercy would be a failure among men it could not be doubted as long as it is sustained by the nature of God. In the same manner forgiveness is moral because God forgives, not because forgiveness is of larger worth in human life than revenge. Justice and truthfulness, honesty and purity are right not because they are expedient or prove to be the best policy, but because they are divine in their origin and claim. To take any other attitude would undermine the specific force of Christian moral motives. Their certainty must lie within the immediate authority of the divine command, and not within the problematic establishment by human test.

The constant appeal to proof and test undermines finally all authority in morals and faith. If authority is needless in religion, this difficulty does not in the least trouble us. But if authority of some sort or kind is necessary to maintain and propagate faith, it follows that any theory which disturbs authority is detrimental. The proof that can be demanded is only the proof that the authority is the right authority. To demonstrate the reasonableness of authority is good as far as it furnishes a ground why men are willing to bow to authority, and why such submission is advantageous. But the verification of authority by being found to be useful does not establish it. Au-

thority is authority prior to all proof, and it must be received and accepted directly. The authoritative claim of Christianity upon the conscience and upon the soul of man asks to be received not through argument but upon its own demand. If it is received in this manner it will justify itself, but no rational proof, and no demonstration in life, give certainty to the authoritative and divine claim of Christianity. It is true that men accept authority in religion because they feel its need and recognize its necessity, but the feeling of this need and the satisfaction which may come through authority do not constitute the authority. Real religious authority and divine authority must rest upon itself. When Christianity claims divine origin and authority, it cannot permit this authority to be derived from human experience, for this would mean a confusion between the human and divine. It would base an authority which claims to be divine upon the mere workings of human experience, and, consequently, the authority would be a delusion. Christianity permits and encourages its demand of authority to be tested, but the test is not that which makes the authority.

The lack of authority appears in the manner in which the pragmatist arrives at his conception of God. Because his universe is pluralistic, and because the workableness of an idea is thought sufficient to establish the truth, the pragmatist argues for a finite God. As Christians we can sympathize with the pragmatist when he opposes the Absolute of the pantheist, which is Substance, the Universe, the Whole. Every such abstract notion of God destroys His personality.²¹ Therefore, as far as the pragmatist is justly pluralistic he is favorable to Christianity, but the difficulty is the lack of authority. This appears in the manner in which Professor James approaches the problem of God. He says: "On prag-

²¹ Cf. p. 175 ff.

matistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. Now whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it certainly does work, and that the problem is to build it out and determine it so that it will combine satisfactorily with all the other working truths." ²² When Professor James begins to approach the working out of the hypothesis of God, and strives to adjust it to other truths, he arrives at the conception of a finite God. This idea is not a new one in philosophic thinking. It was broached by John Stuart Mill, who claimed: "If the maker of the world *can* all that he will, he wills misery, and there is no escape from the conclusion." ²³ He holds that men have usually saved God's goodness at the expense of His power, and says: "But those who have been strengthened in goodness by relying on the sympathizing support of a powerful and good Governor of the world, have, I am satisfied, never really believed that Governor to be, in the strict sense of the term, omnipotent." ²⁴ In a similar way Mill claims that the argument from Design in the world does not justify an omnipotent God. In this contention he followed Kant.

Influenced by Mill's arguments, Schiller, in order to overthrow the pantheistic Absolute, and to meet the dilemma between God's power and goodness, rejects the idea of an Infinite. He argues for a finite God and claims that only a "personal and finite, but non-phenomenal, God is the only possible cause that can account for the existence and character of the world-process." ²⁵ In the very same manner Professor James defines his attitude thus: "The line of least resistance, then, as it seems

²² "Pragmatism," p. 299.

²³ "Three Essays on Religion," p. 37.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

²⁵ "Riddles of the Sphinx," p. 372. Cf. also the whole of Chapter X.

to me, both in theology and in philosophy, is to accept along with the superhuman consciousness, the notion that it is not all-embracing, the notion in other words, that there is a God, but that he is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or in both at once." ²⁶ Such is the final resultant which a theory of workableness arrives at in explaining a pluralistic universe.

The attitude of Christianity cannot accept such a limitation of God as proposed by Mill, Schiller and James. The pluralistic universe of Christian thinking is monistic in origin and purpose. While it does not place the unity of the universe in the world, and allows for individualities and real things, it demands a unification in God. When the single units of the universe, however, are all-determining and the test of truth is agreement with their actuality and experience, there can remain no God in the sense of Christianity. Christianity in contrast with the finiteness of the world must apply in some manner the adjectives infinite and absolute to God. It can only permit such a limitation as lies within God's self-determination. God limits Himself when He permits human freedom; He limits Himself as He enters into history. From this self-limitation it is possible to explain evil, or at least to show that it does not contradict God's power, and that it does not impugn God's goodness. When the effort is made to justify God by a limitation of His own nature, and when He is reduced to one among many beings, although far higher, this justification is bought at too high a price. Christianity cannot allow God to be reduced to mere substance, nor His might to be interpreted impersonally, for this would lead to pantheism with all its implications. At the same time Christianity cannot gravitate into mere pragmatism, and believe in a finite God. Such a belief would take away the certainty of Christian faith.

²⁶ "A Pluralistic Universe," p. 311.

The effort which approaches more closely to a balanced center, is that of Rashdall. He argues thus: "God is certainly limited by all other beings in the Universe, that is to say, by other selves, in so far as He is not those selves. He is not limited, as I hold, by anything which does not ultimately proceed from his own Nature or Will or Power. That power is doubtless limited, and in the frank recognition of power lies the only solution of the problem of Evil which does not either destroy the goodness of God or destroy moral distinctions altogether. He is limited by his own eternal, if you like 'necessary' nature — a nature which wills eternally the best which that nature has in it to create. The limitation is therefore what Theologians have often called a self-limitation: provided only that this limitation must not be regarded as an arbitrary self-limitation, but as arising from the presence of that idea of the best that is eternally present to a will whose potentialities are limited — that idea of the best which to Platonising Fathers and Schoolmen became the Second Person of the Holy Trinity. The truth of the world is then neither Monism, in the pantheising sense of the word, nor Pluralism: the world is neither a single Being, nor many co-ordinate and independent Beings, but a One Mind who gives rise to many."²⁷ If the limitations of God which Rashdall suggests be placed altogether within His control, and if His personality be not subjected to His nature, nor His nature divorced from His personality, we shall approach more closely to the heart of this great problem. Christianity conceives of God as Spirit and as Love. If the character of God as Love expresses itself through Him as Spirit, His limitation will not be arbitrary but in agreement with what He is and what He wills. He is His nature; and an abstraction like nature dare never be greater

²⁷ "Personality, Human and Divine," p. 390 ff, in Sturt, "Personal Idealism."

and more determinative of the idea of God than that of a living, personal God. His personality, however, must not be so construed as to injure the essential deity of the Son and the Spirit. It dare not become unitary and individualistic. With these reservations we have a real God who can and does limit Himself by love and who grants the right of freedom. But such a self-limiting God, not a force, moving by its own impetus, not a world in its unconscious totality, is not the finite God of the pluralistic universe of pragmatism.

Because pragmatism has a finite God it denies the power of determination in God. God is not allowed really to determine the world. Says Schiller: "*If human freedom is real, the world is really indeterminate.*"²⁸ In the indeterminate world men are subject to chance, although this chance is limited by the laws of nature and is controlled by the choice of men. In such a universe there is no place for an absolute control by God. Even though He is given a specific place higher than man He is only freer than man. His power is thus described by Schiller: "A higher and more perfect being than man, if the intelligent operations of such a one are traceable in the world, would be both 'freer' than man, that is more able to achieve his ends and less often thwarted, and also more determinate in his action, and more uniform and calculable in the execution of his purposes."²⁹ But such a higher being though He possesses more power than man and is more uniform in action, is only different in degree from man. There is no absolute difference of kind. With such a notion prevalent in pragmatism, there can be no real room for any Christian doctrine of providence, nor for even the mildest possible formulation of predestination. The greater freedom and knowledge of God would only

²⁸ "Studies in Humanism," p. 411.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 413.

show greater power to use the universe. God is after all only a higher unit in a pluralistic universe, but He is not above the universe. When the pragmatist, therefore, assails the absolutist so severely, he is not entirely justified. For although the absolutist absorbs God in the universe, as an ideally conceived whole, he does not make God a mere part. But the pluralistic pragmatist, unconsciously influenced by his naturalism, makes God only one among many personalities. The God of the pragmatist does not seem to be above the laws of nature. He is enclosed in a multiverse, and is not the real Creator and Governor of the world.

It follows legitimately from such a conception of God that there can be no real purpose of God in the world. God is not really the First Cause. The pragmatist lives altogether in a world of secondary causes. In the chain of secondary causes he may admit the occurrence of purpose. Moore asks: "Does not the conception of the mutability of species at any rate make an opening for purposive, ideational control as a type of change?"³⁰ He asserts: "Variation in species implies at least the possibility of a purposive species of variation."³¹ But this purposive control is merely within a moving world, but it does not admit a transcendent power and purpose. Pragmatism does not, if it be true to itself, seek for the transcendent. Dewey clearly states: "Merely because Spencer labeled his unknowable energy 'God,' this faded piece of metaphysical goods was greeted as an important and grateful concession to the reality of the spiritual realm. Were it not for the deep hold of the habit of seeking justification for ideal values in the remote and transcendent, surely this reference of them to an unknowable absolute would be despised in comparison with the

³⁰ "Pragmatism and Its Critics," p. 77.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

demonstrations of experience that knowable energies are daily generating about us precious values.”³² Dewey does not explain the real reason of the deep hold of ideal values and of the human trend to seek a single transcendent energy. He claims that we do not really need it. “And were it a thousand times dialectically demonstrated that life as a whole is regulated by a transcendent principle to a final inclusive goal, none the less truth and error, health and disease, good and evil, hope and fear in the concrete, would remain just what and where they now are.”³³ But the question remains whether all experiences would be “what and where they are now,” if there were not in the world and in the religious history of man the belief in a transcendent, divine power and purpose. Does such a hypothesis of God’s rule make no difference in the life of men? Does it not aid the righteous and their cause in their deepest distress and in their temporary failures? Is life, without belief in a purposing and powerful God, finally the same and will it create the same results as a belief in mere purpose found in the working of the world? Christianity claims that the world and the life of the soul of man do need faith in God’s determination. Without it man is lost in the world of secondary causes. The denial of pragmatism that there is purpose beyond the experience of man is a real indication of its enslavement to biologism. Pragmatism has not shaken off the accidentalism of the Darwinian theory. And because it is not free from this it cannot have a real God. If we suppose God to be immanent in the universe, He can be immanent, according to pragmatic theory, only as a result. The consistent pragmatist must believe that God is being shaped and made in the world. As Truth will be the final summing up of many truths tried out and found valuable, so God will be

³² “Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays,” p. 16.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 16 ff.

the final summing up of man's religious experiences. He will come at the end, and not at the beginning; He will be the Omega, but not the Alpha of the world. His immanence is not a real one but a developing one. Man is making his God as he is making his truth. It is this emphasis on humanism, it is this proud claim of pragmatism, whether it be openly uttered or not, that brings it into opposition with Christianity, which teaches humility, and whose central figure, Jesus Christ, gloried as man to be meek and lowly. For Jesus only God was good. The God of Jesus is not the God of pragmatism. Humanity as Jesus sees it is not humanity as pragmatism paints it.

CHAPTER VI

THE VITALIST VIEW

THE discussion of the pragmatist's position leads very naturally to the two other ruling modern attitudes, the vitalistic conception of reality and truth, and the realistic interpretation. The former must be clearly distinguished from what is known as vitalism in biology. The older vitalism in biology, which was largely believed in before the reign of Darwinism, was the conception of a force known as life-force, which, though in its essence wonderful and mysterious, was supposed to explain organic structure, continuous purpose, and the transmission of life from form to form. Since Darwinism there has been an effort to return to vitalism. The attitude of neo-vitalism is represented through such leading German biologists as Driesch and Reinke. These men oppose any mechanical explanation of life, and hold that there are certain distinct formative and purposive individual centers. These individual life-centers through which separate organic life-forms are shaped, are known as "dominants," or "entelechies." But it is not this theory which concerns us in the discussion of the vitalistic view of the present. The vitalism of present philosophical thinking is due to the effort of Henri Bergson and Rudolf Eucken, to make life, as a real, full, concrete, active force and tendency, which is fundamentally ideal, the central and all-embracing reality.

The new philosophy of life, distinct as it is from the pragmatic method, because it is metaphysical and not

merely logical, nevertheless possesses several points of contact with pragmatism. It strives, though more so in Bergson than in Eucken, to be the legitimate philosophic explanation of evolution and the corrective of a mere material conception of development. Like pragmatism it, therefore, grows out of the evolutionary point of view. Bergson's whole discussion is due to the effort to demonstrate, in his great book, "Creative Evolution," how constant creative activity is the essence of development. Eucken does not begin with biology, nor does he, like Bergson, discuss mechanism and finality as great problems. He rather outlines and attacks the problem of life from the cultural, ethical, and religious standpoints, which show life as a force, a fact and a developing reality. To his mind there is danger in stressing biology, and in biologism he sees a defective description of the full reality of life. Nevertheless he claims to be an actualist, who explains the world through movement and action. In this actualism he agrees with Bergson; and both philosophers in their emphasis of movement and actualism are acceptable to the pragmatists. Eucken, however, is not as emphatic an advocate of movement as Bergson, although he values the conception of movement in the pragmatic point of view, the close attention to experience, and the humanistic elements. He definitely opposes the distractedness, the atomism and the shifting character of pragmatism. Its separation of action from causality, and its under-estimation of the part which thought plays in creating life, and not merely furthering it as an instrument or tool, is strongly disapproved of by Eucken. Bergson takes a friendlier attitude toward pragmatic efforts, and he has received the endorsement of Professor James.¹ Both Eucken and Bergson agree with pragmatism on the whole in its anti-intellectual attitude. Neither of these philoso-

¹ "A Pluralistic Universe," Lecture VI.

phers, however, accept the pluralistic conception of pragmatism. Eucken has a more pregnant monistic ideal of life than Bergson, but even Bergson's notion of life is not individualistic, nor pluralistic, but fundamentally unitary.

BERGSON

Life, according to Bergson, must be grasped in its totality and movement. It is a creative effort, but not of a material sort. Even in its humblest stages life already constitutes a spiritual activity and takes on a spiritual character. "Life is conscious, spiritual activity, creative effort leading towards freedom."² There is no rest in life, but it is continued and continuous movement. "It is movement that we must accustom ourselves to look upon as simplest and clearest, immobility being only the extreme limit of the slowing down of movement, a limit reached only, perhaps, in thought and never realized in nature."³ This ineradicable mobility, in which life consists, is due to "an *original impetus* of life, passing from one generation of germs to the following generation of germs through the developed organisms which bridge the interval between the generations. This impetus, sustained right along the lines of evolution among which it gets divided, is the fundamental cause of variations, at least of those that are regularly passed on, that accumulate and create new species."⁴ The vital impulse keeps a true, inward unity, but it does not remain a single movement and the same tendency. Vegetative, instinctive and rational life are not "three successive degrees of the development of one and the same tendency."⁵ "They are three divergent directions of an activity that has split up

² LeRoy, "The New Philosophy of Henri Bergson," p. 213.

³ Bergson, "An Introduction to Metaphysics," p. 51.

⁴ Bergson, "Creative Evolution," p. 87.

⁵ "Creative Evolution," p. 135.

as it grew. The difference between them is not a difference of intensity, nor, more generally of degree, but of kind." ⁶ In the balance brought about by this difference of tendency and by the unity of the movement of life, we find the solution of the progress of life.

Wherever life moves and pushes along, it has to overcome the torpor of matter, which is the very inverse of life. It is in the living species and the connected life-forms that we must trace the original impetus and impulsion of life. Life may be compared to an immense vessel "full of steam at a high pressure, and here and there in its sides a crack through which the steam is escaping in a jet. The steam thrown into the air is nearly all condensed into little drops which fall back and this condensation and this fall represent simply the loss of something, an interruption, a deficit." ⁷ The condensation and the falling of the condensed drops represent matter, while the living steam represents the impulse of life. The condensation is a picture of the way in which the creative activity unmakes itself in matter. But the vital activity is that which exists and continues as the direct movement in the indirect movement, which works against it. Life, however, goes on persistently. "In vital activity, we see, then, that which subsists of the direct movement in the inverted movement, *a reality which is making itself in a reality which is unmaking itself.*" ⁸

The direct creative movement, which is an ascending movement, an inner ripening and unfolding, endures in its essence. The very continuation of the universe is dependent upon this continuance and duration of movement. Without the living movement, there would be no duration, but duration is the key to movement. In the speculation

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 247.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

of Bergson duration forms a very essential conception. Through it he finds the ideal factor. It is the absolute opposite of any static notion. Through duration and its tension, Bergson describes consciousness and ideal life. "The duration lived by our consciousness is a duration with its own determined rhythm, a duration very different from the time of the physicist, which can store up, in a given interval, as great a number of phenomena as we please."⁹ This flowing duration, which is real life, is summed up by our consciousness. Not the separate deeds measured by a fixed order, but a flowing connection marks continuation. It is by this free flow that we conquer necessity. Therefore, the continuous and untrammelled movement of duration is the solution of time. Time is no static notion. But it is the full complete movement of real duration. "Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself *live*, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states. For this purpose it need not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or idea; for then, on the contrary, it would no longer *endure*."¹⁰ As the ego endures in the living movement of time it finds its freedom. Time and free will belong together. There is a constant unfoldment in the onward trend of real time and duration. "Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances. And as the past grows without ceasing, so also there is no limit to its preservation."¹¹

It is through memory that duration continues and lives. No mere physical continuation in any way explains time and duration, but consciousness lies back of duration and works through it. Matter must be clearly separated from

⁹ "Matter and Memory," p. 272.

¹⁰ "Time and Free Will," p. 100.

¹¹ "Creative Evolution," p. 4.

memory, through which the bond is formed for the continuation of the movement of the living impulse. Without memory we fail to really understand duration. "Inner duration is the continuous life of a memory which prolongs the past into the present, the present either containing within it in a distinct form, the ceaselessly growing image of the past, or, more probably, showing by its continual change of quality the heavier and still heavier load we drag behind us as we grow older. Without this survival of the past into the present there would be no duration, but only instantaneity."¹² But continued memory is no emanation of matter. It is "just the intersection of mind and matter,"¹³ and no brain lesion destroys it. It is through memory that we pass from perception and from material images to spiritual continuance. "To touch the reality of spirit we must place ourselves at the point where an individual consciousness, continuing and retaining the past in a present enriched by it, thus escapes the law of necessity, the law which ordains that the past shall ever follow itself in a present which merely repeats it in another form, and that all things shall ever be flowing away. When we pass from pure perception to memory, we definitely abandon matter for spirit."¹⁴ Memory, therefore, becomes the solvent for the problem of duration. The correlation of unity and multiplicity in consciousness is effected through the synthesis of living tension. This living tension is memory, which is entirely distinct from every sort and kind of matter.

It naturally follows that if duration is the solvent of the vital impulse, and if the center of duration is memory, by which consciousness continuously moves on, we cannot separate these three. The result is that "*theory of*

¹² "An Introduction to Metaphysics," p. 44 ff.

¹³ "Matter and Memory," Introduction, p. xii.

¹⁴ "Matter and Memory," p. 313.

knowledge and theory of life seem to us inseparable.”¹⁵ We must explain knowledge from the angle of life. Now as life progresses and pushes on, consciousness can not remain within itself. It launches into matter and struggles with it. The world shows us consciousness falling asleep in matter, but it again arouses itself, and impels itself onward. In the onward movement life may pay attention to its own movement, or it may direct itself toward the matter it passes through. If life pays attention to its own movement it appears as intuition, in which life and consciousness remain within themselves. If, however, life looks to matter it needs the intellect, which is the concentration of consciousness on matter. Intellect is demanded for the sake of matter, but in intuition we have the key to the inwardness of knowledge and life.¹⁶ Intuition fully reinstates us into original life. We gain full reality and find an absolute through intuition. “By intuition is meant the kind of *intellectual sympathy* by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible.”¹⁷ Through intuition, therefore, we enter into the very heart of knowledge.

There are, however, practical reasons which compel us to turn to the intellect with its fixed concepts. It is true that intuition precedes the concepts, which are demanded through matter and for the sake of matter. They “are the deposited sediment of intuition.”¹⁸ But we are at times forced to go outside of intuition and the living flow of duration. There are static relations of matter and space, which call for mechanics and physics. The needs of these sciences, and the practical necessity of actual living

¹⁵ “Creative Evolution,” Introduction, p. xiii.

¹⁶ Cf. “Creative Evolution,” p. 181 ff.

¹⁷ “Introduction to Metaphysics,” p. 7.

¹⁸ LeRoy, “The New Philosophy of Henri Bergson,” p. 53.

in space with its relations, justify and require the intellect. Through the external relations and connections the intellect frames its static concepts. We begin with real living intuition; but the fundamental thinking, which is of an intuitional nature, passes from the actually experienced things to concepts. The movement is not vice versa and man does not pass from concepts to things. The living grasp of things found in the intuition of life must give way as man deals with matter. Through matter there arises the idea of static space. When we have arrived at this idea the intellect has already had its history. The theoretical speculations on matter and space may express scientifically the character of the intellect, but they do not originate it. The origin of intellect is due to practical demands, and fundamentally it arises as an instrument or tool to meet practical demands. "In short, *intelligence, considered in what seems to be its original feature, is the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, especially tools to make tools, and of indefinitely varying the manufacture.*"¹⁹ Because the intellect has arisen through meeting practical mechanical needs, it is fundamentally mechanical and spatial, and it is not meant for real theorizing. "If the intellect were meant for pure theorizing, it would take its place within movement, for movement is reality itself, and immobility is always only apparent or relative. But the intellect is meant for something altogether different. Unless it does violence to itself, it takes the opposite course; it always starts from immobility, as if this were the ultimate reality; when it tries to form an idea of movement, it does so by constructing movement out of immobilities put together."²⁰ The mistake which the intellect makes, when it starts with a fixed world, is due to the very character of the intellect,

¹⁹ "Creative Evolution," p. 139.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

for it can only grasp the immovable. There is no way in which it can lay hold of a living flux. "The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life."²¹ But it is also "*characterized by the unlimited power of decomposing according to any law and of recomposing into any system.*"²² The human intellect thus has the power to fabricate its systems, but whatever it projects is an adaptation to the fundamental static character of space. Consequently the intellect, in all its systems and through all its speculations, can never build up the real duration nor find the vital impulse. Its use, therefore, is purely instrumental and secondary; it can never solve the riddle of the universe, which must be approached from the point of view of moving, creating, and progressing life.

There are many valuable deductions to be derived for the elucidation of Christian truth from Bergson's fundamental notions. Of all these notions, the most central and the ever-recurring one is that of life as movement. Christianity, when it regards the message of the Gospel of John, can well employ any true effort to describe life as inner creative continuity, full, rich, ideal and spiritual. If God's life in us and our life in God are thought of as real power, we can discover in Bergson's pictures of unfolding life illustrations of life in its inmost spiritual reality. The constant trend toward the Johannine conception, which considers Christianity fundamentally as life, finds itself in agreement with the philosophic attempt to make life the all-determining center of a real view of the world. The manner in which Bergson aims to combine the diversity in the unfoldment of life with its underlying unity may be employed to show the divergences of the divine life in the world and also its unity. The oneness and central

²¹ "Creative Evolution," p. 165.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 157.

continuity of divine life in its eternal character enters into the changes of history and through them works out its plans. We men live and move and have our being in God, and still develop along our own separate lines of character. The Christian life in Christ and His presence in us is one of strong unity; but, nevertheless, at certain nodal points it starts in different men and at different times and among different peoples on new and varying lines of divergent development, unfolding into ever richer complexity and bursting into ever greater glory as it proceeds.

The separation of matter and memory in the philosophy of Bergson is very important. It follows from this fact, that matter is purely secondary, and results as a deposit of the real life, which in its essence is fundamentally of an ideal and spiritual nature. The import of the speculation of Bergson, who, with all his careful knowledge of biology, has found it necessary to define life not mechanically, but as a real force, a vital impulse, a spiritual activity, is very great. From the observations of life in the world, we are led away into an inner life which is not material. The very threshold of Christianity is approached when life is spiritualized. Of course, no speculation can reach the life that proceeds from the Father and that is fully and really present in Christ, the Life. But the spiritualization of life in the world, and that view of it, which does not rest with the interpretation of a chemical process or a mechanical movement, approaches the mystery of life in Christianity. While, of course, Christianity does not deal with the external and observable phenomena of life, and while it does not deny any just generalizations to be derived from them, nevertheless, it is favorably inclined to a view of life, even in the phenomenal world, which rises above the level of the material. It has an interest in the emphasis of the soul-life of man, and in God as life, who determines all life in its final source and in its deepest as-

pects. A real broad Christianity will never quarrel with the manner and form of hypotheses that are framed on the basis of the observable progress of life in the sphere of secondary causes and movements. But no Christianity can allow that the solutions of science shall contradict or deny the fact that life in its first origin and in its last analysis is of the spirit. It is, therefore, ready gladly to receive and to employ any view of total life, which is anti-material and rightly ideal. Its agreement is all the greater when the ideal life is placed at the very center of all being.

The opposition of Bergson to the intellect as primary, and his emphasis of intuition, are also valuable for Christianity. The appeal of Christianity is to the conscience, and the value of Christian truth does not rest upon its demonstrability. Christian truth is not logically established, but comes with a direct demand of acceptance. Now such a direct demand, which comes not in words of human wisdom, but through the paradox of human foolishness and divine wisdom, can never rest upon the proofs of the intellect. In calling upon the deepest apprehensive power of the human soul, Christian truth rests its case upon and seeks its reception through an inner, immediate, intuitive recognition of what it is and what it means. The belief that underlies Christian truth is the conviction that spiritual truth is spiritually discerned by spiritual man. The natural man with his reasoning cannot find it through logic or rhetoric.²³ Spiritual discernment is in its very nature alogical; its axioms arise from the agreement with the intuition of the spiritual man, who has been born again of the Spirit. The very experience by which man is permitted to test Christianity, and his possibility of understanding it, rest upon a spiritual experience of the new birth which is intuitional and not in its

²³ I Corinthians, 2.

essence intellectual. The spiritual man knows the truth, and needs not to be taught, for he is born of God. This inner intuition of truth in the Christian life is a sympathy which takes intellectual color, but it really instates itself within the divine, the mysterious, the everlasting truth, by ready child-like receptivity, and through trust in the inward leading of the Spirit of God. The theory of knowledge in Christianity is fundamentally intuitional, and, therefore, Christianity readily understands and highly esteems any theory that seeks to define and establish the knowledge of intuition.

It is out of living intuition that we arrive at the true self and discover personality. Our self is multiple, but it is not like other multiplicity, for it has a real unity and continuity. It is through the vital, multiple unity of the self that we find the balance between unity and multiplicity. The self is a reality superior to abstract unity and multiplicity. This character of the self can only be found through intuition. "Now philosophy will know this only when it recovers possession of the simple intuition of the self by the self."²⁴ It is the self which is the enduring fact. "There is one reality, at least, which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is our own personality in its flowing through time — our self which endures."²⁵ As our self and our expanding personality is given through real intuition, it can never be constituted or re-constituted out of the operations of the mind. It is a fundamental mistake to "try to reconstruct personality with psychical states, whether they confine themselves to those states alone, or whether they add a kind of thread for the purpose of joining the states together."²⁶ The self or soul, which is a real unity of life,

²⁴ "An Introduction to Metaphysics," p. 38.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

is constantly being created, but it also pre-exists as one of "the little rills into which the great river of life divides itself, flowing through the body of humanity."²⁷ This flowing life expressing itself through soul is conscious, and because it is conscious it is free. "Consciousness is essentially free; it is freedom itself."²⁸ As consciousness passes through matter it must adapt itself, and this adaptation is intellectuality, but in itself the soul can not be explained by psychological phenomena. Even on the basis of the associations in the phenomenal life of the mind, "it is difficult to maintain that an act is absolutely determined by its motive and our conscious states by one another."²⁹ But it is not this possibility of demonstrating the independence of the self psychologically upon which the whole matter is to be determined. In intuition we finally find the real, conscious and truly free personality.

In this conception of personality, advocated by Bergson, there is much that is highly valuable for Christian truth. The opposition to a psychology of mere phenomenalism, and the affirmation that the soul is found as a living concrete unity in man's intuition, offers an excellent philosophic explanation of the Christian emphasis on the soul. A psychology of mere disjoinable states and of separable personalities, in which the abnormal experience of divided selves is fundamental, must always be in conflict with the unitary idea of the soul or self as a spiritual unit, which Christianity posits in determining personality. Christianity desires the inward grasp and the intuitive belief in the soul which Bergson deduces from life. Not the psychologism of the soul, but the apprehension of it as a living unity in multiplicity, approaches the Christian idea of the soul or of the human spirit as coming from God.

²⁷ "Creative Evolution," p. 270.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

²⁹ "Time and Free Will," p. 158.

When the soul is found by Bergson in the stream of life, and when he does not interpret it as a reflection of matter, he has put himself in strong opposition to materialistic science. For him the soul cannot be an after-effect, which will cease when the mechanical and chemical actions and reactions of the body stop. The soul is valued at a price which materialistic and naturalistic science cannot meet. The derivation of souls from life itself gives them an ideal worth and a spiritual origin. Christianity in its own terms and on its own foundation can find in such philosophic speculation an approach to its ideals. It may employ such conceptions for its conviction that we are of the life of God. Our souls are His breath, and not the shadow of matter ascending through the brutes and animals. Such origin and descent of man is not strictly Darwinian, it is not a creative evolution in the naturalistic sense. The soul-theory of Bergson leads us into spiritual and ideal realms, and it is, therefore, that Christianity may and does welcome it.

It is of great interest to find that Bergson allows personality to be continually created and shaped, and to be vitally free in itself. The continuity of life in which men are freely made personalities can be viewed favorably by Christianity. It may agree with the idea that God is constantly making and shaping us in our inmost souls. He, in whom we live and move and have our being, did not make us absolutely finished, predestined personalities; but through and in Jesus Christ He is building up our lives and our souls constantly. This very construction is realized by us in vital inner freedom. Our sanctification as Christians, and the life through which the Holy Spirit is constantly leading us into the truth, is really a new creation within us. Christianity at its best is not favorable to any theory of the dead level of the soul. It opposes any determinism of the soul as soul, although it finds the

actual soul burdened and enthralled by sin; but in the ideal state the soul is free, and sin does not belong to its being. In like manner Christianity will not allow any other slavery of the soul through heredity, environment or any such thing. Whatever degrading inheritance of sin attaches to the soul is overcome for the Christian, when he is born again and becomes a new creature. The assurance that the guilt is removed lies at the foundation, but the process of the removal is continuous. In this new spiritual re-creation the creation and its ideal is completing itself. There is a creative evolution of God in the human soul, and God is working out a new development in human lives.

There is much also in Bergson's philosophy, which as far as it is now developed by him, seems favorable to theism. His God is not an intellectual Absolute, not a mere name for the universe, and not a synonym for nature or matter. The God of Bergson is life. In a letter Bergson says that God is "a free, creating God producing matter and life at once, whose creative effort is continued in a vital direction by the creation of species and the construction of human personalities."³⁰ Apparently we have here a freely working and freely creating God. He is immanent in the world and shaping it constantly and continuously out of the fullness of His life, but apparently He is not His creation, for He is free and produces life and matter.

But after we have considered the strong and favorable aspects of the Bergsonian philosophy, and after we have noted its close approach to Christian ideas and to Christian truth in many particulars, it remains for us to discuss certain weaknesses and defects. The first of these is the elimination of the idea of rest. Duration is eternal, but it is movement. In this so central idea of his phi-

³⁰ LeRoy, "The New Philosophy of Henri Bergson," p. 224.

losophy Bergson has in essence returned to the speculations of the Greek philosopher, Heraclitus. He has built up his philosophy on a world of change. The opposition of Bergson to any static conception is apparently true to the idea of life as we see it developing and growing in the world. But Bergson has been influenced by the phenomenal side of life, and has used the observable changes in physical life to determine the character and constitution of life in itself. Because he has noted the development of life, this very development is its creation. There is no distinction between the beginning and the continuance. Life itself as changing and unfolding is made eternal. Consequently there can be no distinction between the creation and the preservation of life in the world, the former is absorbed into the latter. Life, in its changing aspects that we find now, is made the prime assumption. The origin of life lies in itself and in its present processes. Life is a flowing river without beginning or end, and it has no banks. Is it possible for Christian truth to be satisfied with such a notion of life, or must there be a demand for more permanence, in order to satisfy the implications of spiritual life? Is spiritual life nothing but movement and progress, or does it demand strong, permanent, and conserved elements? Is the memory of the soul only movement because the recall of the memory is movement, or is the spiritual content and the truth which memory returns fixed and static in nature? We cannot but assume that there is a constancy in truth, an eternity in great ideals, a fixity in spiritual conceptions, even though all of these may at times be forgotten or neglected. A philosophy of movement and of action cannot really appreciate the fact of eternal, fixed ideals. Christianity does hold to a faith once delivered to the saints. It believes in a permanence of divine truth for the soul, and in an inner identity of the soul which no creative change can destroy or make. There

is an underlying idea of duration in Christianity, which is not the interpenetration of moving elements, but of a great lasting fixity.

Bergson's view seems to offer no idea of rest over against the shifting of time. It has translated flowing time itself into eternity. There is no separation between the eternity when there was no time, and the time which is the framework for finite development. Because time and change are made so fundamental the conception of eternity suffers. Through its depreciation the Christian ideals of a rest for the people of God, of a cessation from the trials, burdens and labors of time, and of a heaven of peaceful and restful calm suffer. God Himself, if all is in time, and if all is movement, must work hitherto and be movement in Himself in such a manner that He does not rest from His labors. The elimination of the idea of rest may carry with it the loss of the idea of peace. The striving creative evolution seems to offer no support for those elements in Christian truth that demand rest and peace. Nor can there seem to be any end or fulfillment for hope. The process goes on forever, for evolution is eternal. There can be no finally new heaven and new earth. Growth is eternal and life is eternal, and, therefore, development can not cease. While it may be true that the Christian life will unceasingly unfold into all eternity, is this unfolding the same as that of time? Does not the Christian hope call for a new condition in heaven, through which the very development of man must be differentiated very clearly from all growth of the spirit in the present age and time? There appears to be in Bergson's philosophy a naturalistic remnant, which is not removed although life is translated into the terms of consciousness.

Despite the emphasis put on the soul as it is found in intuition, the consciousness described is, after all, the consciousness of phenomenal psychology, the stream of

thoughts, feelings, and volition. This phenomenal consciousness is exalted into the eternal, and consequently there can be no vital, absolute truth larger and more real than the change of external life. Everything is within the stream and nothing is without it. Fixity is a mere necessity of matter, and movement is of the very nature of life. From this it must follow that a truth is not true because of itself, but because it is life and movement, and the soul is eternal not because it is divine, but because it is life and life lasts. Life itself, not really freed from biological determinations, is not eternal as God's life, but as a moving and unfolding duration.

It is through the reinstatement into life that we really know and find truth, for in life we have everlasting moving duration. But the reinstatement into life is possible only through intuition. Intuition, as stated above,³¹ is the deepest and truest knowledge, for through it we find reality. The intellect is secondary and exists for material ends and practical purposes. This emphasis upon intuition which, as previously stated, has its great worth for Christian truth, is, however, in its strong accentuation dangerous. In Christian truth intuition is allowed as a means for receiving the great fixed truths of God. The Bergsonian intuition is a part of the moving and shaping reality. It does not receive eternal facts and realities, but it is carried along by the creative flux. As man's mind dips into the living stream of life and duration he finds truth. Truth is within the movement.

From this exclusive right of intuition the depreciation of the intellect naturally results. While Bergson calls intuition "intellectual sympathy," the adjective "intellectual" is really lost in the stressing of sympathy. Intuition is fundamentally anti-intellectual. Because the intuition is found in life and its unfoldment, and because true

³¹ P. 248.

knowledge is gathered out of the reinstatement of the mind in the great stream of life, the nature of the intuition takes on the character of feeling and striving. The will aids in the reinstatement, and the experience of the sympathy is in feeling. Consequently this intuitionism has no place for thought and intellect as necessary to find spiritual truth. But the spiritual truth of Christianity has never been without an intellectual side. No form of Christianity has been able finally to get along without doctrines. In this attitude Christianity has been true to the best in religious experience. If, however, the intellect is merely instrumental to material uses, then reflection has no place in religious life. Modern religious psychology in its latest development is not willing, however, to suppress the intellectual side of religious experience and truth. Professor Galloway rightly says: "Religious belief and doctrines have a cognitive aspect, and, in virtue of this, thought has the right to examine them and to test, so far as that is possible, their consistency with the articulated whole of knowledge. Where applicable, reason is the most adequate criterion; feeling is individual; working value has a social and historic aspect; but thought is universal. And reflective thinking alone makes it possible to connect and compare the religious experience with experience as a whole."³² In order that a religion may become universal it is necessary that it be both understood and taught. It must, therefore, employ intellect and reflection. While Christianity does not rest upon logic, it can and must employ it in unifying its truth, in confessing its faith and in communicating its ideals. Any theory which limits the truth of Christianity by mere intuitionism makes Christianity individualistic, uncertain and shifting. The depression of the intellect will also finally impugn the place of knowledge and wisdom in God Himself. If in-

³² "The Philosophy of Religion," p. 369.

tellec must be altogether removed from the unity of life and its inward reality, then as God is in such life there can be no real intellect in God. His knowledge must be reduced to the movement of life itself. That this resultant has actually been indicated by Bergson, despite his care, will appear further on.

The mere intuitionist, like Bergson, who has no place for intellect in the greatest religious issues, can consistently have no fixed standards of judgment. His norm of truth, like that of the pragmatist, must become experiential and purely psychological. But truth for its vitality demands firm logical criteria. Above all Christian truth, which asks to be accepted as divine and authoritative, must hold to standards which are eternally stable and true in themselves, although they are never experienced. There is, it is true, a necessity for flowing experience, but this does not guarantee divine truth in itself. Mere movement can never assure us of standards, and where there are no standards there can be no real distinction of true and false. That by which we measure must be fixed. The higher the issue, the more certain must be the standard. If the yard-stick would move with the cloth, how could it measure? If the hands on the dial of the clock were not the only moving thing, but if the dial would revolve with the hands, how could we have any standard of the fleeting moments? If there is nothing but on-going life by what shall it be measured? Christianity, therefore, does not favor an exposition of movement that injures its standard and its claim to be the final and universal religion. The abandonment of the peculiar claim of Christianity, its reduction to a mere experience like other experience, and its depression to changing life, would invalidate its very being. It is equally true, that if Christianity is interpreted as only social and historical, and if all its types are considered equally right and true,

then its worth becomes questionable. Such a procedure produces indifferentism and detracts from the power and definiteness of the Christian message. The end of intuitionism would be, in the sympathy of feeling to do away with the intellectual strength and the reflective universality of Christian truth.

When we approach the problem of the self or soul, we shall find that the under-estimation of the intellect has its effect upon the doctrine of the soul. Great as has been the service of Bergson in calling attention to the freedom of the soul, there has been offered no sufficient guarantee for the real separate individuality of the soul. While the great stream of life finds certain spiritual and nodal points in spiritual centers, these are not really independent. The souls are not placed above on-flowing life, even though they are said to pre-exist in a certain undefined sense. The rising wave of consciousness, which includes potentialities without number, bears matter along with it. In the interstices of this matter consciousness inserts itself, but the matter divides it into distinct individualities. "On flows the current, running through human generations, subdividing itself into individuals. This subdivision was vaguely indicated in it, but could not have been made clear without matter. Thus souls are continually being created, which, nevertheless, in a certain sense pre-existed."³³ Individuality of the soul is, therefore, not clearly ascribed to the spirit but caused by matter. It is the body which after all divides the souls from the great stream of life. The souls are compared to "little rills into which the great river of life divides itself, flowing through the body of humanity."³⁴ If this illustration means anything, it means that the soul is only a wave in the great river of life itself. Hindered by the body it

³³ "Creative Evolution," p. 269 ff.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

is separate from all life in its individuality. The problem is, through intuition to seek again the immersion in the river of life. Back of the effort of Bergson to unite the fullness of life with human personality there lies a romantic pantheism, which must destroy real personality and responsibility. The soul is not, as in Christianity, connected with a wise, knowing, and personal God, but is a wave in the vital impulsion, divided from the whole of life by the body. There is a secret Platonism in Bergson, but still no Platonism of individual souls. Along with it there is a depreciation of the body which Christianity does not favor. For to the Christian the body is the temple of the Spirit, and his hope is that of a final spiritual organism. Neither, therefore, in the dependence of the soul on the pantheistic notion of life, nor in the relation of the soul to the body, can Christianity gain any advantage from the Bergsonian point of view.

Because Bergson makes life greater than the soul, he is also compelled to make life greater than God. Wherever the soul is sunk into the general stream of movement, and does not remain personal, there the conception of God as Creator and Father must also suffer. While LeRoy,³⁵ quoted above, seems to imply that Bergson has a free, creative, personal God, this statement is only found in a letter of Bergson. What can be gleaned from the statements in "Creative Evolution" does not justify us in maintaining that within the system of Bergson, there is a place for a real, personal God. God seems to exist as secondary to life and for the sake of life. There is no clear and definite statement that life flows forth from God. It is the action of life itself which moves Bergson to say: "I simply express this probable similitude when I speak of a center from which worlds shoot out like rockets in a fire-works display — provided, however, that

³⁵ See p. 256.

I do not present this center as a *thing*, but as a continuity of shooting out. God, thus defined, has nothing of the already made; He is unceasing life, action, freedom. Creation, so conceived, is not a mystery; we experience it in ourselves when we act freely."³⁶ The God of Bergson, as here defined, is a "continuity of shooting out and "unceasing life, action, freedom." There is no mystery in His creation, for our own free actions are the same. It follows from this, that God cannot be the Supreme Person. He is in a process; and the opposition of Bergson to God as a thing is really an opposition to God in His self-possessed personality. God is motion, and this really means that motion is God. Life, action, freedom of movement in life, is really Bergson's God. He has subsumed the personal conception of God to the impersonal concept of life; therefore, he is really a vitalistic pantheist and not a theist. He has no God and Father of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, because he has no separate place for the soul of man.

Because Bergson's God, like the God of consistent pragmatists, is wholly within the world, it naturally follows that the purposes and plans of God are not above but within the universe. In the great discussion on the relation of mechanism and finalism,³⁷ Bergson opposes the mere mechanical notion; but he gives no room to the old conception of finalism. Evidences of purpose in the world are not denied. Purpose, however, is supposed not to be prior to the development, but to be found as we look back upon life. Evolution is held to produce not only the forms of life, but also the ideas that will enable the intellect to understand these forms in their correlation and purpose. Purpose and teleological value are among the ideas wrought out in the process of life. Says Bergson: "If

³⁶ "Creative Evolution," p. 248.

³⁷ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 37 ff.

life realizes a plan, it ought to manifest a greater harmony the further it advances, just as the house shows better and better the idea of the architect as stone is set upon stone. If, on the contrary, the unity of life is to be found solely in the impetus that pushes it along the road of time, the harmony is not in front, but behind. The unity is derived from a *vis a tergo*: it is given at the start as an impulsion, not placed at the end as an attraction." ³⁸ In this description we note that life is to derive its unity from the mere impulse of life. The harmony of life and its plan is behind the universe. It is picked out of the process. Bergson does not desire it to be pictured as an attractive force at the end. It is the pictorial representation of a purpose pulling the world on which has misled Bergson. He has overlooked the fact, that the increasing complexity of life, which shows harmony and purpose, must either be explained as purposive through accident, or through design. It must be the latter; but to include design in the impulse of life makes life intellectual. The inclusion of design working itself out and appearing at the end is a peculiar contradiction. It might seem guaranteed by the notion of Bergson that life is finally spiritual. But the problem remains, whether it is impersonally spiritual, or personally spiritual. Can it be impersonally spiritual and still remain purposive? In this denial of purpose as pointing to a personal God, a supreme Mind beyond the universe, Bergson has been true to the limitations of the thought of evolution. Because he has included everything within evolution he cannot make mind greater than its purposive actions. He is at one with other thinkers for whom Hobhouse speaks, when he says, "It is submitted, not in the least as a matter of faith, but as a sound working hypothesis, that the evolutionary process can be best under-

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

stood as the effect of a purpose slowly working itself out under limiting conditions which it brings successively under control.”³⁹ But Bergson differs from Hobhouse in his defining the evolutionary process to be life, and life finally as spiritual. But this definition does not overcome the evolutionary conception. Because this is all-controlling for Bergson, he has no place for an over-ruling and purposing God and Father outside of and beyond the world. Because his God is simply life and movement, the purposes of God must be within life and movement. These purposes cannot be the plans of the transcendent, personal God that Christianity believes in. The purposes in the world arise from the impulsion of life. Consequently they are the result of will, and there is only in the idea of Bergson a forward-pushing of life, but not a forward-looking in life. The lack of the intellectual element in plan and purpose destroys its meaning. While plan, design, and aim cannot be explained as mere calculation without will, it is equally impossible to exclude the intellect from these conceptions. But if the intellect must be included, Bergson fails in his theory of finalism. And he fails, because his immanence of plan is not connected with transcendence of intellect; and there can be no transcendence of intellect without a real personal God. Bergson never sees that there can be no finality of purpose without priority, and that finality cannot be maintained in the notion of a mere moving series. All these errors in the conception of Bergson finally lead him to a denial of the Creator and Preserver of the world, whom Christianity accepts. The God of Bergson cannot be the God of the Christian. The purposing and planning God of Christianity is not the God whom Bergson includes within the stream of life.

³⁹ “Development and Purpose,” Introduction, p. xxvi.

EUCKEN

When we turn from Bergson, the Frenchman, with his brilliant pictorial philosophy, to Eucken, the German, with his depth of sentiment, his height of ideality, and his breadth of spirit, the definition of life and its relation to thought and truth take on an entirely different aspect. While life, as evidenced in this world and in time, is not a finished magnitude but a problem, nevertheless the greatness of life consists in the fact that it dwells and remains within itself. This self-centering life is truly spiritual. "Man cannot produce a spiritual life of his own capacity: a spiritual world must impart itself to him and raise him to itself."⁴⁰ It is characteristic of this life "that it is conducted from the whole; the elements are moulded by a comprehensive unity; the different complexes and tendencies which arise within this life strive ultimately towards a single realm."⁴¹ The movement of this life is not a scattered one, but it shapes everything that belongs to life as ordinarily lived. The whole range of interests of man are covered, and all meanness and smallness is overcome. The spiritual life is a true independent reality, which comprehends the opposition of subject and object. "It is not that a primary thought or even a creative moral activity operates in us, but that a new totality of life, a self-existent and self-sufficing being, a primary creative power which fashions the world and expresses itself in complete acts, makes its presence felt in us — this is the cardinal principle on the attainment and vivid realization of which all truth of thought and life depends for us."⁴²

In such spiritual life unity and multiplicity are rightly balanced, through it eternity comes into time, the outer

⁴⁰ "Life's Basis and Life's Ideal," p. 144.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

⁴² "The Life of the Spirit," p. 329.

and the inner world are united; and happiness is found when truth is life. This life does not leave us hollow and unsatisfied because it is richer than all that mere intellect implies. "It is swayed by strong spiritual passion, by a deep longing to make life more dependent on personal decision and to shape it by personal effort; it is absorbed in a keen struggle to secure a master-position from which the whole environment can be brought under control."⁴³ The life of this nature has authoritative fixity, a sure goal, and is independent of human caprices. Out of it comes the completion of all that incomplete and minor living seeks, for its movements are transcending, and it is the original source of life. "Only as life thus turns itself and elaborates a depth can it win a content and an independent footing. Here for the first time we see a reality that is grounded in itself. Thus the new life is not one particular kind of life as contrasted with others, but the completion of life in general. The only life that is life in the genuine sense is that which becomes ensouled through the growth of an independent inward world. That this life does not remain a mere vague outline is shown both by its development in particular directions, e.g., those of the good, the true, and the beautiful, and by the formation of well-defined departments of life, such as we find in science and art, in law and economics, and so on. All these are by no means merely special applications of one general idea, but rather distinctive developments of an independent inward principle."⁴⁴

It is the fullness of the inner life which enables men to accomplish what they do. The results in the life of great leaders and thinkers, and the manner in which they solve the problem of life is due to a full, deeply active life, which embraces power and has its object of action. There

⁴³ "Can We Still Be Christians?" p. 87.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

arises a peculiar atmosphere about those who stand on the heights, but we are not to turn to them and their own ideas. "No; we are not concerned with the reflections of these thinkers about life, but with life itself as it is fashioned forth in their world of thought."⁴⁵ Through them life has creative power, and to work out its creative emphasis is its purpose. When it enters into history, and is subject to development, it may be pressed about with difficulties, but at last it breaks through again triumphant and victorious, autonomous and free, full of originality and force. Though there are many movements and multitudinous changes in the universe and in historic experience, yet through all these different phases there is a single, total movement. "In it life seeks itself, its self-presence (Beisichselbstsein), and at the same time its full content, its full depth."⁴⁶ "History offers this self-presence not as a mere succession, but only in as far as out of the movement of history there is lifted up a life beyond time (zeitueberlegendes Leben)."⁴⁷ Its leading spirits are those in whom new life and powers come to be developed. They are conquerors in the realm of the spirit. The life of the spirit requires effort; it must be gained through actual hope, strength and striving, but it must also be believed in. It requires faith because it is a life, true, eternal, beyond material conditions, beyond temporal forms of economic development, beyond cultural advance and even above historic forms of religion. Into this real and divine life all human endeavor must be raised, but the lifting up into the lasting life needs struggle. It is accomplished as men by striving allow it to encompass and conquer the temporal flow of succession.

Out of such a conception of life it follows that mere

⁴⁵ "The Problem of Human Life," Introduction, p. xx.

⁴⁶ "Erkennen und Leben," p. 97. Engl. Translation—"Knowledge and Life."

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

intellectualism will never suffice. It is particularly modern life with its many intellectual problems and difficulties, thinks Eucken, that has led philosophy necessarily to the problem of life which is more inclusive than the problem of thought and truth. "The constantly growing expansion of life in great outlines as well as in details revealed it as far too rich and differently colored, as far too movable and changeable than to permit it to be absorbed into the forms and formulas of thinking."⁴⁸ Thought instead of offering real things dealt with symbols, signs and pictures; through its ceaseless reflection and discussion it appeared to dissipate life and to wander into a land of shadows. It did not satisfy the passionate thirst for reality.

But perhaps we can flee to the immediacy of intuition, as men did in the past. Can we thus grasp reality? "This immediate grasping the past centuries designated as intuition, which shaped itself at times more artistically as the grasp of unity in multiplicity, at times it shaped itself more religiously as the grasp of a unity over against all multiplicity and evident through all multiplicity. Thus there met in intuition the demands of immediacy and unity; as discursive thinking had resolved reality into single pieces and theories, it becomes the task of intuition to effect a combination into a whole and out of this whole to permeate all multiplicity with quickening spirit. It is not to be wondered at that the conception of intuition gained all the love of men, but it is also not surprising that the willing recognition of an indisputable task allowed the question, whether the solution offered was adequate, to be treated far too summarily."⁴⁹ Through such intuitive thinking it happened that the scientific aspect of the world was reduced to the artistic point of view. Such a view the ancient world could accept, but the modern

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

world cannot accept it, for the modern world cannot so readily separate sense and spirit, as did the ancient world, but it unites the two. Back of this unity of modern thought is the failure to be readily satisfied with what formerly seemed final and axiomatic. Modern thinking not only asks for stronger unity of sense and spirit, but it also is far more critical. It constantly pushes former axioms further back. Together with its critical doubt modern thought is translating everything into action. What is needed, therefore, is not the intuition of the past, but the instatement into creative reality, and the reduction of this creative reality to the "total of a purely original life."⁵⁰

There are two extremes that we must avoid. We cannot remain mere intellectualists, but we can also not be mere intuitionists. Therefore, thought must be within life. From this, however, it does not follow that the modern thinkers are correct in their anti-intellectualism, when they totally disregard and reject the importance of logic. "The reaction against intellectualism in the midst of which we find ourselves to-day leads us easily to undervalue the logical elements in the work of knowledge. Certainly logic cannot create out of itself; it can only criticize and regulate. It pre-supposes something as a basis of its activity. But it is an indispensable means for attaining unity of life, for removing contradictions, for binding together isolated members into a whole. The lack of logic is always avenged in the end by a dismemberment of life. Our striving for a full comprehension of reality, for a transformation of the world in our own life, certainly meets insurmountable limits; but shall we on that account at once take refuge in the irrational? He who always gives first place to life and regards an enhancement of it as possible, will try to enrich thought with elements de-

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

rived from life; he certainly will not undervalue thought and seek knowledge outside of it. One may reject Rationalism without necessarily becoming a Romanticist.”⁵¹ Though logic may tempt to formalism this danger ought never to recommend to men the romantic disposition, which rejoices in the illogical and allows contradictions to stand. Whatever dangers and difficulties there are in logic must only serve to drive it beyond itself into broader connections, and to compel it to seek animating and discriminating forces in the total of life.

In order to carry through the legitimate use of logic and to combine with it whatever is valuable in the older idea of intuition, Eucken aims to combine thought and life. He derives thought and truth out of the reality and independence of the spiritual life. This independent life through all complications strives toward a common goal, and in its striving develops a characteristic form. In such development thinking is fructified and becomes a vital knowing. A true reality arises out of the labor of thinking, a reality which cannot be hidden, but which allows a full and thorough permeation of light and life. The whole seeking and striving, moving and developing, is not an abstract tendency of thought. It is a real movement which arises out of the wholeness of total life, which is spiritual life. It leads from life to true enlightenment and knowledge in three distinctive stages, the stages of Criticism, of Creation, and of Work.

“As Criticism it causes the immediately preceding condition of man to be felt as intolerable incompleteness and confusion, and arouses him to action to free himself from that condition. In the problem of knowledge the conflict of philosophy with the traditional stand-point is especially severe, since here philosophy makes evident the insecurity,

⁵¹ “Knowledge and Life,” *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXII, p. 13. Cf. also, “Erkennen und Leben,” p. 141.

even the emptiness, of all that with which man is usually satisfied. In like manner when dealing with the problems of the good and the beautiful, philosophy has been a powerful force in arousing men from their comfortable self-satisfaction and lethargy.”⁵² The confusion and the insufficiency of the existing intellectual, æsthetic and moral life, must be overcome, if the spiritual life is to find its originality and independence. The spiritual life must contradict the existing order, arouse men from their comfortable self-satisfaction and idleness, and show them through keen analysis the smallness, the meanness, the shadowiness and uncertainty of their attitude. How weak are the usual means suggested to heal the hurt of spiritual life! But the result of criticism, which conditions of thought and life force on us, cannot be reached unless criticism begins with the problem of knowledge. Because men held that they knew and had the truth, while they really lacked in real foundations and firm support for their supposed truth, great thinkers were moved to anger and determined struggle against the blindness and stubbornness of men. The thinkers sought and found the truth through the purgatory of doubt and through the negation of existent but erroneous ideas. When the intellectual sphere had forced men to criticism, other great spheres of life, like art, morality, and religion, were also criticised and revealed in their defects. Criticism was essential if life was to be reached. It had to remove the hindrances and the obstacles that thwarted life and its developments.

“In all genuine criticism there lies a germ of positive truth, but this germ must be fully developed. Now this can only be done through a continuous creative movement, in which, with the help of logical fancy, the spiritual life constitutes itself as an independent world, and at the same

⁵² “Knowledge and Life,” *Philos. Review*, XXII, p. 8.

time develops its own peculiar character.”⁵³ It is thus that criticism merges into creative life, in which man is elevated above the needs and purposes of mere man. Into whatever sphere creative power enters it constructs a new reality with its self determining reason, that transcends the opinions and desires of finite individuals. The creative spiritual life, although it works through man, is above man. It re-creates him, his needs, his thoughts, and his ideals. The reality of the life in itself, which criticism could not give, but toward which it pointed, is found in creation. But man himself as a creator is not finally the fact. He only grasps the original life which exists in itself. This life can exercise its creative, superhuman, spiritual, and divine function after criticism has removed the pretenses and the obstacles of ordinary external life. Creation is the joyous gospel of life, while criticism is its necessary and prevenient law.

It would be an error were we to suppose that Eucken held that this creative stage was the end, and that its goal was our mere passive reception of the creative power of life. Creation leads to work, as criticism was needed that creation might have its full sway. It is true that creation must precede, if work is to succeed and is not to be occupied with merely external aspects. The heroes of revolution and of creative innovation must appear to prepare the way for the heroes of ceaseless toil and steady advance. “But to Creation there must finally be added Work, which leads us back from the transcendence of the world to the realm of experience. It is in the subjection of this latter world through Work that the spiritual world proves itself to be the all-ruling truth, and at the same time brings the world of experience to a fuller reality and perfection.”⁵⁴ The world of Work is not so easily con-

⁵³ “Knowledge and Life,” *Philos. Review*, XXII, p. 8.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, *Philos. Review*, XXII, p. 9.

quered. "The new kingdom is not ready-made, so that we can appropriate it without trouble, but it needs to be formed within us and demands our labor and devotion; in turning toward it and holding it fast there lies an act, an act which dare not form a mere transition, but which must continue, and support and permeate all doing. In this respect this new kingdom may be called a kingdom of act (Tatwelt). But it does not thereby become a work of mere man, it is not something which he thinks out and spins out. But what happens in man here, that lies at the same time above him, and lifts him in devotion above himself, is the unfoldment of independent happening, the revelation of a new world, whose grasp makes something different of us and transports the center of gravity of our very being."⁵⁵ When such work is thus performed, real spiritual life has its power over us. We are led on to control all being, to see connections everywhere, to correlate all that is related, to explain not single features, but to find life as a total. A new world opens itself thus to man, and his life receives a new tension and magnitude. A mighty movement enters into experience, and the metaphysic of life begins through the life of the spirit.

But after we have been on the mountain and received the inward inspiration of labor we must turn toward the external tasks of life. Without abandoning its independence the new life must enter the world and its confusion, and attempt to encompass it. The world of thought must spread out and branch out, and systematize the whole world of thought and action through the new center of spiritual life. The creative act as it bursts forth in works leads to the task of applying its force and meaning constantly. Without creation thought and its systems are soulless efforts. After creation, however, comes the demand of the use and development of life. Creative life

⁵⁵ "Erkennen und Leben," p. 82.

must be carried down into everyday experience, and the world must be made the better in every direction; better thought, better ideals, better science, better art, better morals, and better religion must appear. The inner life must complete itself, but its fulfillment is not the result of a mere world of action or of outer surroundings.

It is in the inter-relation of the three stages of criticism, of creation, and of work that knowledge arises. These must be equally developed, and in their co-operation they form the ideal to be approached, in which truth is apprehended. When their balance is lost danger arises. Criticism will become mere fruitless dialectic and idle reasoning, it will lead to destructive doubt and skepticism, and it will tear apart the unities of life, unless it be united with creation. Creation, the quickening soul of the whole procedure, must not only follow but constantly animate criticism, if criticism is not to be lost like a stream in the swamp. Without creation work must become a useless undertaking and an idle venture, tiresome, oppressive, without force and lasting result. Creation alone can add to work its real impetus and power. But if creation lacks criticism, it cannot be separated from the standard general average of effort. The severer and keener the criticism the more creative life is longed for, and the more clearly it stands out. Without work creation may lose the necessary self-clarification and the possibility to make itself felt in the whole, wide world. Through the whole process of knowledge as it reaches truth, there must be the indispensable co-operation of criticism, creation and work for the completing of life. In this way life uses thought, for life needs thought as thought also needs life. Through life thought remains vital; in itself it is but a skeleton. In life thought seeks and finds as it is led beyond itself. Its powers are exalted and it centers in a real world of totality, and enters into the unity of being.

Thus thought and life are the expression of the real philosophy of activism. It is activism for which Eucken stands.⁵⁶ But this activism is not a mere movement of life in the manner in which Bergson conceives life to be action and movement. Eucken believes that life must be found in activity, but this activity does not seem possible to him "starting from given being with its strong enchainments, but only through a reversal of this being, through the grasping of a new point of departure and the unfoldment of a new life."⁵⁷ This constitutes the activism of Eucken.

In the philosophy of Eucken we find an ideal of life which is more friendly to Christianity than that of Bergson. Up to this time the latter has never fully freed himself from psychological presuppositions, and his reasoning is largely clothed in biological terms. Eucken, however, has sought for life in the cultural and spiritual movements of the world. He has searched the ideals of great thinkers, and he has analyzed great currents of striving thought and truth as the expression of fundamental life. Consequently his conception of life is more closely affiliated to religion. Religion itself is included in many of his thoughts on life, and he has endeavored to find and describe its real content of truth. He would not have religion regarded from the mere subjective point of view and clearly shows that its real purpose is universal. "Religion has quite a different content, and thus a different significance for knowledge, according as it is looked upon as a means to further the subjective well-being of man — whether as an individual or as a social complex,— to strengthen and afford support for his wishes and hopes, or as a force which carries further the demands of

⁵⁶ "Geistige Stroemungen der Gegenwart," p. 51 ff. Engl. Translation, "Main Current of Thought."

⁵⁷ "Geistige Stroemungen der Gegenwart," p. 52.

a natural life. Under this latter conception, religion awakens man to consciousness of new tasks and capacities, calls forth new activities and alters his whole view of life. In short, religion effects such a complete revolution of life-processes in man that all former pursuits and standards, indeed all previously recognized forms of reality become unreal and even intolerable to him."⁵⁸ It is in this manner that we find real universal religion. The universal life breaks through and lifts us above the weakness and pettiness of our life. "But all this is no product of natural evolution; it arises through man being uplifted by the power of the whole, in other words through his turning to religion. The presupposition of religion is in fact just this, that something higher makes its appearance in man and yet is hindered and restricted in the condition in which it first finds him. Religion is the overcoming of such hindrance and restriction."⁵⁹

But out of this universal religion grow historic religions. "The main concern of the historic religions was not the kindling of spirituality, but the saving of the human soul and of the whole human life from intolerable contradiction, the emancipation from sin and sorrow, the upholding of the spiritual life against the destruction which threatens it on every hand. In pursuit of this aim these religions were obliged to sever themselves from the rest of life and to found a new order of fellowship."⁶⁰ The historic religions helped to save the spiritual life; they allowed the universal religion to work its way through and to lift them beyond themselves. Historic religions become in the terminology of Eucken, "characteristic." "As all religion in the characteristic sense springs from the desire to be freed from sorrow and sin, it must effect a con-

⁵⁸ *Philos. Review*, XXII, p. 5.

⁵⁹ "Can We Still Be Christians?" p. 102. Cf. also Part II in "The Truth of Religion."

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

quest of these and, in so doing, must convert life into a great onward movement. This movement seeks to press beyond sorrow, but can still allow a value to sorrow in so far as it rouses life from inertia and sloth, awakens longing in the soul, and thus paves the way for the uplifting into a new life."⁶¹ The approach to religion and Christianity is opened through interpreting all religion as spiritual life and its true movement. There is no neglect, nor undervaluation of the fact and reality of religion in the theory of Eucken.

There is an inwardness in Eucken's idea of life combined with a rich and full concreteness of reality. The manner in which he elevates life, and attempts to keep it full and real, allows a religious use of his philosophic endeavor to describe life. What Christianity claims to be man's real life in God, what it describes as man's life in Christ, and what it assigns to life in spiritual possessions and gifts, agrees with the endeavor to define reality as life. For Eucken his philosophy is no mere speculative attempt at definition. It is to aid not in discussion or intellectual subtlety, but in forming a real world-view. In the "Weltanschauung" of Eucken a number of elements have been fused together to bring about his richly colored notion of life. He began as a student of Aristotle and was influenced by his realism and his actualism. He possesses the rich breadth of Hegel, without emphasizing mechanically the logical, absolute reason of Hegelianism. The strong actualism and moral earnestness of Fichte appears in him, but he has combined the moral purpose of Fichte with the religious idealism of Hegel. Through the unity of these elements the "Weltanschauung" of Eucken becomes in its highest ranges ethical and religious. Because ethical and religious elements interpenetrate, and because faith and morals are summed up into a totality

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 120 ff. Cf. Part IV, "The Truth of Religion."

and combined with all life, the philosophy of Eucken can be welcomed by such a religion as Christianity, whose truth always seeks fulfillment in religious and moral life.

Eucken in his anti-intellectual attitude is less pronounced than Bergson. While he desires to avoid stressing the logical movement of reason, as Hegel did, he is still more inimical to the naturalistic monism of his colleague at Jena, Haeckel. Consequently he does not depress the intellect unduly,⁶² and he allows logic an important place in maintaining the balance and consistency of truth. Eucken's appreciation of logic in its place, and his defense of its necessity, not as foundational but as regulative, appeals very much to Christianity, which cannot do without a firm logical assumption in the theory of knowledge. In order to unify its messages and in order to defend them over against false implications and inferences, Christianity needs logic for systematization. But the logic of Christianity is not constitutive of its truth, and must constantly be permeated and kept alive by the free Spirit of God. In similar manner Eucken desires no mere mechanical logic as master of reality. He desires life to fill logical forms, but he does not deny the use of logical axioms and categories over against unsystematized truth. The balance of life and logic in Eucken is most suggestive, and it can aid Christian truth in its endeavor rightly to keep apart and yet justly to combine logic and life.

A very striking feature in Eucken's speculation is the emphasis on the super-human character of real life. For him life is a higher actuality than a mere stream of flowing duration, which lies at the basis of Bergson's thinking. Ever and again Eucken lifts life above mere man. He gives it a place, a content, and a character of an eternal kind. The true life, as it in part appears in religious

⁶² See above p. 271.

faith, comes from above and has its own right of existence. It is not given merely to satisfy our desires or to strengthen our hopes. To give such an interpretation to life in religion would be to make religion psychological, but psychological religion, thinks Eucken, would never raise us above ourselves. It can never remove the doubt, whether the whole sphere of religion is not a mere spinning out of human wishes and ideas, and whether man is not building up a world of imagination which has no claim upon truth. "But when religion calls forth movements, which directly oppose the natural comfort of man, which generate severe complications and throw man into great unrest, but which through all arousal and negation open up for man new contents of life, new motive powers, new aims, yea, which accomplish a reversal of life — can all this be derived from that given existence, which most directly surrounds us; is there not to be recognized here a wide opening of reality, which carries its legitimation within itself?"⁶³ Such a conception as this rests on the ideal of a great, free and independent life, which is the reality. Eucken opens up the way for divine life in man. Life eternal becomes incarnate in humanity. This attempt at a philosophic exposition of the divine in the human is closer to the Christian idea of incarnation than the Hegelian embodiment of reason. It also offers an analogy to the Christian ideal of the overcoming life. In the Christian ideal regeneration makes man a new creature and the new life conquers the old sinful life in man. Through all difficulties the new life, which is God's life, maintains itself. For these two ideas of incarnation and the new, regenerate life of the Christian Eucken has furnished an important philosophical parallel. He has approached to the very kernel of the truth of Christianity.

Because Eucken has an ideal of superhuman life, he has

⁶³ "Erkennen und Leben," p. 49.

also been able rightly to stress the spiritual character of life. Life to him is not full nor real if it is not spiritual. It is true, that his idea of a struggle for a spiritual content of life begins on a lower level than that of religion, but at the end it rises up to it. In all history Eucken finds spiritual reality. This reality, however, does not appear in mere outward deeds but in spiritual inwardness. It is not in nature, not in individual soul-life, not in ontological speculation, but in the inner world of the spiritual life, its struggles and opposition, its revelations and experiences, that real knowledge and truth are found. They cannot be gathered apart from life but must arise in its own self-development. It is the constant effort of Eucken to keep his concept of spiritual life entirely pure and uncontaminated from all individualistic, socialistic, economic and naturalistic features. He repeats and repeats in one form or another his emphasis on the spirituality of life as the guiding reality of mankind. In this endeavor Eucken's philosophy seeks to define on its level what Christianity aims at when it so strongly holds to the fact that the highest truth is the truth of the Spirit, into which men are constantly led and guided by the living presence, power and enlightenment of God.

Eucken, in holding to the unity of the spiritual life, raises it above science, culture, and social ends. In so doing he vindicates philosophically the right of religion to demand its own independence and reality. He deprecates the claim that science can give a "Weltanschauung." The change of science into "Weltanschauung" is only possible, he thinks, when man, the subject, is overlooked and the great spiritual process in history is neglected. It is this process which really bears the work of science, and which has brought forth contents and aims that are far broader and larger than science, and that are truly human. Among such contents and aims of human en-

deavor Eucken includes art, literature, morals and religion. Religion is made a full cultural fact and reality.

In the same way Eucken, although he approaches in his conception of culture to religion, would not have culture and religion identified. He believes that a mere humanistic and naturalistic culture is insufficient. On the one hand there is too much subjective emotionalism, on the other hand there is too much soulless objectivity. Between these two man's life is rent apart. If man is not to surrender himself his "effort will inevitably take the form of a struggle for spiritual self-preservation."⁶⁴ In this struggle religion must be a mighty aid.

In the same manner as religion is independent over against mere culture and science, it must be independent of and cannot be controlled by the mere interests of society. These are very liable to reduce man's spiritual life to material terms. While there are ideals in the new social striving it cannot compensate for religion, for it does not answer to the spiritual need. "This striving, which in itself cannot be rejected, enters upon a narrow course and at the same time upon much that is problematical, in that it unites with the positivistic tendencies of the age in the rejection of all invisible connections and the restriction of life to the experience of sense. Instead of the whole, we now have the average and the masses, and instead of a creation from the whole, a building up from below; the needs of the masses are the main motive power of life. But as with the masses the chief questions are those of the physical preservation of life, and of economic existence, it seems as if, with their solution, with the deliverance from the oppressing cares and necessity through a radical revolution, a complete state of happiness and a ceaseless spiritual advance of humanity are assured. Material welfare, which in earlier

⁶⁴ "Can We Still Be Christians?" p. 79.

organizations of life was so depreciated, in the new system becomes the matter of chief concern; it is regarded as that which more than anything else leads to the development of every power and makes culture the truth for the whole of humanity."⁶⁵ In the clear elimination of the purely social ideal as adequate for human life Eucken again aids in bringing out definitely the supreme need of all-embracing life. Christianity can only welcome such an approximation to its claim of the right of religion, and of its supreme necessity in human life to solve the deepest problems, to maintain the real ideality, and to furnish permanent happiness.

While Eucken's philosophy thus has many ideas which Christian thinking can hail with delight, it also has elements against which Christianity must remain in a doubtful attitude. The first of the difficulties is the way in which Eucken deals with the problem of personality. Apparently Eucken is favorable to personality as he seeks a unity, which will recognize both the ethical and speculative movement of mankind. He says: "that we should cling to the word 'personal' as descriptive of that unity is not due to any love of the mere word, which we could easily consent to drop. It is due rather to that which lies behind the word. Thinkers such as Leibniz and Kant, whom no one can accuse of a crass anthropomorphism, have used it to designate the transcendence of the spiritual life. We desire to retain it in order that the spiritual may be understood and recognized as an active element, and the divine as self-determining life, not as the mysterious, dreamy, enchained process which romanticism conceived it to be. But our object becomes imperilled, or at least obscured, if once we designate and treat the ultimate cause of things as impersonal. Because concepts drawn from human life do not satisfy us completely,

⁶⁵ "Life's Basis and Life's Ideal," p. 48 ff.

we must not, therefore, sink back upon something infra-human, as has so often happened and is happening in many quarters to-day." ⁶⁶ This seemingly so strong defense appears to do full justice to the idea of the personality. But, after all, while there is a strong effort to overcome indefinite impersonalism, the problem remains whether personality, in which the spiritual becomes active and the divine determining, is a higher idea than spiritual life. Is personality essential to the transcendent, divine life, or does the transcendent, divine life only become personal in man? Is the spiritual, divine life essentially personal? While Eucken seems to assert this in maintaining that personality is needed to make the divine a self-determining life, nevertheless he determines personality not as a fixed possession. Personality for man is defined as a constant appropriation of higher life, a great task, and the winning of a new self. Personality is to be a concentration in man gained through experiences and decisions, through struggle and conquest. Personality lies at the height of a spiritual movement.⁶⁷ Eucken nowhere clearly says that God has personality. And the conception of personality as mere becoming will not allow of its consistent application to the idea of God. Eucken has freed himself from the non-personal intellectualism of Hegel, but he has not really gained a full theistic foundation. The spiritual life as a category and an idea retains a larger place than God as a person. With all his efforts Eucken does not seem to have kept clearly away from a pantheistic trend. His idea of life is supreme. The ultimate is not God, but spiritual life.

Another difficulty in Eucken's thinking is the failure to find definite standards of truth in the notion of life. While life is largely described it retains elements of in-

⁶⁶ "Can We Still Be Christians?" p. 153.

⁶⁷ Cf. "Geistige Stroemungen der Gegenwart," p. 348 ff.

definiteness. There may not be in Eucken's description of life as much pictorialness as in Bergson's conception, but nevertheless Eucken does employ the illustrative method of portraying life. He would resent being called a romanticist, and he is no romanticist of the extreme, illogical type, but his actualism and his notion of life are richer in descriptive detail and poetic fervor than in logical accuracy and in distinct norms of truth. Eucken is a romantic, idealistic preacher who sermonizes on life, and preaches a definitely thought out romantic conception like a religion. If we ask for the definite contents of Eucken's philosophy we shall not find that they are worked out in a great system. He has a great central theme in spiritual life, which he constantly elaborates upon and applies. Everything is subservient to this ruling idea. Not only the matter but also the very manner of Eucken as a lecturer demonstrate how large an element feeling and imagination play in his thinking. Were all truth of this nature it would lead to much uncertainty, for with all his brilliancy Eucken has not given the world strong standards. It is in this respect that Christianity holds, that a mere philosophy of life cannot compensate for strong, fixed standards of truth. Christianity has a system of truth to which it must cling. Eucken, it is true, says, that life must have authoritative fixity; but how does he define this fixity? "Unless life have some such authoritative fixity over against human dealings, we can never arrive at any sure goal, any inner fellowship, any independence of time's fluctuations. To us modern men, however, taught by long experience of the world's work, that authoritative fixity can never come from without."⁶⁸ But if the authority cannot come from without, if truth has no value apart from life and as shaping life, does not truth become changeable and flowing? On this founda-

⁶⁸ "Can We Still Be Christians?" p. 88.

tion Eucken cannot hold to any fixed eternal truth. He has no such standard as Christianity accepts in its authoritative revelation of truth.

Because Eucken's philosophy, despite his protest, has a romantic flavor; and because he claims for it the real inwardness and unity, and because he uses it to determine the whole problem of man, the world, and God, he must place philosophy above religion. He claims that only through philosophy can the problems of life be lifted up into the character of principles, and only through philosophy can the complications of life be resolved into unity.⁶⁹ Of course this philosophy is not the mere philosophy of the schools, but it is a philosophy of human life. Such a philosophy is, however, superior and unifies all that man possesses. While Eucken does not subsume religion to reason, like Hegel, he is, after all, Hegelian in as far as religion is secondary to philosophy. He believes that though art and religion bring inward reality to man, and though they possess independence over against philosophy, nevertheless philosophy must furnish the final justification of their strivings. It is the great unifier which is superior to all other forms of life. But such a claim Christianity can never admit. It must maintain not only its independence, but also its authoritative superiority to every philosophy. It does not need any philosophy to give unity and clarity to its own life. It may use philosophies to approach to the mind of man, but the value of its truth lies within itself. The life of religion, particularly in Christianity, can never bow to the demand of philosophy whose source is reflection, whether it be colored with imagination or not. The immediacy of the authority and truth of Christian revelation can suffer no abatement through any philosophical claim. Christianity cannot admit that it must in any way finally

⁶⁹ Cf. "Erkennen und Leben," p. 159.

stand aside for either philosophy, science or art.

In addition to these general discrepancies between Christian truth and the philosophy of Eucken, we have some very direct utterances which affect the central place of Christianity and some of its essential doctrines. Eucken has discussed his view of Christianity in "The Truth of Religion."⁷⁰ But he has most definitely described his attitude toward Christianity, in view of the modern world, in the volume "Can We Still Be Christians?" He admits that Christianity has certain great and supreme elements. It makes religion the sovereign mistress of man's life and destiny, and reveals another world to him than that of his surroundings. This new world is a supra-sensible, invisible kingdom and constitutes Christianity, as a religion of the spirit. Spirituality marks Christianity, for it is not a religion of the law, but a religion of redemption. The redemption which Christianity promises is ethical and not intellectual. Through these truths Christianity attempts to close up the rift between God and man in its message of the coming of the kingdom and of the incarnation and mediation through Christ. Eucken believes that Christianity can still be maintained and cannot be rejected altogether, because through it alone can we rightly define our relation to the world, maintain the true value of our nature, and properly control and shape the real work of life.

But with all this strength of estimation of the value of Christianity, Eucken does not give it the place of the final religion. He says, "Therefore, we must most resolutely resist the claim of any one particular religion, Christianity included, to be the one and only true religion to the exclusion and rejection of all others. It is only necessary to think out the consequences of a claim of this kind in order to feel its monstrosity. Other religions be-

⁷⁰ Cf. Part V.

sides Christianity allow man to live and die in the belief that divine life is ruling within him and drawing him away and beyond himself. If now the manifestation of divinity be limited to Christianity, then this belief can be nothing more than a gross illusion; the supposed revelation becomes mere semblance and deception."⁷¹ The difficulty in this estimate of Christianity is, that there is permitted to be in it no specific and final message of God to men. A real, broad Christianity does not deny that God at all times was seeking men; but is the divine which other religions than Christianity claim of the same redemptive value that Christianity is, and has it the same vital truth? Because Eucken has a great, general spiritual life, which is found in universal religion, he cannot admit that the peculiar characteristics of Christianity constitute it *the* religion for mankind. But can a consistent Christianity abandon this claim? If it can, Eucken is correct; if it cannot, we must reject the depression of Christianity in Eucken's point of view. The latter is the general assumption among Christians, and is the outcome of Christian truth and experience.

Out of Eucken's view of Christianity, and closely connected with it, there arises his conception of the Church. He is willing to give the Church a real spiritual value. He says: "We have touched repeatedly on the problem of the Church and convinced ourselves that, in spite of all defects and imperfections, a religious community is nevertheless indispensable. Christianity, moreover, must find such a community particularly essential and valuable, since, with more than ordinary boldness, it builds up a new world over against the world as given, and instead of looking upon the kingdom of God as a far-distant goal seeks to bring it right into human existence."⁷² High

⁷¹ "Can We Still Be Christians?" p. 132 ff.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 180 ff.

as this estimate appears to be, it justifies the Church solely on the necessity of religious fellowship and of a religious community. There is no appreciation of the relation of the Church to Christ. It seems to grow, in Eucken's view, out of the religious need. Of course, it cannot be expected that the fullness of Christian truth about the Church, as the body of Christ, is to be found in the philosophic approach. Nevertheless the definition of the Church is too broad and lacks character.

Over against the ideal need of the Church Eucken finds many difficulties in the practical life of the Church. He knows and admits that there must be an inner connection of Christian truth starting out from the incarnation and the redemption. From these central dogmas there follow for Christianity "all its other distinctive dogmas, such as the Trinity, the miraculous birth, the bodily resurrection, and the ascension. There is something exceedingly logical in the development of these dogmas. There is no stopping midway; he who wishes to retain one must accept the others."⁷³ But the problem for Christians, according to Eucken, is, "whether the religious formation which we find in Christianity has really the fundamental contact which will enable it to maintain itself as the supreme climax of religious life, in face of all the attacks and opposition which it must encounter to-day."⁷⁴ Another question is "whether the forms in which Christianity is at present enshrined are really capable of including the truth-content of the life which has been gradually growing up anew in the movements and experiences of the last few centuries."⁷⁵ In general it is the opinion of Eucken that present Christianity in its ecclesiastical forms cannot solve these problems.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

A new Christianity is indispensable because the present cannot be reformed. To prove this he analyzes broadly both Catholicism and Protestantism. As to the former he states, that the manner in which Catholicism controlled culture is no longer possible. It is attached to an old culture and, therefore, cannot control the present. In addition it dwells too much in the sensible embodiment of the spiritual, and is liable to make the Church an end in itself. All this dooms it in view of the inner life which the modern age demands. Protestantism is divided into old and new Protestantism. Of the old Protestantism it is said, that it "did not regard itself as in any way a mere part of a progressive movement, but rather as a highly necessary restoration of a truth which had been tarnished and disfigured but was in itself valid to all eternity. To this extent it shows just as decided an aversion to the idea of progress as did Catholicism."⁷⁶ The newer Protestantism is supposed to be ineffective because in its liberality, in its confidence in man's powers, and in its strong immanental leaning, it has "a tendency to overlook the obscurity of life and its inward struggles."⁷⁷ Every historic form, therefore, of Christianity is insufficient, and the maintenance of Christianity is supposed to demand a freeing from ecclesiastical control. Christianity is supposed only to be able to live "on the one condition, that Christianity be recognized as a progressive historic movement still in the making, that it be shaken free from the numbing influence of ecclesiasticism and placed upon a broader foundation."⁷⁸ In other words, the value of the present historic forms of Christianity has ceased, in Eucken's opinion. There must be a new broad movement in which universal religion, the religion of the

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

spiritual life, redeems what is eternal in Christianity. On such a theory there has been no continuity of Christian life, and the Spirit has forsaken the Church. The broad development of thought is to re-make and reformulate Christian truth, not out of its own treasures, but in accord with the philosophic notion of what constitutes spiritual life. The Church has no normative Word of God to which it can return; it has no innate authority of truth. Eucken seems to have given away altogether to the modern criticism against the Church. He would not re-vivify her, as far as she needs it, out of her own life, but in agreement with modern ideals and modern culture.

The difference between Eucken's point of view and Christianity also appears in the manner in which he attempts to eliminate the temporal elements of Christian truth in some of its great teachings. He singles out, first of all, the doctrines of human sin and guilt, and of atonement. There is, according to Eucken, a real problem of evil, which optimism cannot so easily explain away. But Eucken hopes that the contradiction of evil may be overcome by the new spiritual life. He says: "The harm and perversion would be impossible, if there were nothing to harm and to pervert. Without good, evil is unthinkable. The very risks we run may make us conscious of something deeper than we before suspected. Guilt may strengthen our certainty of the government of a moral order; doubt may make us more convinced of the existence of a truth. But this reflection still leaves us our contradiction, and with it the danger that our life and effort may come to a complete standstill."⁷⁹ The manner in which the danger can be met and the burden overcome is summed up in this manner: "That through the opening-up of an immediate relationship of the soul and of man to a God-

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

head which is not merely immanent in the world but also transcendent, a new spiritual life wells up which cannot be thus imperilled and distorted, since now all human activity has the support and sustenance of the divine." ⁸⁰ With all the effort to appreciate guilt and evil justly, it is, nevertheless, not grasped in its depth. There is no easy attempt to get rid of the complications of life and its real wrongs. But the apprehension of sin in its depth is lacking, and the emphasis of redemption from sin is wanting, for these ideas are supposed to savor "of old-world weakness and weariness, and cannot be adopted by the man of to-day unless he be disloyal to himself." ⁸¹ There is no estimate of sin which makes it guilt before God, for the wrath of God is disallowed, and the greatness of sin in its source and results, which Christianity claims, is neglected.

There is also an under-estimation of real atonement. Its sacrificial character is questioned. It is supposed to be mythical. Says Eucken: "When further we contemplate the important part played by the sacrificial blood in this doctrine of mediation and substitution, we cannot but realize that this whole mode of presentation, penetrated though it be by a depth of real spiritual feeling, yet belongs to another, more childish and more picture-loving stage of spiritual development than that in which we find ourselves to-day after all our centuries of experience and struggle. That which once seemed a fitting expression of divine truth bids fair to become for us anthropomorphic and mythological. And no power on earth can force us to respect as religious a conception which we once perceive to be of the nature of myth." ⁸² In the same manner it is doubted that the divine love, grace, and reaction against sin depend upon any manifestation in

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

Jesus Christ, and that they are evident in His redemption. "The imaginative conceptions, moreover, which support the whole edifice of Christian dogma,—particularly that of the wrath of God only to be appeased through the blood of His son,—we are bound to reject as far too anthropomorphic and irreconcilable with our purer conceptions of the Godhead."⁸³ Eucken has mentioned as his objections anthropomorphism and mythologism. The former has often been urged since the days of the early Greek thinker, Xenophanes, but its value cannot be denied if it is rightly limited. To remove all anthropomorphism would lead into vagueness, abstraction and finally agnosticism. The removal of the elements which Eucken disapproves of would depreciate sin and the personal conception of God. The mythologism charged is due to a questioning of the historical sources of Christianity. Eucken's main quarrel is with any historic redemption through Jesus Christ, and with any doctrine in which real sin before God is atoned for through Jesus Christ. No room is left for any formulation of atonement such as the teaching of Christ and early Christianity demands. Eucken must reject the statement of Jesus, that He gave His life as a ransom for many.⁸⁴ In the same way the reference to sacrifice, when Jesus says at the Last Supper, that the cup is the New Testament in His blood,⁸⁵ must be repudiated. Christ cannot be made sin for us by God,⁸⁶ and God is not really in Christ, reconciling men, and not imputing their sins to them.⁸⁷ All such teachings have no place if the sacrifice of Jesus be set aside, and if the mention of His blood is pure anthropomorphism. Eucken cannot square himself with the Christian doctrines

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

⁸⁴ Mark, 10:45.

⁸⁵ Matthew, 26:28.

⁸⁶ II Corinthians, 5:21.

⁸⁷ II Corinthians, 5:19.

of sin and atonement, because his activism will not allow for real sin, and his depreciation of the historical Jesus, as will appear below, hinders him from accepting a real atonement. The romantic character of the doctrine of spiritual life makes this life itself the atoning factor, and, therefore, no historic atonement and no sacrifice is really needed. Christianity finds in Eucken's re-formulation of sin and sacrifice the same hindrances which it found in Hegel's effort to discover permanent rational Christianity. The real historical is lost in Eucken's case as well as in Hegel's. The all-determining influence of the creative life reigns and in all consistency suffers no real atonement.

When, at last, we come to the fact of Jesus Himself, there is discovered in Eucken a combination of an high estimate of Jesus with a doubt of His actual incarnation and of His divine nature. Says Eucken: "The Christian conviction of love as a world-ruling power was embodied in a personality which in its union of childlike simplicity with historic greatness, outward poverty with inward loftiness, tenderest spirituality with world-compelling power, youthful joyousness with impressive seriousness, has made a deep and lasting impression upon humanity and stands out clear and vivid in the minds of all Christian believers."⁸⁸ Jesus is the personality which brought divine truth to historic realization. "A personality like that of Jesus is not a mere carrier of doctrines or moods, but a convincing actual proof of divine life, from which new divine life can constantly be kindled."⁸⁹ The fact of Jesus is the source of an endless movement. But after all Jesus is not the Christ of confessing Christianity, although He is not lowered to a mere teacher. "The per-

⁸⁸ "Can We Still Be Christians?" p. 14.

⁸⁹ Translated from "Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion," p. 427. Engl. Translation, "The Truth of Religion."

sonality of Jesus, the man Jesus, is in no wise robbed of its pre-eminent significance, nor is his status lowered to that of a mere teacher of wisdom.”⁹⁰ But Jesus is not vitally the Son of God; He is simply a unique Creator of spiritual life.

There is no approval of the union of the divine and human in Jesus. In fact, many difficulties are found. Says Eucken, “The full unity of Godhead and humanity in ONE person has not become a living reality for the religious life through the dogmatic decreeing of it.”⁹¹ There is supposed to be an insoluble contradiction in a man who is God, who bears human cares and sufferings, and still remains in possession of the full completeness of divine absolute truth. Not only is Jesus opposed in view of His Godhead, but there is a fear that Christianity is too much bound to holding fast the truth as it was realized in Jesus. Consequently Eucken says: “Nor is our resistance on this point confined to the old, in itself consistent, doctrine of the God-man; it is directed also against the modern halfway position which drops the old doctrine, but nevertheless calls Jesus unconditionally lord and master and must consequently bind our whole religious life indissolubly to him, thus taking away all independence with regard to him, and robbing our own life of its full originative power.”⁹² The desire of Eucken to be free from the control of the personality of Jesus, after he has so highly estimated Him, may at first seem strange. The doubt of Eucken and his rejection of the divine-human Jesus is, however, readily explicable if we recall Eucken’s leading conceptions.

There is no room for the inclusion of divine, spiritual life in one great personality, if divine life is a universal

⁹⁰ “Can We Still Be Christians?” p. 178.

⁹¹ “Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion,” p. 424.

⁹² “Can We Still Be Christians?” p. 173.

idea. Eucken cannot accept the uniqueness of Jesus just because his idea of life is greater than that of personality. Despite his exaltation of the personal, quoted above,⁹³ in which the divine is supposed to have its self-determination in personality, Eucken cannot bring himself to a consistent and real conviction that the divine and human, that divinity and humanity can coalesce in ONE person. The unity of divine and human cannot be found in one person because personality itself is not concrete in God. It is rather identified with the indefinite, general, romantic term of spiritual life. Eucken finds contradiction in the real vital unity of divine and human in Jesus, and still he maintains that the spiritual life is divine. Why should there be more contradiction, when the contrast is centered in a person, than if we suppose a divine movement of life to be struggling with human movements? If the divine cannot enter a person, can it enter finite human movements? Either Eucken's divine can not be a real full divine, or his human must be lost in the divine, when spiritual life breaks through.

In general the divine plays a minor part in Eucken's theory. The activism of the divine in creation is frequently forgotten in the stressing of human work. The labor is man's labor, and the divine in life is not by grace.⁹⁴ Consequently there is a failure in the interrelation of the divine and human in Eucken's speculation. His objection, therefore, to centering divinity and humanity in their fullness in Jesus, is a result of his lack of a real, absolutely divine element. There is also a constant reluctance against making a single historical personality like Jesus all-determining. Should we grant that Eucken has maintained the balance of the divine and human in

⁹³ See p. 284.

⁹⁴ Even where grace is appreciated activity and freedom are largely stressed (cf. "Ethics and Modern Thought," p. 57).

spiritual life, as he intends to do, it would be necessary to ascribe his objection to the divine-human in Jesus to the dwelling within the romantic notion of life. This notion seeks to absorb subjective and objective into a unity, and is averse to personality in its concreteness because it may become individuality.

At all events, whatever may be the reason, Eucken does not possess the Christ of Christianity. He does not want Him as divine Saviour, not even, on a liberal basis, as Lord and Master. But Christianity can never surrender its central figure to any such idea as that of Eucken. The vitality and power of Christianity would be gone with the fading away of the picture of Jesus in all its fullness. It is specifically in the incarnation of Jesus and all that follows from it that Christianity finds its support. But the end of this incarnation is for Christianity no speculative aim, but the practical necessity of a real salvation through God and in God for man. The injury done to any of the vital elements that are embraced in the truth of the salvation of Jesus, through His person and merit, is an injury, which must at last destroy Christianity, as the best interpretation of the religion of salvation in the world. Consequently a Christianity that knows what it possesses will always maintain the integrity of Jesus in His human and divine character.

CHAPTER VII

THE REALIST REALM

AMONG the diverse modern movements in America one of the latest is the philosophical movement which calls itself Neo-Realism. It is a common endeavor of the following university professors: Edwin B. Holt of Harvard, Ralph Barton Perry of Harvard, W. P. Montague of Columbia, Walter B. Pitkin of Columbia, E. G. Spaulding of Princeton, and Walter T. Marvin of Rutgers College. These are the distinct leaders of American Neo-Realism, although there is a realistic trend in Professor Fullerton's later publications, and in Bertrand Russell's speculations. The neo-realists in opposition to all assumptions of a single substance are seeking to assert that there are only functioning centers. Over against the priority of mere first simples they demand continuing energies. They attack idealism by denying the ego-centric character of the world and its purely ideal nature. They hold to independent entities which exist in themselves and are not dependent upon the mind. In their realism they do not follow the older Scottish philosophers who opposed idealism, and became common-sense dualists, demanding both mind and matter. The American realists are not satisfied with such a naïve theory. Their attitude strives for a different kind of pluralistic world. It is not the world of everybody, it is not the shifting world of pragmatism, it is not the dream world of idealism, but a world of immediate experience of physi-

cal phenomena, which are not to be made mental.¹ The attitudes of the neo-realists are still largely critical and negative, but a common program and platform has been announced.² Although neo-realism objects to any identification with naturalism, idealism or pragmatism, it is nevertheless in agreement with many important teachings of these attitudes. "With naturalism, for example, it maintains the unimpeachable truth of the accredited results of science, and the independence of physical nature on knowledge; with idealism it maintains the validity and irreducibility of logical and moral science; and with pragmatism, the practical and empirical character of the knowledge process, and the presumptively pluralistic constitution of the universe."³

Realism begins with a world of manifold entities. These are "not all mental, conscious, or spiritual," and "are knowable without being known."⁴ It is even asserted that "the entities (objects, facts, etc.) under study in logic, mathematics, and the physical sciences are not mental in any usual or proper meaning of the word 'mental.'"⁵ There is a drift away from mental emphasis, and the claim of Professor Perry, that neo-realism like idealism maintains the irreducibility of logical and moral science, is hardly sustained. The entities are not fundamentally of an ideal nature. The pressure everywhere is against any assertion or stressing of mental entities in the sense of their being conditioned upon knowledge. Such an attitude might lead in logic and morals to either Platonic ideas, or to the spiritual monads of Leibniz, or to the ideal

¹ Cf. "The New Realism," by Professor Fullerton, in "Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James," etc., p. 3 ff.—Cf. also, Fullerton, "The World We Live In," Chapters IX, X, XI.

² "The New Realism," p. 471 ff.

³ Perry, "Present Philosophical Tendencies," p. 272.

⁴ Professor Spaulding, in "The New Realism," p. 478.

⁵ Professor Holt, in "The New Realism," p. 472.

reals of Herbart, but this is not the case. It will appear that in logic, morals and religion, neo-realism has practically become pragmatic. Its strong assertion of the independence of entities, and its opposition to knowledge as conditioning any of them, tend toward making the entities really physical. In other words, because neo-realism is not dualistic in an outspoken manner, and because it denies the ideality of all entities, it is actually monistic in a physical and naturalistic manner. Its pluralism is scientific and external, and can be used even less for mental ends than pragmatic pluralism. It becomes as indeterminate and shifting in its pluralism as does pragmatism. Its emphasis of manyness and irrevelance goes even further than that of pragmatism.

The indefinite description of entities, which really looks toward materialism, is strongly seconded by the opposition of neo-realism to an idealistic theory of knowledge. The entities are never to be conditioned in their nature or being through being known. They enter into many relations which do not change them in their substance. One of these relations may be knowledge. But the entities are never completely immanent in knowledge, for they may be immanent in many connections, combinations, and relations, and still remain transcendent and independent. This independence is denominated "the external view of relations." It is opposed to a connected, inner relationship of all things, which absolutism asserts. The assertion that all things are external to each other is the great fundamental logical principle which is to be prior to all metaphysical systems and theories of knowledge. Many propositions are built upon it. "There are many existential, as well as non-existential, propositions which are logically prior to epistemology," for "epistemology is not logically fundamental."⁶ In all propositions "one identi-

⁶ Professor Marvin, in "The New Realism," p. 473.

cal term may stand in many relations,"⁷ and it may change some relations without changing all. There is no real alteration brought about by knowledge. "Realism holds that things known may continue to exist unaltered when they are not known, or that things may pass in and out of the cognitive relation without prejudice to their reality."⁸ Knowledge plays its part within an independent environment. It is "a complex process, involving physical, physiological, biological, and ethical factors that are determinable by the laws proper to these sciences."⁹ There is the strongest emphasis on a naturalistic theory of knowledge. Professor Perry claims that modern realism is closer to the phenomenal monistic realism of Hume than to the dualistic realism of the Scottish philosophers. There is an effort to regard things not merely as independent of the mind, but as identical with perception when they are present to the mind. Things may enter directly into the mind and then become ideas. This theory of the mind largely deals with entities as physical things, and certainly under-values mental entities.

The whole neo-realistic school does not accentuate objective mental facts in themselves and in their relation to knowledge. There are occasional utterances about spiritual entities, but the whole trend is toward a neglect of the spiritual and an exaltation of the natural. It is through the speculations of the English thinker Bertrand Russell that we find a better valuation of objective mental facts. His theory of knowledge and of truth asserts that there are many things which enter into multiple relations through the mind. When a judgment is made there is "not a dual relation of the mind to a single objective, but a multiple relation of the mind to the various other terms

⁷ Professor Pitkin, in "The New Realism," p. 477.

⁸ Professor Montague, in "The New Realism," p. 474.

⁹ "The New Realism," p. 135.

with which the judgment is concerned.”¹⁰ It is through such multiple relations that the mind finds both things and ideas. Out of the proper relations truth is constituted. When a judgment is true, there is a relation between the objects of the judgment, which really exist. “Every judgment is a relation of a mind to several objects, one of which is a relation; the judgment is *true* when the relation which is one of the objects relates the other objects, otherwise it is false.”¹¹ Knowledge, therefore, rests on the relating which has objective facts with which the mind must connect. The objective facts are not merely material, they may be ideal. The relation, however, of the mind does not make the existence, it only establishes connections. There is more room for both the mind and the world in this theory than in that of neo-realism.

From the doctrine of knowledge, which the realists hold, there follows a peculiar explanation of the mind. The mind is only a center of relationships. In its consciousness, says Professor Woodbridge, “we have simply an instance of the existence of different things together, . . . consciousness is only a form of connection of objects, a relation between them.”¹² The relations established by the mind do not change the objects which persist in their nature. When the mind is studied and observed in its experience of sensations and perceptions, the result, according to neo-realism, shows that the mind is not distinctive and separate in nature and function. It is a complex which has arisen from certain biological processes that acted in the direction of self-preservation. These processes protected, renewed and finally isolated themselves, and thus they developed a variety of special interests. Out of such origin the mind through biological de-

¹⁰ “Philosophical Essays,” p. 180.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

¹² Perry, “Present Philosophical Tendencies,” p. 278.

termination became a complex organization which acted desideratively or interestedly. In the action of biological interest the vital processes were developed. "Such processes, interested in their general form, possess characteristic instrumentalities, notably a bodily nervous system which localizes the interest and conditions the refinement and range of its intercourse with its environment."¹³ Through these instrumentalities the mind has taken up such contents of the environment as it sought on behalf of the biological interests and desires. This theory of the mind is certainly naturalistic and material. It is not parallelistic like the prevailing theory of most psychologists. It does not allow for any real interaction, but is simply and solely a biological process. Consequently the mind must be only a name for the fact of the functioning of entities through a center. The mind and its phenomena are natural, for biology and physiology altogether determine it. There is no distinctive spiritual character and life of the mind. "The natural mind, as here and now existing, is thus an organization possessing as distinguishable, but complementary, aspects, *interest, nervous system, and contents*. Or, if interest and nervous system be taken together as constituting the action of the mind, we may summarize mind as *action and contents*."¹⁴ On such a theory of mind no place is left for any real spirit or for any truly spiritual entities, and even logical, moral, and religious facts must be fundamentally naturalistic.

At times the characteristics of naturalism may appear more disguised, but finally they will break through again. This result is very evident in the discussion of the problem of truth by neo-realism. Truth is approached as in pragmatism not from a unitary ideal, but through the collection of details. "The logical categories of unity,

¹³ Perry, "Present Philosophical Tendencies," p. 304.

¹⁴ Perry, *Ibid.*, p. 304.

such as homogeneity, consistency, coherence, interrelation, etc., do not in any case imply a determinate degree of unity. Hence the degree of unity which the world possesses can not be determined logically, but only by assembling the results of the special branches of knowledge." ¹⁵ It is only through the special results of special sciences that we are enabled to reach truths. The relation and relevancy of special facts allows us to approach to truths, and from truths we can seek for truth. It is, therefore, relation and not inner value that actually establishes a truth. No intuition and no axiomatic truth is really possible. "There may be axiomatic truths or intuitive truths. But the fact that a truth belongs to either of these classes does not make it fundamental or important for a theory of knowledge, much less for a theory of reality. Like all other truths, it too must be interpreted in the light of other relevant truths." ¹⁶

The whole investigation of truth, therefore, is the problem of relevancy, and relevancy must be established through the existence of objective facts, but objective facts largely depend upon the immediate experience of the senses. Professor Montague clearly demonstrates this in his essay on "A Theory of Truth and Error." He says: "I hold that *the true and the false are respectively the real and the unreal, considered as objects of a possible belief or judgment.* There is, that is to say, the same difference between what is real and what is true as between George Washington and President George Washington. President George Washington refers to Washington in a certain relation to our government. George Washington denotes precisely the same individual without calling attention to the presidential relation." ¹⁷ The real world from which

¹⁵ Perry, in "The New Realism," p. 476.

¹⁶ Professor Pitkin, in "The New Realism," p. 478.

¹⁷ "The New Realism," p. 252.

truths are found is the world of qualities and objects in space and time. "*The real universe consists of the space-time system of existence, together with all that is presupposed by that system.*"¹⁸ Toward this universe, this reality, when its existents are expressed in propositions, we take an attitude of belief or judgment. This belief or judgment about objects of the space-time universe is truth. In the working out of this relation there is no partial truth and error; truth and error are always definite and distinct.

The world as we find it in its complexity must be analyzed into its simpler elements. In the proper analysis we find the existents which guarantee the truth. When we elaborate the relation of existent objects to belief we have three facts to consider: first, the actually existing, external, object; second, the cerebral state; third, the object perceived and apprehended. When truth is found the real, external object or event is identical with the perceived object or event. This may be due to the fact "that the medium through which the energy has been carried from the external object to the brain has not altered the character of that energy."¹⁹ Then the cerebral event corresponds with the object. But more frequently the medium has distorted the energy in quality, time or space, "but the brain through inherited capacities or through memory-traces will have neutralized and corrected this distortion."²⁰ We are limited to these origins in the relation which is called truth. Even when we appear to be conscious of ourselves and our states, there is merely "the consciousness at each moment of the brain processes and implications of the just preceding moment."²¹ When we are conscious of our brain-states, the consciousness is intra-organic. "And in this intra-organic consciousness,

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 290.

where the self-transcending implication 'reaches' only to the next moment, there would seem to be no chance for error."²² In other words, the certainty of truth in introspection is greater than from external objects, and we are more sure of our own thoughts and feelings than of anything else. This sureness, however, is greater because of the temporal closeness of observed brain-states. Thus through cerebral concatenation in time arises the idea of the greater certainty of our thoughts and feelings. We are determined even here not by spiritual axioms and surroundings, but by physical environment and conditions. The most certain truth is established by closeness to the brain environment of the self.

By statements like these realism gravitates back into a materialistic evaluation of truth and of mind. Professor Perry definitely states, "Mind operates in an environment, and succeeds or fails, according as it meets or violates the terms which the environment dictates. Truth is the achievement and error the risk, incidental to the great adventure of knowledge. But eternal being, and the order of nature, are not implicated in its vicissitudes."²³ There is a return in this statement to a grosser pragmatism than that maintained by any regular pragmatist. Truth is mere adjustment and there are no eternal values to be found in it. It is no guiding star, no inner ideal and no leading hope, but it may be compared to a ship risking its way and making its compass as it goes. The certainties of this theory of truth are finally uncertainties. They are risks taken and relative assurance in the risks.

If the inquiry is made as to the advantages for Christian truth from neo-realism, no great claim can be established until realism changes some of its attitudes. As far as it is pluralistic it is more material and not as congenial

²² *Ibid.*, p. 290.

²³ "Present Philosophical Tendencies," p. 328.

to Christianity as pragmatism. It cannot at all measure itself with the pluralism of Leibniz whose theory of monads is quite usable by Christian theism. The entities of realism are mostly gross, sense-entities, or energy-centers. Professor Holt in his book on "The Concept of Consciousness," argues for neutral, simple entities. These, however, are not spiritual nor ideal like Leibniz's monads. Most of the realists entirely disregard spiritual and ideal centers. As far as realism opposes idealism it is no advance on pragmatism. Its theory of knowledge is inferior to that of pragmatism.

Neo-realism claims to have aided positive freedom on the basis of decision and intention, and to have favored negative freedom from the exclusive control of mechanical laws. Professor Perry claims that there is also a freedom for the individual from cosmic moral laws. He says: "There is a sense in which every individual is morally a law unto himself."²⁴ With this in mind it is possible to see how far the negative freedom extends. It is not only asserted that moral laws take precedence in the control of life over mechanical laws, but the individual is free within himself. In other words, freedom has become mere individualism. But when we ask upon what psychology such individualism and such freedom rest, we are disappointed, for we learn that "mental action is a property of the physical organism."²⁵ A physically determined organism is free in its choices. This means that a physically controlled man is free in the determinations and in the laws of his organism. In other words he is not really free as a biological center. He is only free from mechanical control and from cosmic moral control. Such a theory of freedom is really deterministic. On its moral side it does away with all general moral laws, and it de-

²⁴ "Present Philosophical Tendencies," p. 343.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 298.

stroys the foundations of common ethics and common moral purposes.

Scientific, mechanical, physical, and biological attitudes control realism. It is materialistic to a remarkable degree and has no real place for the spirit. The claim of the independence of logical, æsthetical, moral and religious facts is not warranted by the gross psychology of realism. Because it has no real foundation for spiritual independence, and because it denies the ideality of knowledge, truth for it is a question of brain-states. There is no spiritual element in its theory of truth. It has borrowed from the most materialistic German philosophers, like Mach and Avenarius, but it has no sympathy with the strivings of the mind and the ideals of the spirit. If Christianity must fundamentally combat any modern type of thinking and any scheme of philosophy, it must combat this inconsistent materialism parading under the name of realism.

Apparently Professor Perry rescues morals and religion in his endeavor at a realistic philosophy of life.²⁶ But what does he leave us of morals and religion, and how does he seek to establish them? He says: "A philosophy of life must always contain two principal components, a theory concerning the nature of goodness or value, and a theory concerning the conditions and prospect of its realization. The former is the central topic of ethics, and the second is the central topic of a philosophy of religion."²⁷ In this definition Professor Perry has borrowed a Kantian idea to determine the place and use of religion. Religion is only necessary and its philosophy is only demanded for the realization of goodness or value. Thus religion is the servant of ethics, and its own life and worth is denied. Value is fundamentally value of goodness. Consequently ethics is all that really

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 329 ff.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

constitutes life. It is supposed that there must be faith, but when faith acts it must create a habit. The making of a habit is, however, advantageous, for though faith and religious optimism cannot be proven, as little can pessimism be sustained. Pessimism holds that man's hope must be buried in the final collapse of the universe. It is better not to believe in the collapse of the universe. Optimism, consequently, and faith in goodness is most profitable. Therefore, the religion of neo-realism is a belief in an optimistic chance of man in the universe of necessity. Such is the extent of the religious philosophy in realism. It does not assert a God. It has no place for superhuman and supernatural fact. God can only be a hypothesis, and a hypothesis which is a habit. Because there is no emphasis placed upon directly and immediately experienced spiritual realities, and because there is no allowance for an inner spiritual grasp of God, it is impossible to have any real religion or any real philosophy of religion except as an inference from morals. The vitiating influence of the materialistic psychology of realism stands in the way of the recognition of real religion as a human experience. There can be no truce between such an uncertain optimism, misnamed religion, and Christianity. Even the moral hopefulness of mere realism is not the outcome of a strong ethical idealism. Kant's thought is borrowed, but it has not grown out of this new philosophy. Realism has attempted to graft an incompatible part of an idealistic belief in optimism on a barren naturalistic tree.

The attitude which Professor Perry assumes toward religion leads us to ask how the moral values are conserved, for the sake of which optimism, called religion, is demanded. The good is not conceded to be good because it is inherently good. Its value depends on desire. There is no inherent worth because every value is supposed to

arise from a relation to interests in which desire expresses itself. "Moral value arises from the complexity and mutual relation of interests."²⁸ This moral value depends first of all on rightness and when an action is right it conduces to goodness. But rightness only leads to comparative goodness, and this is the outcome of proper action controlled by interest. "When an interest is confronted by an occasion, or particular phase of the environment, there is an action which will so meet the occasion as to fulfill the interest. This is the *right act in the premises.*"²⁹ "But rightness is not necessarily moral; it may be merely intelligence or expediency. Moral values adhere only when there is a question of comparative value. And this question arises from the contact and conflict of interests."³⁰ In all this conflict of actions that is best which fulfills all interests. "Morality, then, is *such performance as under the circumstances, and in view of all the interests affected, conduces to most goodness.*"³¹ Morality, consequently, can only be a probable decision about the good. There can be no absolute value and no absolute ideal. Only what is best for existing interests under existing conditions can be reached. Moral life has no fixed ideals toward which it strives. It is true that Professor Perry claims that this theory is not "relativistic in any vicious or sceptical sense,"³² but it is after all strongly relative. It has no foundation in absolute goodness. All actions are determined by relation to desires and interests. The satisfactions are not clearly emphasized as moral satisfactions even in a relative sense. The outcome of this relativism in morals can be readily foreseen. In such a shifting morality of mere comparative

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 333.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 333 ff.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 334.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 334.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 337.

values, Christianity can find no friend, but it can only detect an enemy. If Christianity is ever to use the new realism, the realists must remove the leaven of scientific materialism, of naturalistic psychologism, of uncertain standards of truth and morals, and of an unfounded optimism wrongly called religion. Christian truth has its own basis and its own value; and these do not agree with the uncertainties, the relativism, and the materialism of the new realism.

It has been necessary, in examining all the trends of thought and all the solutions of the problem of truth, for Christianity to maintain its own standard and ideals. It has discovered points of contact, but it has also frequently found points of difference. There can be no acceptance of a natural theology, which rests on the supposition that the only accurate thinking is mathematical. Christianity has to dissent from the quantitative, a priori idea of truth. It finds a better plan in a rightly guarded conception of induction, which considers the living facts of experience. The religion of Christianity is a life and it derives its principles from a real life. It can employ real comparison and just conjecture. It cannot throw itself into the arms of a mechanical theory of the world, but it accepts real external things and is not to be misled into an illusive idealism. For it the theories of physical life cannot determine all life, and its world cannot be a world of chance but one of purpose, of an unfolding purpose of God. No theory of mind which impairs spiritual reality is acceptable to it. In its truth no conception of society which endangers the soul is possible. It uses, however, true ideals of the things in the world, of the interests of mind, of the plans of life, and of the values of society.

With a high standard of truth, personally expressed

in Christ, before it, Christianity has a conception of truth and life which gives it its own character. It cannot, therefore, become absolutistic, merge God into the world, injure freedom and virtually deny sin, as does absolutism. The ideality of the absolutist appeals to it, but it finds a deeper striving of inwardness in mysticism. But even mysticism gravitates to a negative position, to an absolute One, which injures the living God and Father of Christianity. Christianity is, therefore, not essentially absolutist or mystical in its idea of truth. It has real relations with a living verification of truth in a pragmatic world, but it must reject the uncertainty, the utilitarianism and the naturalism of pragmatism. In sympathy with the ideal of life, it nevertheless finds that neither the vital impulse, nor the God who is an outbursting of forces, can satisfy it. In closer affinity with the conception of a divine life in the world, it must, nevertheless, dissent from a philosophy of life which has no definite personal God, no divine-human Christ, no real appreciation of guilt and sin, no vital atonement, and no really Spirit-guided Church. It stands altogether aloof from the materialism and relativism of the newer realistic philosophy.

While Christianity is no philosophy, it bears within its life the implications and the truths which compel it to take these attitudes. It is neither materialistic nor philosophically idealistic, for it accepts real things but claims an ideal origin and purpose for the world. It is neither monistic nor purely pluralistic, but it wants a unity of origin and plan in a world of many things and persons. It is neither totally absolutistic, nor in any way relativistic. It emphasizes neither the intellect exclusively, nor feelings exclusively, nor the will exclusively, but rests on man's total nature. It uses intuition, but is not altogether intuitional or inspirational. It does not depreciate the body for the sake of the soul, and it does not condemn

the individual because of society. The aim of Christianity, as it works its way through succeeding ages of civilization and culture, is to correlate the discordant opposites in all the specific philosophies. Its unity is larger than that of mere logic, but it is not a harmony of indefinite desires and feelings. The mere consistency of any single system of thought is not the aim or fulfillment of Christian truth. It has its correlations and unities of thought and truth, but its life is larger. If difficulties of logic within any Christian system are criticized, they are only the result of the whole problem of knowledge. Professor Ladd, in discussing knowledge on its own basis, is willing to accept the criticism that he does not belong to any one school in the problem of knowledge, which is due to the vitality and difficulties of knowledge. But he finally says:³³ "Knowledge does not come by indisputable logic; truth is not revealed to those who will not seek, and pay its price; the path of right living is not all in the 'lime-light.'" Knowledge and life have never been compassed by any system. The fact that Christianity and its truth cannot be encased in any one philosophy, and that they are larger than logic, connects them with all real life and vital knowledge. The demand of standards and their use does not reduce Christianity to logic. It only aids in preserving revelation which is not to be corrected by logic. Christianity must and will create its systems of doctrine, but these are not philosophies in the true sense. Their principle is not reason. In them Christianity seeks to hold fast and defend its vital elements. If Christianity surrenders any of its vital elements it will become a mere human philosophy; if it maintains its essentials, its life and truth will again and again overcome the errors of time and lead mankind to a larger synthesis of all truth in Him, who is truly the Way, the Truth and the Life.

³³ "What Can I Know?" p. 307.

INDEX

INDEX

- Absolute, the, 16
 as truth, 172
 and God, 174
- Absolutism
 and personal immortality, 178
 and incarnation, 179
 and mysticism, 184
- Absolutist
 aim, 167ff.
 and Christianity, 167, 174
- Absolutists
 assert absolute wholeness, 172
 and individuality, 175ff.
- Accidental change, its difficulties, 111
- Accounts of the Gospels, 78
- Activism of Eucken, 277
- Adaptation, 115
 and pragmatism, 203ff.
- Ames,
 religion claims total life, 130
 subconsciousness not peculiar
 place of religion, 133
 on ideas as movements, 140
- Analogy, 61
 and conservation of energy, 62
 analyzed, 63ff.
 in religion and science, 65
 of man and God, 68
 and purpose, 69
 between Christianity and general history, 70
 in comparative religion, 72
 of faith, 175
- Ancestor worship, 73
- Animism, 73
- Anselm, 100
- Anthropomorphism, 68, 294
- Apologetics and mathematics, 35
- Aristotle
 and induction, 46ff.
 in Christian truth, 58
 gains new power in Christian truth, 58
- Aristotle—Continued.
 and purpose, 105
- Art, relation to religion, 10ff.
- Assyriology and analogy, 63
- Atomism, 94
- Atonement
 for community, 150ff.
 as speculative fact, 167
 according to Eucken, 293
- Augustine and Platonism, 99
- Authority in religion, 233
- Bacon formulated induction, 47
- Bergson, Henri, 17, 105, 109, 111, 244ff.
 his discussion of mathematics, 44ff.
 evolution and unity, 54
 on difficulty of sudden variation, 112
 on life, 124
 compared with Eucken, 243
 on life as mobility, 244
 on vital impulse, 245
 on duration, 245ff.
 on time, 246
 on matter and memory, 247
 on theory of knowledge, 248
 on intuition, 248
 on the intellect, 249
 and the Christian idea of life, 250
 opposition to intellect, 252
 on personality, 253
 on soul, 254, 262
 opposes psychology of phenomenism, 254
 on personality as continually created, 255
 and theism, 256, 263
 eliminates idea of rest, 256ff.
 his philosophy of change, 257
 no strong conception of eternity, 258

- Bergson—Continued.
 evolution as eternal, 258
 has partly phenomenal consciousness, 259
 lacks strong norms, 261
 has romantic pantheism, 263
 his Platonism, 263
 makes life greater than God, 263
 his God, life and action, 264
 and purpose, 264ff.
 on design, 265
 no place for over-ruling God, 266
- Berkeley's psychological idealism, 100ff.
- Biological supposition, 14, 104ff.
- Biology
 and the Unseen, 87
 its influence on the sciences, 104
 and purpose, 106ff.
 and philosophy, 107
- Boodin, Professor
 on truth as self realization, 206
 on judgment as a process, 206
 on utility as a criterion, 213
 on truth as result, 214
- Bosanquet, Professor, 175
 on the danger of sole application of quantity, 42ff.
- Boscovich, 94
- Brahmanism, 93, 188, 193
- Bradley, Professor
 truth as harmony, 168
 on the super-personal, 176
 on degrees of reality, 177
 doubts personal immortality, 178ff.
 on the reality in appearance, 179
 on relativity of good and evil, 183
- Buddhism, 93, 136, 188
- Burroughs, John, on mechanism, 98
- Burton, on sin, 120
- Butler's Analogy, 64
- Calvin, 58
- Carlyle, 146
- Catholicism, according to Eucken, 291
- Causal chain, 48ff.
- Cause in the Darwinian theory, 107ff.
- Centers, four, of discussion, 12ff.
- Certainty
 in mathematics, 32, 35
 in hypothesis, 85
- Chance, doctrine of, 77, 110
- Characteristic religion, 278
- Chemistry and the Unseen, 87
- Child mind, 127
- Christ
 and history, 71ff.
 as ideal in Christianity, 74
 and mysticism, 188
 on practical test of truth, 220
 calls for a valuation of himself, 222
- Christianity
 types of, 18ff.
 dogmatic ideal of, 19
 mystic conception of, 19
 voluntarist ideal of, 20
 communal idea of, 23
 eternal and temporal idea of, 24
 as vital knowledge, 45
 and inductive science, 53
 and inductive argument, 56ff.
 not necessarily deductive, 57
 and single controlling principle, 58
 and Aristotle, 58, 100
 history of, and general history, 70
 and ethical development, 75ff.
 and hypothesis, 82
 and criticism, 82ff.
 and a static universe, 93ff.
 and idealism, 99ff., 136
 can use mechanism, 97, 99, 103
 and naturalistic determinism, 117
 and heredity, 120
 and evolution, 121
 and life, 125
 demands objective revelation, 135
 a new humanity, 152
 and social betterment, 153

- Christianity—Continued.
 and socialism, 153ff.
 and social reform, 154
 and economic interests, 155ff.
 and the economic state, 157
 and the individual, 157ff.
 and philosophy of history, 158ff.
 and absolutist, 167
 and absolutism as to harmony, 173
 believes that truth is, 173
 and the infinite and absolute, 174
 and the intellectual ideal, 174ff.
 demands finite truth, 181
 seeks certainty for its message, 181
 denies that evil is partial, 182
 and mystic elements, 187ff.
 what it approves of in mysticism, 190ff.
 and conscience, 190
 and mysticism on the soul, 191
 and inner revelation, 191
 and passivity, 194
 and biological terms, 216
 and selection, 217
 and verification, 218ff.
 and satisfaction, 219ff.
 not merely intellectual, 220ff.
 and values, 222
 and pluralism, 224
 and development, 227
 demands fixity of truth, 229
 its transcendent ideas, 230
 and non-resistance, 230
 needs strong moral principles, 233
 and a limited God, 236ff.
 and Bergson's depreciation of matter, 251
 and spiritual life, 251ff.
 and spiritual experience, 253
 and Bergson's soul, 254ff.
 not fully satisfied with a philosophy of change, 257
 and eternity, 258
 and the intellectual side of man, 260
 and intuitionism, 260
- Christianity—Continued.
 approves of no movement without standards, 261
 and Eucken's idea of life, 279ff.
 and Eucken's anti-intellectualism, 280
 wherein it differs from Eucken, 284ff.
 cannot admit superiority of philosophy, 287
 Eucken's idea of, 288ff.
 denied as final religion by Eucken, 288ff.
 a specific and final message, 289
 cannot accept the Christ of Eucken, 298
 and realism, 307ff.
 a life, 312ff.
 no philosophy, 313
 uses all truths, 314
- Church
 Eucken's view of the, 289ff.
 Eucken's criticism of the, 290ff.
- Coe, Professor, psychology of religion, 128
- Communal idea of Christianity, 23
- Community claimed as central doctrine of Christianity, 150
- Comparative thinking, 13
- Comparative idea, 61ff.
- Comparative method in languages, 62ff.
- Comparative religion, 72ff.
- Comte, and sociology, 147
- Conjectural thinking, 13
- Conjectural scheme, 77ff.
- Conscience in Christianity, 190
- Consciousness,
 Christian, 52
 and brain states, 306
- Constant
 in induction, 50ff.
 and the human mind, 51
 as external, 51
 and religion, 52
 in each group of facts, 52ff.
- Continuity,
 mathematical, 39

- Continuity—Continued.
 problem of defining, 54ff.
 and religion, 55
 and a personal God, 56
 idea developed in the Nineteenth Century, 145
- Conventions in mathematics, 41
- Co-ordination in evolution, 113
- Cosmological proof, 33
- Creation
 and evolution, 122
 its relation to criticism and work in Eucken's philosophy, 276
- Creative thought according to Eucken, 273ff.
- Criticism, 83ff.
 in Eucken, 272ff.
 its relation and work in Eucken's philosophy, 276
- Culture and religion, 283
- Darwin, Charles, 47, 81
 and analogy, 61ff.
 repudiates design, 105ff.
 and idea of God, 106
 use of natural selection, 110
- Darwinism, 104, 145
 and pragmatism, 199ff.
- Deduction and Christianity, 57ff.
- DeLaguna,
 on pragmatism as Darwinism, 199
 on function of consciousness, 199ff.
 on happiness as separate from survival, 228
- Descartes, 31, 47, 100
 emphasizes thinking ego, 165
- Design,
 opposed by Darwin, 105ff.
 in Bergson's philosophy, 265
- DeVries, 112
- Dewey, Professor
 on Maeterlinck, 193
 on truth as experienced relation, 197
 on knowledge as set of changes, 201
 on ideas as attitudes of response, 203ff.
- Dewey, Professor—Continued.
 on thought as dependent upon actual conditions, 207
 on truth as within experience, 214
 on truth as experienced fulfilment, 215
 against Spencer's unknowable, 239
 against transcendent principle, 240
- Difference in science, philosophy and Christianity, 11
- Dogmatic ideal, 19
- Dominants, 115, 242
- Drummond, and analogy, 64
- Duration in Bergson's philosophy, 245ff.
- Ebbinghaus, Herman, 139
- Economic consideration in history, 146
- Entelechies, 242
- Energy
 and the divine will, 67
 and matter, 94
 and will, 95
- Entities in neo-realism, 300ff.
- Entropy, 93
- Environment
 and purpose, 115ff.
 must include ideals of mind, 117
- Epistemology, modern, 165ff.
- Error
 and truth, 168ff., 180ff.
 as finite appearance, 168
 grades of, 169
 partial truth, 170
 as isolation, 171
 in neo-realism, 305ff.
- Eternity and temporality of Christianity, 25
- Eucken, 17, 105, 267ff.
 on life, 124
 on naturalistic evolution, 227
 compared with Bergson, 243
 on pragmatism, 243
 on spiritual life, 267
 on life, its depth and compass, 268

Eucken—Continued.

- on life in its self-presence, 269
- on life and the thinkers, 269
- and intellectualism, 270
- on intuition, 270
- logical elements needed, 271
- on thought and life, 272
- on criticism, 272ff.
- on creative movement of thought, 273ff.
- on spiritual work, 274
- on the kingdom of the act, 275
- and the tasks of life, 275
- inter-relation of creation, criticism and work, 276
- his activism, 277
- on spiritual and cultural movements, 277
- on religion, 277ff.
- on universal religion, 278
- on historical religions, 278ff.
- seeks inwardness of life, 279
- his "Weltanschauung," 279
- as anti-intellectual, 280
- on life as super-human, 280ff.
- on religion as above man and divine, 281
- and spiritual reality, 282
- puts religion above culture, 283
- on religion as above the interests of society, 283ff.
- on personality, 284ff.
- and impersonalism, 285
- and definite standards of truth, 285ff.
- a romanticist, 286
- on authority, 286
- places philosophy above religion, 287
- on Christianity, 288ff.
- denies finality of Christianity, 288ff.
- on the Church, 289ff.
- criticism of the Church, 290ff.
- on dogmas, 290
- on Catholicism and Protestantism, 291
- on evil, 292ff.
- on atonement, 293
- on anthropomorphic elements in the atonement, 294
- on Jesus, 295

Eucken—Continued.

- doubts Godhead of Jesus, 296
- cannot find divinity in one person, 296, 297
- his Christ not that of Christianity, 298
- Euclid, 30
- Evidence, 78
- Evil
 - and good in absolutism, 181ff.
 - according to Eucken, 292ff.
- Evolution
 - and teleology, 108ff.
 - and progress, 109
 - and co-ordination, 113
 - and mimicry, 113ff.
 - and instinct, 114
 - and Christianity, 120ff.
 - and a personal God, 122
 - and creation, 122
 - and spiritual life, 122ff.
 - and man's spirit, 124
 - and pragmatism, 199
 - as eternal, 258
- Experience, 21, 41, 59, 78ff.
- completed as truth, 172
- in truth, 214
- Eye, the, in evolution, 110
- Facts and reasoning, 46
- Facts and induction, 48
- Faith
 - and mathematics, 29
 - in psychology of religion, 130
- Fechner, formula of, 37, 126
- Finalism and purpose, 266
- Finding of truth, 16, 163ff.
- Finite lost in infinite, 177
- Fichte and the ego, 101
- Fleming, 189, 190
- Force, see Energy
- Fortuitousness, 110
- Fox, 22
- Freedom
 - and pragmatism, 223
 - in neo-realism, 308
- Galileo, 47
- Galloway,
 - relation of art and religion, 10
 - religion needs cognitive aspect, 260

- Galton calculated regression, 110
 Geo-centric idea, 145
 Geometry,
 and thought, 30
 non-Euclidean, 37ff.
 of four dimensions, 38
 God
 proofs for, 33
 Christian conception of, 74
 and energy, 95
 and evolution, 122
 personality not guaranteed in
 absolutism, 167
 His personality denied, 176
 as reality, 177
 as the One in mysticism, 187
 of mysticism, 193
 as personality, 225
 and the finite self, 226
 guarantees virtues, 233
 finite in pragmatism, 235
 as self-limiting, 236ff.
 as limited, 237ff.
 the, of pragmatism, 241
 the, of Bergson, 256, 263
 in time and movement, 258
 as life and action in Bergson,
 264
 and neo-realism, 310
 Gods of wild tribes, 134
 Goethe, 149
 Good and evil in absolutism,
 181ff.
 Goodness of God and nature, 65
 Goodness as relative, 182
 Harmony as asserted by abso-
 lutists, 172
 Hartman, von, 95
 Hegel, 146, 152
 on mathematical formulas, 42
 and analogy, 69
 and idealism, 101ff.
 and the absolute, 102
 and Christian truths, 167ff.
 Hegelianism and sin, 167
 Herbart, 127
 Heredity, 118ff.
 and Christianity, 120
 History,
 general, and history of Christi-
 anity, 70
 History—Continued.
 theories of, 146
 and economics, 146
 philosophy of, and Christian-
 ity, 158ff.
 and personality, 159
 and incarnation, 159
 Hobhouse, Professor, 108
 on religion as deductive, 57
 on assumptions, 80
 on organic structure, 91
 denial of purposive causation,
 92
 on entropy, 93
 on evolution and purpose, 109
 Hoeffding, 139
 Homogeneity and heterogeneity,
 92
 Howison, 121
 evolution, man's question, 117
 opposed to cosmic conscious-
 ness, 122
 Humanism, 211
 Hume, 139
 and scepticism, 101
 definition of causes, 107
 and functional psychology, 126
 stimulates Kant, 165
 Huxley, 138
 re-formulates final cause, 106
 on epi-phenomenon, 136
 Hypothesis, 79ff.
 requirements of, 83ff.
 and certainty, 85
 in religion, 85ff.
 mental character of, 86ff.
 Idea and meaning, 172
 Idealism
 and Christianity, 97
 its danger to Christianity, 102,
 136
 Identity, law of, 61
 Immanence, injures a personal
 God, 102
 Immediate, the, in mysticism,
 187
 Immortality
 and absolutism, 178
 personal, and the universe, 179
 Impersonalism, 68

- Incarnation
 in philosophy of history, 159ff.
 and absolutism, 179ff.
 not explicable as appearance
 and reality, 180
- Individual, the, in Christianity,
 157ff.
- Individualism, 148ff.
 in religion, 22
 naturalistic, 149
- Individuality
 as the Universe, 175ff.
 in Bergson, 262
- Induction
 and the sciences, 48
 methods of, 49ff.
 its constant, 50ff.
 materialistic interpretation, 52
- Inductive claim, 46ff.
- Inductive science and Christian-
 ity, 53
- Inductive thinking, 13
- Industrial revolution, 147
- Industrial conditions, favor soci-
 ology, 147ff.
- Infinite, and God, 174
- Instinct and evolution, 114
- Intellect
 in truth, 16
 in Bergson's philosophy, 248ff.
 and space, 249
 its systems, 250
- Intellectual ideal and Christian-
 ity, 174
- Intellectualism in Eucken, 270
- Intuition
 and truth, 190
 in Bergson's philosophy, 248
 its danger, 259ff.
 in Eucken, 270
 its insufficiency, 270ff.
- Intuitionism and Christian truth,
 260
- James, Professor William, 127,
 128, 139
 on the will to believe, 141, 221
 on mystical states as knowl-
 edge, 184
 on origin of pragmatism, 196
 on leading, 208ff.
- James, Professor—Continued.
 on pragmatism as consequence,
 209
 on satisfaction, 210
 on truth as verification, 210
 on "the true" as expedient,
 212
 on practical value of theologi-
 cal ideas, 213
 on finite God, 235ff.
- Jesus,
 no social program, 156
 according to Eucken, 295
 divine character doubted, 296
- St. John
 and mysticism, 190
 Gospel of, and Bergson's idea
 of life, 250
- Joachim,
 on nature of truth, 170ff.
 his insoluble problem, 171
- Judgment
 analytic, 30
 synthetic, 30
 in pragmatism, 206
- Kant,
 treatment of mathematics, 30ff.
 and ontological proof, 33
 on purpose in the organic
 world, 70
 produces new wave of ideal-
 ism, 101
 and good will, 141
 formulates problem of knowl-
 edge, 165
 finds truth through logic, 165
- Kelvin, Lord, 94
- Kepler, 47
- Kingdom of God
 and the social point of view,
 155ff.
 the individual in the, 158
- Knowing and the knower, 186
- Knowledge
 in Bergson's philosophy, 248ff.
 and neo-realism, 301, 302
 and life, 314
- Ladd, Professor, on knowledge,
 314
- Lamarck, 116

- Lamprecht, 146
 Leading, process of, in pragmatism, 208ff.
 Leibniz, 34, 145
 on thinking centers, 165
 Lessing, 34
 Life,
 philosophy of, 17
 and secondary causes, 105
 and evolution, 123
 and Christianity, 125
 needs a purposive God, 240
 its new philosophy, 242ff.
 as mobility, 244
 and knowledge, 248
 Christian idea, 251
 its depth and fullness, 268
 and the thinkers, 269
 in its exaltedness, 269
 its tasks, 275
 Logic
 as limiting psychology, 208
 in Eucken's philosophy, 271ff.
 Logical ideas, 12
 Lyell, 48
- Maeterlinck, his pantheism, 193
 Magic, 73
 Malthus, 62
 Mansel, 44
 Man's place in the universe, 145
 Marx, 148
 Mathematics
 and modern sciences, 37
 and experience, 39ff.
 Mathematical continuity, 39
 Mathematical method of thinking, 29ff.
 Matter in Bergson's philosophy, 247
 Mayer, Dr. Robert, on transference of energy, 62
 McTaggart, on personal immortality, 178
 Mechanical and chemical view, 90
 Mechanical conception, 14
 Mechanical demand, 90ff.
 Mechanical view, its static character, 92
- Mechanism
 and cause, 91
 and material sequence, 91
 and living organisms, 91
 a complex assumption, 94
 and purpose, 96ff.
 usable by Christianity, 97, 99, 103
 and final purpose, 97
 and mind, 97
 its elimination, 98
 Memory, in Bergson's philosophy, 247
 Mendel's law, 118
 Merz, discussion of Kant, 31ff.
 Mill, John Stuart, 46ff.
 and causes, 107
 on God as not omnipotent, 235
 Mimicry and evolution, 113
 Mind,
 its immanence in the world, 97
 according to neo-realism, 303
 and environment, 304, 307
 Modes of thinking, 12ff.
 Montaigne, 145
 Moore,
 truth as desire and effort, 214
 on purpose in change, 239
 Moral proofs for God, 33ff.
 Mystic absorption, 184ff.
 Mysticism, 19
 its noetic quality, 184ff.
 and reflection, 185
 merges reason into intuition, 185
 as inner experience, 186
 finds truth in the soul, 186
 essence of, as Being, 186
 and God, 187
 and quietism, 187
 and the Immediate, 187
 and Christianity, 187ff.
 and St. Paul, 189
 and St. John, 190
 how far approved of by Christianity, 190ff.
 and Christianity, on the soul, 191
 as inner revelation, 191
 its subjectivism, 192
 and inner intuition, 192
 untrue to the individual, 192ff.

- Mysticism—Continued.
 and materialistic pantheism, 193
 and God, 193
 and passivity, 194
 Mythologism, 294
- Natural selection
 and purpose, 110ff.
 and pragmatism, 201ff.
- Natural theology, 35
- Naturalism in neo-realism, 304ff.
- Neo-platonism, 99, 101
- Neo-realism, 299ff.
 its relation to other philosophies, 300
 as world of manifold entities, 300ff.
 as pragmatic, 301
 opposes idealistic theory of knowledge, 301
 its explanation of mind, 303
 its naturalism, 304ff.
 its theory of truth and error, 305ff.
 on brain states and consciousness, 306
 materialistic in theory of truth and mind, 307
 and Christianity, 307ff.
 and freedom, 308
 has no place for the spirit, 309
 and morals, 309ff.
 and religion, 309ff.
 and moral values, 310ff.
 and morality, 311ff.
- Neo-vitalism, 242
- Newton, 47, 94
- Nietzsche,
 his cyclical universe, 93
 on brute force, 95
 against Christianity, 119
 and heredity, 119
- Nineteenth Century as social, 145
- Non-Euclidean, see Geometry
- Non-resistance, ideal of, 75
- Old Testament, 71ff.
- Ontological proof, 33
- Original sin, 66ff.
- Origin of religion, 133ff.
- Origin and the Darwinian interpretation, 134
- Orr, Professor James, compares Hume and James, 126ff.
- Ostwald, 94
- O'Sullivan, Dr. J. M.
 on Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry, 38
 on satisfaction in pragmatism, 210
- Paley, 106
 on the notion of species, 108
- Pantheism, materialistic, 193
- Parallelism in psychology, 137, 138
- Particulars in reasoning, 46
- Patten, Professor
 economic idea of Christianity, 152ff.
- Paul, St.
 on slavery, 156
 and mysticism, 189
- Passivity in mysticism, 194
- Peirce, Charles, 196
- Perry, 205
 on pragmatism as bio-centric philosophy, 204
 on neo-realism, 300
 on mind and nervous system, 304
 on mind and environment, 307
 on freedom, 308
 on morals, 309ff.
 on religion, 309ff.
 on morality, 311
 and relativism, 311
- "Personal idealism," 224
- Personalism, 198
- Personality, 225
 and God, 68
 its ultimates, 88
 in Bergson, 253
 as continually created, 255
 and Eucken, 284
- Philosophy and religion, 287
- Physico-theological proof, see Design, Purpose
- Physics, and the Unseen, 86
- Pitkin, Professor, on geometry, 40
- Plato and induction, 46

- Plato's idealism and mathematics, 31
- Platonism, 99
in Bergson, 263
- Poincaré, Professor, H. L.
on principles of geometry, 37
mathematics as definitions, 40
- Positivism and mathematics, 36
- Postulates
in mathematics, 41
and the soul, 42
- Practicability and moral postulates, 232ff.
- Pragmatic program, 196ff.
- Pragmatism, 17, 164
objects to epistemology, 165ff.
principle of, 196ff.
how to explain its vogue, 197
its real explanation, 198ff.
and evolution, 199
and variation, 201
and natural selection, 201ff.
and survival of the fittest, 202ff.
and adaptation, 203ff.
fundamentally biological, 204ff.
as psychological, 205ff., 217ff.
has no place for logic, 205ff.
as leading, 208
looking to consequences, 209
as satisfaction, 209ff.
and utility, 212, 213
and experience, 214
its results, 215ff.
its bearing on Christianity, 216ff.
and spiritual life, 218
and doctrine of values, 221ff., 222, 231
and freedom, 223
and pluralism, 224
too biological, 227ff.
its psychological material, 228
its undervaluation of ideas, 229
and workableness of truth, 229ff.
as agnostic, 231
and a finite God, 234ff.
denies power of determination in God, 238
and purpose, 239
- Pragmatism—Continued.
and Darwinian accidentalism, 240ff.
its God, 241
as related to vitalism, 243
- Pratt, on psychological nature of pragmatism, 208
- Predestination, 66, 224
- Probability, 77, 78
- Progress and Christianity, 24ff.
- Progress and evolution, 109
- Proofs for God, 33
- Protestantism according to Eucken, 291
- Providence, 66, 79
- Psychological investigation, 127
- Psychological point of view, 14
- Psychological solution, 126ff.
- Psychological test in pragmatism, 217ff.
- Psychology
and the Unseen, 87
and management, 128
and social life, 128
width of application, 128
and materialism, 136, 138
as parallelistic, 137, 138, 139
its physiological character, 137
and ethical concepts, 142
and logic, 142
and knowledge, 166
and pragmatism, 206ff.
- Psychology of religion, 128
its value, 129ff.
and origin of religion, 133
subjective, 134ff.
and theology, 143
- Purpose
and analogy, 69
and mechanism, 96
in things, 97
and life, 105
and biology, 106, 109
and evolution, 108
and freedom, 116
and heredity, 118
and meaning, 172
and pragmatism, 239ff.
in Bergson's philosophy, 264ff.
and God, 265
- Purposive cause, 92

- Pythagoras, 31
- Quantitative idea, and theology, 43ff.
- Quantitative thinking, 13
- Ranke, 146
- Rashdall
 on personality, 225
 on God as limited, 237
- Rational basis of religion, 32
- Rationalism, 22
- Real, the, greater than the good, 183
- Realism, the new, 18
- Realist realm, 299ff.
- Reality, 16
 in appearance, 172
 degrees of, 177
 as God, 177
- Reformers
 against Aristotle, 58
 as nominalists, 58
- Religion
 rational basis of, 32
 within the limits of reason, 34
 its constant, 52
 comparative, 72ff.
 not illusion, 129
 not fundamentally subconscious, 132
 origin of, 133ff.
 as fear, 139
 reduced to material antecedent, 140
 and social viewpoint, 149ff.
 and authority, 233ff.
 universal, 278
 historic, 278ff.
 as new content of divine life, 281
 above culture, 283
 above the interests of society, 283ff.
 and philosophy, 287
- Results of pragmatism, 216ff.
- Revelation, inner, 191
- Rosetta Stone, 63
- Rousseau, 144
- Rowland, Eleanor, 142
- Royce, 172
- Royce—Continued.
 social explanation of Christianity, 150ff.
 finds truth in completed experience, 171
 on the mystic and knowledge, 185
 on essence of mysticism, 186
- Russell, Bertrand,
 on mathematical entities, 41
 his theory of knowledge, 302ff.
- Salvation and nature, 66
- Satisfaction
 in pragmatism, 209ff.
 and Christianity, 219ff.
- Schelling and identity, 101
- Schiller,
 and humanism, 198
 on evolutionism in thought, 200
 on selection in knowledge, 202
 as against pure thought, 205
 truth as human, 211
 truth as ambiguous, 211, 232
 on finite God, 235
 on an indeterminate world, 238
- Schleiermacher, 139
 Christianity and other religions, 72
- Schopenhauer, 95, 172
- Science and the spiritual process, 282
- Scriptures, 59
- Selection and Christianity, 217
- Self deception and religious experience, 129
- Self, the, as enduring, 253
- Sense-content, how it becomes logical, 208
- Similarity, 61
- Simplicity of hypothesis, 83
- Sin, defined by Prof. Patten, 152
- Slavery, St. Paul on, 156
- Socialism, 148
 and Christianity, 153ff.
- Social reform and Christianity, 154
- Social viewpoint, 15
 and religion, 149
 and kingdom of God, 155

- Social trend, the, 144ff.
- Society,
forces of mind in, 87ff.
and religious interests, 283ff.
- Sociology, its use explained, 147
- Socrates, 46
- Soul
truth found in, 186
the real self, 186
in Christianity and mysticism,
191
in Bergson, 254, 262
- Sovereignty, divine, 59
- Spencer, 44, 73
- Spinoza, 138
and the mathematical method,
31
the father of parallelism, 100
depersonalized thinking, 165
his idea of personality, 176
identifies God and the world,
176
- Spirit of man and evolution, 124
- Spiritual experiences not mystic,
189
- Spiritual life above science, 282
- Spiritual life not only changing,
257
- Spiritual sciences, 104
- Starbuck, Prof., 128, 139
- Sub-conscious, the,
and religion, 130ff.
danger of, in religion, 131ff.
- Subjectivism of piety, 60
- Subjectivism in mysticism, 192
- Sufficiency of hypothesis, 84
- Super-personalism, see Impersonalism
- Super-personality and God, 176
- Survival of the fittest, 115
and pragmatism, 202ff.
- System of ideas complete as
truth, 172
- System and Christian truth, 175
- Teleological proof, see Design
and Purpose
- Theology
and quantitative thinking, 43
and psychology of religion, 143
- Thought, common character of, 9
- Thought and ends, 209
- Time in Bergson's philosophy,
246
- Transference of energy, its unity,
93
- Transmission of characters, 115
- Treason, and salvation, 151
- Trinity as intellectual movement,
167
- Truth
and thought, 15ff.
finding of, 16, 163ff.
formal character of, 163
as absoluteness, 164
search after, 164
the dilemma of, 166
and error, 168ff., 180ff.
degrees of, 168
and reality, 169
grades of, 169
partial error, 170
as expression of universe, 170
as connectedness, 170
as completeness, 170
needs error, 171
as complete, 173
makes men, 173
Christian, and system, 175
as experienced relation, 197
made true by events, 210
as ambiguous, 211, 232
as workableness, 212, 229ff.
as useful, 212
as within experience, 214
as only in situations, 215
standards of, in Eucken, 285ff.
according to neo-realism, 305ff.
- Tyndale, Professor, use of imag-
ination, 81
- Uniformity of nature, 53ff.
and religion, 55ff.
- Unity of the race and spiritual,
66ff.
- Universality and certainty in
mathematics, 32
- Universe, the, disregarding of
personal immortality, 179
- Unseen, the, in speculation, 87ff.
- Utilitarianism, 212
- Utility in pragmatism, 212ff.

- Validity of thought and truth, 163
- Values, doctrine of, and pragmatism, 222, 231
- Values, and Christianity, 222
- Variation,
slight and slow, 111
sudden, 111
along definite lines, 114ff.
in pragmatism, 201
- Venn on induction, 54
- Verification in Christianity, 218ff., 231
- Vinci, da, 47
- "Vital impulse," 245
- Vitalism, the older, 242
- Vitalist view, 242ff.
- Voluntarist ideal, 20
- Ward on teleological factors, 108
- Watson, Professor,
correlated variations, 111
his constructive realism, 177
- Weber, formula of, 37, 126
- Weissman, 118
- Wilberforce, Bishop, attacks evolution, 107
- Will and energy, 95
- Will to believe, 141
- Wolff, 34
- Work, according to Eucken, 274ff.
- Work, its relation to creation and criticism, in Eucken's philosophy, 276
- World-view and Christianity, 9
- Wundt, 127

Princeton Theological Seminary Libraries



1 1012 01197 0136

